EU enlargement to the Balkans: will the leopard change its spots? EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

As the leadership of the European Union hands over the baton to a new management this autumn, will the winds of change blow also through the cobwebs of the EU’s enlargement agenda? Jean-Claude Juncker – the incoming President of the European Commission – has already promised to put the gearbox of further EU widening in neutral for the next five years of his mandate, and has designated the Austrian Johannes Hahn as Commissioner for the re-baptised portfolio of now European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, instructing him to focus on the Union’s political and economic ties with Southern and Eastern Europe, and in particular with the Balkans. Such an approach in the field of enlargement – once crowned the jewel of EU foreign policy – has all the appeal of a damp rag but does not necessarily depart from the festina lente strategy of the recent past. Inside the Union, political appetite and public support for expansion have been fizzling since Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and were then severely curbed in the context of the on-going crisis by growing fears of importing organised crime and migrants from the Balkans. Juncker’s logic of consolidation sounds depressingly similar to what it supposedly replaces and incidentally, it also fits neatly with the unambitious and inward-looking mantra favoured at present in discussions at all levels on the future of European integration, more generally. With the 28-member block determined to catch its breath in the immediate time period, and given that even the forerunner countries in the Balkans – that is, Montenegro and Serbia – will realistically need more than five years to complete their accession talks, what priorities should guide Commissioner Hahn, soon to be Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations – when they get down to business on 1 November?

The twenty-first century needs a better G20 and a new G7+. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/13, 14 November 2014

During the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 was hastily elevated to ‘global economic steering committee’. In the early stages of the crisis, the G20 was an effective forum for crisis containment. As the crisis has eased, however, the G20 has lost both direction and momentum. Governments and policymakers have felt less need to act in unison and have rather refocused on their national agendas, as is their duty and primary function. However, effective global governance is needed permanently, not just in crisis times. It is desirable to have more representative and effective global governance that, among other things, is equipped to prevent crises rather than just react to them. In an environment of rapid change in global patterns of trade and wealth creation, a new revamped (but highly representative) grouping should be created within the G20, to provide leadership on key economic policy matters. Euro-area members should give up their individual seats in this G7+, allowing room for China and other large emerging economies. Without euro-area countries taking such a step, it would be impossible to reconcile effectiveness and representation in this new G7+, which would take charge of decision making on global economic imbalances, financial and monetary issues. All existing G20 countries, including individual euro-area countries, would however remain in the G20, which could potentially expand and would remain the prime forum for discussion on all remaining matters at global level.

Iceland’s contested European Policy: The Footprint of the Past - A Small and Insular Society. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 01/2013

Introduction. Iceland’s domestic politics and foreign affairs are undergoing drastic changes. After an economic crash, violent protests on the streets of Reykjavik for the first time in Iceland’s history contributed to the defeat of the government. The party system has been altered. A turn has been taken towards Europe after the United States left the island, first by closing its military base in 2006 and then by its clear stance not to assist the country in its economic difficulties. The former close relations with the superpower are unlikely ever to be restored. The EU membership application is placing severe constraints on political parties which are split on the issue and has put in jeopardy the unity of the first left majority in the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. Society is in a state of flux after an unprecedented economic downscaling and the collapse of almost its entire financial sector – which had boomed rapidly beginning in the mid-1990s. The credibility of politicians, the parliament and the media is in ruins. Iceland’s smallness and its location on the geographical map – one could also say the geopolitical map – has had a profound influence on its domestic and foreign affairs. Iceland is closely associated with the other Nordic states and has adopted many of their domestic characteristics, with important exceptions. On the other hand, the country has come under American influence – geographically, it straddles the Mid-Atlantic rift – and has limited its participation in the European project. Its geographical location in the middle of the North Atlantic has led to a notion that the country’s culture is unique and should be protected by all available means. Politicians continue to play the ‘nationalistic uniqueness’ card with considerable success even though the country has been swept by globalization. Rapid modernization (which only really began in the Second World War with British and American occupations) and sudden engagement with the outside world (which only extended to the general public in the last quarter of the twentieth century) are still slowly but steadily making their mark on the country’s foreign policy. The country’s political discourse and foreign policy still bear the hallmark of the past, i.e. of a small and insular society This paper will address the political developments in Iceland since the 2008 economic crash and place it in a historical context. The aim is to understand Iceland’s present foreign policy and, in particular, the highly contested decision by its government in 2009 to apply for membership of the European Union. The paper is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction and the concluding remarks. First, it starts by explaining the importance in Iceland of a political discourse based on the concept of independence which dates back to the historical narrative of the settlement period. This section will also examine Iceland’s close relations with the other Nordic states – despite important differences between it and the others. Second, the paper will analyse the importance of the party system, i.e. the dominance of the centre-right in Icelandic politics, and the changed nature of the system. Third, it examines how Iceland further distinguishes itself from the other Nordic states in many important features. Fourthly, the paper analyses the country’s three main foreign policy priorities in the post-war period, i.e. extensions of the Exclusive Economic Zone, firm defence arrangements with the US and membership of NATO, and the drive for better market access for marine products – including a partial engagement in the European project. Fifthly, the paper examines how the country’s smallness, in terms of its central administrative capacity, has affected its domestic and foreign policy-making. The concluding section summarizes the main findings concerning the political and historical obstacles that the Social Democratic Alliance faces in its hard-fought battle to change the country’s European Policy.

The US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change: Can the G2 make a difference? CEPS Commentary, 26 November 2014

This Commentary finds that the US-China joint declaration on climate change, issued following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing on November 12th, is undoubtedly an important announcement by the two global economic giants responsible for emitting over 30% of the world’s GHG emissions. As such, it needs to be seen as important and relevant – a very positive development towards a new global climate change agreement in Paris. It is a challenge to those that have announced their pledges and are seen as capable of doing more, as well as to those that have not yet announced their intentions. It shows the importance and success of the UN climate change conference in Warsaw last year, when the decision was made that all Parties should announce their commitments by the first quarter of 2015. It also represents a total breakdown of the Kyoto Protocol-style separation in climate change negotiations between countries into Annex 1 and non-Annex 1, with China signalling that it is taking on the leadership role that comes with being a great economic power. In broader terms, it shows that there is scope for cooperation between the two main economic actors, even in the face of competition in other spheres. It is also a challenge to the EU, which was a leader and needs to show that there is a benefit in maintaining its leadership. Finally, agreements are deemed historic only by history. This one is important, and a potential game-changer, on the face of it. But it needs to live up to its promise. There is sufficient uncertainty for us to withhold final judgement and see if its promise materialises through implementation. But, as sober a judgement as we must make on such important matters, this announcement certainly gives us great hope that it is possible to do what needs to be done, and we must wholeheartedly welcome and applaud it.

Any changes? The future agenda of Sweden's security policy. OSW Commentary No. 126, 28.01.2014

Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on defence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish parliament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite concerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future direction of the country’s security and defence policy. It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a greater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.

Russia's strategy towards Moldova: continuation or change? OSW Commentary No. 74, 2012-04-19

The nomination on 21 March of deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin to the newly created post of the Russian president’s special representative for Transnistria and to the post of co-chairman of the Russian-Moldovan intergovernmental committee demonstrates the Kremlin’s increased interest in Moldova, and may be a sign of a change in Russia’s strategy towards this country. Other developments which may suggest a revival of Russia’s policy towards Moldova include the appointment on 5 April of Farit Mukhametshin as Russia’s new ambassador in Chisinau. Mukhametshin is a high-ranking official who had previously headed the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), which is one of the major instruments of Russia’s ‘soft power’ policy towards the post-Soviet states. The Kremlin’s growing interest in Moldova has further been confirmed by an unprecedented visit by Russia’s defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov to Transnistria on 12 April, and a two-day visit by Dmitri Rogozin to Chisinau and Tiraspol on 16–17 April.

European Neighbourhood Policy Package - Conclusions for the Eastern Partners. OSW Commentary No. 78, 2012-05-25

In 2011 the European Union began a process aimed at reforming its policy on the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. The change in circumstances in neighbouring countries following the Arab Spring, along with the lack of significant progress regarding Eastern Europe’s integration with the EU, formed the main driving force behind this process. The prime objective of the changes to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was the need to introduce new incentives for partner countries to modernise and integrate more closely with the EU Another aim was to increase the flexibility of EU instruments (by adapting them to the specific context of each partner state). One year later, on 15 May 2012, the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published the European Neighbourhood Policy Package which reported on the progress made in the implementation of the ENP over the preceding year and set out the aims and Action Plans for 20131. An analysis of the outcomes of changes made to the EU policy towards Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus suggests that the aim of the revision was aimed more at addressing the changing political landscape in the region rather than at the implementation of a substantial reform of the neighbourhood policy. The ENP is largely based on bureaucratic procedures (the negotiation of bilateral agreements, the implementation of support programmes). These have only a limited capacity to bring about lasting change in the region, as has been exemplified by the deterioration of democratic standards in a number of countries; this was highlighted in EU’s own reports. This problem is particularly clear in the case of Ukraine; until recently it was seen as the leader of European integration but is now raising much concern due to a deterioration in the state of democracy there. EU instruments have a limited influence on the situation in Eastern Partnership countries and the region’s significance on the EU’s agenda is falling (the priority is now given to counteracting the economic crisis, and prominence in the neighbourhood policy has been given to the Southern Mediterranean). In response to this EU policy on Eastern Europe will focus to a larger extent on technical and sectoral cooperation.

Designing a Genuine EMU: Which "Unions" for EU and Eurozone? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 34/2014

The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.

The Economics of EU Railway Reform. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 8/2004

The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.

The Sustainability Impact of the EU Emissions Trading System on the European Industry. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 17/2007

This BEEP explains the mechanism of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and explore into its likely sustainability impact on European industry. In doing so, it focuses on energy-intensive industries like cement, steel and aluminium production as well as on the emerging hydrogen economy. The BEEP concludes that at the moment it is still very inconsistently implemented and has a fairly narrow scope regarding greenhouse gases and involved sectors. It may also give an incentive to relocate for energy-intensive industries. In its current format, the EU ETS does not yet properly facilitate long term innovation dynamics such as the transition to a hydrogen economy. Nevertheless, the EU ETS is foremost a working system that – with some improvements – has the potential to become a pillar for effective and efficient climate change policy that also gives incentives for investment into climate friendly policies.

Simulation of Land Use and Investment Behaviour under Different Policy Scenarios: Results of the extended farm/household model. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 27, July 2012

Factor markets are a central issue in analyses of farm development and of agricultural sector vitality. Among the different production factors, land is one of the most studied. Several studies seek to estimate the effect of government policy payments on land value or land rental prices. The studies mostly agree that government payments and other types of policy support are significant in explaining land prices and account for a large share of them. In October 2011, the European Commission published a new policy proposal for the common agricultural policy (CAP) up to 2020. The proposed regulation includes a shift from historical to regional payments. The objective of this paper is to provide an ex ante analysis of the impact of the new CAP policy instruments on the land market. In particular, the effect of the regionalisation of payments in Italy is examined. The analysis is based on the use of a mathematical programming model to simulate the changes in land demand for a farm in Emilia Romagna. The results highlight the relevance of the new policy mechanism in determining a change in land demand. Yet the effect is highly dependent on initial ownership of entitlements under the historical payment scheme.

Determinants to Leave Agriculture and Change Occupational Sector: Evidence from an Enlarged EU. Factor Markets Working Document No. 46, May 2013

The objective of this paper is to explore the determinants to leave agriculture and change occupational sector. We adopt a 3-step multivariate probit where we control for selection bias at two stages in the decisions to work and, at a later stage, exit agriculture. The analysis is based on the European Union Labour Force Survey data expanded with additional regional indicators. The main results suggest that younger individuals are more likely to leave farming activities, although the largest outflows of agricultural labour are mainly associated with the retirement of people. Self-employed and family workers are generally less likely to leave agriculture and those with low levels of educations are found to be significantly constrained in entering the non-farm economy. Moreover, labour market conditions at the regional level do matter for switching occupational sector. Differences in the results among the selected new member states and the EU-15 can be explained by the diverse production structures, suggesting different capacities to release and absorb labour.

Simulation Results on the Impact of Changes in the Main EU Policy Tools on Farm Investment Behaviour. Factor Markets Working Document No. 56, June 2013

This paper completes the comparative analysis of the investment demand behaviour, of a sample of specialised arable crop farms, for farm buildings and machinery and equipment, as a function of the different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support, in selected European Union Member States. This contribution focuses on their quantitative interdependence calculating the relevant elasticity measures. In turn, they constitute the methodological tool to simulate the percentage expected change in average net investment levels associated to the implementation of the, recently proposed and currently under discussion, reductions in the Pillar I Direct Payments disbursed under the Common Agricultural Policy. Evidence suggests a statistically significant elastic and inelastic relationship between both types of subsidies and the investment levels for both asset classes in Germany and Italy, respectively. An elastic dependence of investment in farm buildings on decoupled subsidies exists in Hungary while changes in the level of coupled payments appear to translate into less than proportional changes in the demand for both farm buildings and machinery and equipment in France. Coupled payments appear to influence the UK demand for both asset classes in an elastic manner while decoupled support seems to induce a similar effect on investment in machinery and equipment. Since the currently discussed Common Agricultural Policy reform options imply, almost exclusively, a reduction in the level of support granted through Direct Payments, simulated effects were expected to reveal a worsening of the farm investment prospects for both asset types (i.e., a larger negative investment or a smaller positive one). The actual evidence largely respects this expectation with the sole exception of investment in machinery and equipment in France and Italy reaching smaller negative or larger positive levels irrespectively of the magnitude of the implemented cuts in Direct Payments.

Geographic Scope Under Conditions Of Confined And Connected Change: The Case Of Telefónica (Spain). ACES Working Papers, 2012

Traditional explanations of MNE geographic scope formation fit somewhat uncomfortably with recent empirical and theoretical work in IB that suggests (1) that wholesale (not just gradual) changes in MNE geographic scope may be more frequent than previously thought, and (2) that managers’ responses to a world increasingly characterized by random, unpredictable change are more experimental and less optimizing in nature than assumed in most models of international expansion. In this paper we draw from studies portraying industries as dynamic networks, and from the literature on managerial cognition to provide a complementary explanation of the evolution of MNE geographic scope that reconciles the insights of traditional IB models with the questions raised by more recent studies in this field. We illustrate the proposed model through a detailed account of the internationalization process of Telefonica, the Spanish telecommunications company.

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE WTO: INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION. CEPS Policy Brief No. 28/December

Overview. Questions about the interface between the multilateral climate regime embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and the multilateral trade regime embodied in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have become especially timely since the fall of 2001. At that time, ministerial-level meetings in Marrakech and Doha agreed to advance the agendas, respectively, for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and for negotiations on further agreements at the WTO. There have been concerns that each of these multilateral arrangements could constrain the effectiveness of the other, and these concerns will become more salient with the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. There are questions about whether and how the rights and obligations of the members of the WTO and the parties to the Protocol may conflict. Of particular concern is whether provisions in the Protocol, as well as government policies and business activities undertaken in keeping with those provisions, may conflict with the WTO non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment. The WTO agreements that are potentially relevant to climate change issues include many of the individual Uruguay Round agreements and subsequent agreements as well. The principal elements of the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly relevant are its provisions concerning emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, enforcement, and parties’ policies and measures. In combination, therefore, there are numerous potential points of intersection between the elements of the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO agreements. Previous studies have clarified many issues, as they have focused on particular aspects of the regimes’ relationships. Yet, some analyses suggest that the two regimes are largely compatible and even mutually reinforcing, while others suggest that there are significant conflicts between them. Those and other studies are referenced in the ‘suggestions for further reading’ section at the end of the paper.1 The present paper seeks to expand on those studies by providing additional breadth and depth to understanding of the issues. The analysis gives special attention to key issues on the agenda – i.e. issues that are particularly problematic because of the likelihood of occurrence of specific conflicts and the significance of their economic and/or political consequences. The paper adopts a modified ‘triage’ approach, which classifies points of intersection as (a) highly problematic and clearly in need of further attention, (b) perhaps problematic but less urgent, and (c) apparently not problematic, at least at this point in time. The principal conclusions are that: · The missions and objectives of the two regimes are largely compatible, and their operations are potentially mutually reinforcing in several respects. · Some provisions of the multilateral agreements that may superficially seem at odds are not likely to become particularly problematic in practice. · ‘Domestic policies and measures’ that governments may undertake in the context of the Protocol could pose difficult issues in the context of WTO dispute cases. · Recent WTO agreements and dispute cases acknowledge the legitimacy of the ‘precautionary principle’ and are thus consistent with the environmental protection objectives of the Protocol. · The relative newness of the climate regime creates opportunities for institutional adaptation, as compared with the constraints of tradition in the trade-investment regime. · The prospect of largely independent evolutionary paths for the two regimes poses a series of issues about future international regime design and management, which may require new institutional arrangements. In sum, the present paper thus finds that although there are some areas of interaction that are problematic, the two regimes may nevertheless co-exist in relative harmony in other respects –more like ‘neighbours’ than either ‘friends’ or ‘foes’, as Krist (2001) has suggested.