Saving Libya from itself: What the EU should do now. CEPS Commentary, 1 December 2014

Libya is experiencing its worst security crisis since the 2011 revolution, the intervention by NATO and the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. While the parliamentary elections of July 2012 provided “an opportunity to put the transition process back on track and overcome the recent political polarisation”, the country has instead descended into a deadly vortex of conflicting political groups, militias and tribes. Without the international political attention that is needed to save it from itself, Libya is now breaking up in at least two parts. Each faction is under pressure to declare its allegiance to the two biggest rival coalitions: either ‘Libyan Dignity’ or ‘Libyan Dawn’. The authors suggest that EU action take place on three levels.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

The Energy Performance of Buildings: Promises Still Unfulfilled. Egmont Paper No. 78, May 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY All observers agree that energy efficiency must be the cornerstone of any serious EU energy strategy. In this general context, the EU building sector is critical. It represents about 40% of EU final energy consumption (residential houses, public/private offices, commercial buildings, etc.) and approximately 36% of EU CO2 emissions. This is massive. The EU has certainly not been inactive in this field. The Energy Performance in Buildings Directive 2002/91/EC (EPBD) was the first and the main instrument to address the problem of the energy performance of buildings. It has established numerous principles: a reliable methodology which enables the calculation and rating of the energy performance of buildings; minimum energy performance standards for new buildings and existing buildings under major renovation; energy performance certificates; regular inspection of heating and air-conditioning systems; and, finally, quality standards for inspections and energy performance certificates. They were strengthened in 2010 by the recast Directive 2010/31/EU. This directive also introduces a decisive concept for the development of the building sector: ‘nearly zeroenergy buildings’. In 2012, the new Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU dealt with other aspects. In the building sector, three of them are particularly important. They concern: (1) the establishment of long-term strategies for mobilizing investment in the renovation of the national building stocks; (2) the introduction of energy saving schemes for ‘designated’ energy companies with a view to reducing consumption among ‘final consumers’ by 1.5% annually; and (3), as an option, the setting up of an Energy Efficiency National Fund to support energy efficiency initiatives. This paper also briefly examines the different instruments put in place to disseminate information and consultation, and the EU funding for energy efficiency in buildings. Results, however, have remained limited until now. The improvement of the energy performance of buildings and the rhythm of renovation remain extremely weak. Member States’ unwillingness to timely and properly transpose and implement the Directives continues despite the high degree of flexibility permitted. The decentralized approach chosen for some specific aspects and the differentiation in the application of EPBD standards between Member States do not appear optimal either. Adequate financial schemes remain rare. The permanent deficit of qualified and trained personnel and the inertia of public authorities to make the public understand the stakes in this domain remain problematic. Hence the need to take new initiatives to reap the benefits that the building sector is meant to bring.