Why EU promotion is at odds with successful crisis management: public relations, news coverage, and the Aceh Monitoring Mission. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 10, September 2012

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its accompanying Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions can be tools used to increase the international profile of the European Union. Nevertheless, CSDP missions garner little news coverage. This article argues that the very nature of the missions themselves makes them poor vehicles for EU promotion for political, institutional, and logistical reasons. By definition, they are conducted in the middle of crises, making news coverage politically sensitive. The very act of reporting could undermine the mission. Institutionally, all CSDP missions are intergovernmental, making press statements slow, overly bureaucratic, and of little interest to journalists. Logistically, the missions are often located in remote, undeveloped parts of the world, making it difficult and expensive for European and international journalists to cover. Moreover, these regions in crisis seldom have a thriving, local free press. Using the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) as a case study, the author concludes that although a mission may do good, CSDP missions cannot fulfil the political function of raising the profile of the EU.

spotlight europe #2013/03 – March 2013: The European Union and Russia at a Crossroads

The European Union and Russia are strategic partners – through their geographic situation, their common history, through social and economic obligations. Currently, the EU’s relations with Russia are under pressure for innovation. The EU’s ability to manoeuvre is hindered by the financial crisis, which has developed into a crisis of the Union’s political integration. For that reason, the EU’s relations with Russia depend on the Union’s ability to overcome the crisis and undertake reforms.

Strategic planning tools for European negotiators to defend their national interests in the Council of the European Union. EIPA Working Paper 2013/W/02

Summary. Negotiating in the Council of the European Union poses some challenges that are common to most international negotiations but there are other dimensions that are a lot more specific. In order to understand better the specific nature of negotiations on a European level and to develop some practical guidelines for European negotiators, it is important to situate European negotiations in the more general context of the theory on international relations and to remember that European negotiations are governed by the general principles which characterise the negotiation theory. This working document has three objectives; after having reminded ourselves of the fundamental principles that govern European negotiations, it aims to provide a general foundation, which in turn will be useful for preparing most negotiations within the Council. A series of practical recommendations will then be made in order to contribute to the strategic thinking of the negotiator responsible for defending the interests of his or her Member State within the Council.

Could European Governance Ideas Improve Federal-provincial Relations in Canada? EDAP 6/2013

Over the past seventeen years Canada has decentralized many social programmes, moving responsibility from the federal government to 13 provinces and territories through bilateral federal-provincial agreements. In contrast, the European Union (EU) has moved in the opposite direction, building pan-European approaches and establishing new processes to facilitate multilateral collaboration among the 28 EU member states. This has been done through a new governance approach called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Using a detailed case study − employment policy − this paper explores whether Canada could learn from OMC governance ideas to re-build a pan-Canadian dimension to employment policy and improve the performance of its intergovernmental relations system. Concrete lessons for Canada to improve decentralized governance are suggested: consolidating the different bilateral agreements; using benchmarking instead of controls in fiscal transfers; undertaking research, analysis, and comparisons in order to facilitate mutual learning; revitalizing intergovernmental structures in light of devolution; and engaging social partners, civil society and other stakeholders. Post-devolution Canada is not doing badly in managing employment policy, but could do better. Looking to the EU for ideas on new ways to collaborate provides a chance for setting a forward looking agenda that could ultimately result not only in better labour market outcomes, but also improvements to one small part of Canada’s often fractious federation.

The European Union and the Arms Trade Treaty: An Analysis of the EU’s Effectiveness in Multilateral Security Governance. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 3/2013

This paper examines the participation of the European Union (EU) in the multilateral negotiations of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Given the EU’s declared commitment to effective multilateralism and dedication to act as a global security provider, the paper analyses to what extent the EU can be seen as an effective actor in supporting and promoting the ATT. It is argued that overall the EU was an effective player during the multilateral negotiations on the ATT, but the degree of its effectiveness varied along different dimensions. The EU was relatively successful in the achievement of its goals and in maintaining external cohesion during the negotiations, but it scored relatively low in its efforts to commit other major players to sign up to the ATT. The high level of institutional cooperation and the convergence of EU member states’ interests facilitated the EU’s effectiveness in the ATT negotiations, whereas the international context proved to be the major constraining factor.

The sultans of swing: Turkey's stance on integration with the European Union. OSW Point of View Number 37, November 2013

Despite a rise in anti-EU rhetoric and a growing assertiveness in Ankara’s relations with Brussels, Turkey will continue to seek closer integration with the European Union in the coming years. The current stalemate in the accession process has been a source of irritation to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. Nonetheless, a complete collapse of accession talks would be a much worse scenario for the ruling AKP party. Currently, the government is primarily interested in keeping the negotiation process alive, rather than hoping to gain full membership any time soon. Erdoğan’s government will likely seek to continue the accession talks because the AKP is acutely aware of their importance for the country’s domestic politics, for its the economy, and – although to a lesser extent – for Turkey’s international standing. The opportunity to capitalise on this process will encourage the Turkish government to avoid crises in its relations with the EU, or to at least mitigate the impact of any potential diplomatic fallouts.

The ENP in practice - the European Union's policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova one year after the publication of the Strategy Paper. OSW Point of View, June 2005

Clear qualitative changes have taken place in relations between the European Union and its Eastern neighbours over the past year. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been playing a significant part in the context of these changes. In the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, which are the countries interested in enhancing co-operation with the EU, the ENP has provided a formula that allows taking steps to implement this objective. The ENP has also contributed to "outlining an alternative" to Belarus' current self-isolation. However, the ENP has first of all given a clear message to Russia by specifying the EU's interests and objectives concerning Eastern Europe. The ENP has clearly stated that the EU wants to build democracy and a free market in those countries, and has signalled that the European Union intends to discuss the issues concerning the countries directly with them, and not through Moscow's offices.

The Enlarged European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: Problems and Solutions. OSW Point of View, October 2003

The EU enlargement is scheduled to take place in 2004. After this date, it should be a priority for the EU to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy towards its nearest neighbours, i.e. countries bordering the Member States, which cannot join the EU in the nearest future due to their location or weaknesses of their political and economic systems. There are at least three reasons for this. Firstly, good relations with neighbours will underlie the broadly understood security of the Community. Relations with the nearest neighbours will determine both military security of the EU (including the combating of terrorism) and its ability to prevent other threats such as illegal migration, smuggling, etc. Secondly, good economic relations with neighbours may contribute to the Member States' economic growth in the longer term. And finally, the EU's ability to develop an effective and adequate policy towards its nearest neighbours will demonstrate its competence as a subject of international politics. In other words, the EU will not be recognised as a reliable political player in the global scene until it develops an effective strategy for its neighbourhood.

Rosja wobec Unii Europejskiej: kryzys „strategicznego partnerstwa.” Prace OSW 22/2006. = Russia vs. the European Union: a “strategic partnership” crisis. OSW Study 22/2006

Contrary to both parties' declarations on the development of their "strategic partnership", relations between Russia and the European Union have over recent years been in a state which could be called one of crisis. However, this does not mean that there have been no achievements in EU-Russian relations. The key problem is that Russia and the European Union have essentially different perceptions, aspirations and interests, which causes mistrust and disillusionment. This crisis is manifested in mutual criticism by the two sides, regularly recurring tensions and cooling of relations ("minicrises"), and especially by the "virtualisation of co-operation", i.e. concealing a lack of substantive content in many key areas under increasingly rich layers of dialogue and co-operation.

Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap? OSW COMMENTARY No. 154, 2014-12-01

The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia's flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this integration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to reconstruct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key importance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic consequences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia's dominance over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?

No other choice but co-operation. The background of Lithuania's and Latvia's relations with Belarus. OSW Commentary No. 99, 2013-01-04

For years now Belarus has been a key economic partner for Lithuania and Latvia. These two Baltic states have well-developed port infrastructure and thus provide what are the geographically closest and also the cheapest exit to international outlets for Belarusia’s petrochemical and chemical industries, both of which are export-oriented. As a result, the transit of Belarusian goods is one of the major sources of income for the state budgets of the two countries. This economic interdependence has affected the stance Riga and Vilnius take on Minsk at the EU forum. When in February and March 2012 the Council of the European Union was resolving the issue of imposing economic sanction on selected Belarusian companies which backed Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, this triggered a discussion on what the point of such measures is and on possible economic losses in Lithuania and Latvia. As a result of firm resistance from Latvia (which was backed by Slovenia), the Council removed those companies which were most strongly engaged in co-operation with Latvian partners from the list of those to be covered with economic sanctions. Lithuania, which is more critical of the political situation in Belarus, did not express its official opposition to the sanctions. Despite some differences in the policies adopted by Riga and Vilnius, it turned out that Minsk could count on strong support from local business groups in both of these countries, as these groups fear impediments in this highly profitable co-operation and also retaliation from the Belarusian government. The existing economic bonds mean that neither Vilnius nor Riga have any other choice but to co-operate with Belarus. They must therefore adopt a carefully balanced policy towards Minsk. At the same time, being EU member states, they do not officially deny that a problem exists with the violation of human rights by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. It is for this reason that the governments of Latvia and Lithuania will be interested in maintaining the status quo in relations with Minsk. On the other hand, Belarus in a way also has no other choice but to use the ports in Lithuania and Latvia, and this will prevent it from excessively escalating tension in relations with these two countries.