Paris Climate Agreement 2015 – EU needs to ensure ‘signal’ and ‘direction’. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/08/October 2014

Summary. Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change are expected to agree on a new international climate agreement applicable to all countries from 2020 at the Paris climate summit in December 2015. This Policy Brief investigates the possible role of the European Union (EU) towards the 2015 Paris climate agreement. It argues for renewed efforts by the EU at coalition building with progressive developing countries, leadership by example and a more prominent, complementary role of individual EU member states. It also argues for a Paris agreement that provides a strong “signal” and “direction”, and discusses what this may entail.

Addressing the immediate needs of the Greek banks. CEPS Commentary, 31 July 2015

Based on a detailed calculation of the recapitalisation requirements of the Greek banks, we find that the sector needs an infusion of capital, but that the level largely depends on the stringency of the capital requirements applied. An expedient quick fix to comply with the minimum capital requirements could be achieved by a bail-in of existing creditors under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of around €5 billion, leaving only €6 billion needed for re-capitalisation. If the ‘Cypriot’ standard is applied, however, the required re-capitalisation would be €15 billion. A ‘generous’ approach, which takes into account the phasing in of the new more-stringent capital requirements until 2018, would imply a re-capitalisation of €29 billion (or more bailing-in of creditors). The re-capitalisation should be undertaken preferably by the EIB, the EBRD or the new Greek investment fund, rather than via loans from the ESM to the Greek government.

Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank? CEPS Special Report No. 122, 25 November 2015

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) will be responsible for the resolution of banks in the euro area from 1 January 2016. However, the resources of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) at the disposal of the SRB will only gradually be built up until 2023. This paper provides estimates of the potential financing needs of the SRF, based on the euro area bank resolutions that actually occurred between 2007 and 2014. We find that the SRF would have been asked to put a total amount of about €72 billion into these failing banks, which is more than the target for the SRF (€55 billion) but less than the amount the SRF could draw on, if the ex-post levies are also taken into account. As this sum would have been required over eight years, the broad conclusion is that bridge financing, in addition to the existing alternative funding, would only have been needed in the early years of the transition.

Why Belgium Needs a Special Operations Command. Security Policy Brief No. 70, April 2016

The setting up of a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) constitutes a key element of the ongoing Belgian defence reforms. This Policy Brief aims to put the present demand for special operations forces in its historical context and engage in the discussion on how to structure and employ this special instrument of policy. Building on the legacy of the paracommando regiment, the future Belgian SOCOM constitutes a critical capability within an adaptive force structure. This new entity must be able to deliver results in a variety of unconventional missions that require high readiness, intellectual flexibility and maximum discretion or surprise. At the same time, special operations forces do not constitute a substitute for having a comprehensive security policy. They function best when used as force multipliers alongside other instruments of power towards joint effect. As the proverbial tip of the spear, they must lead the way for Belgian defence regeneration in general.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.