Is there a way out of the Polish pickle? EPIN Commentary No. 31/22 January 2016

Poland is making headline news again. This time, however, not in a role of Central European Wunderkind surfing the economic crisis, but for reasons to be less proud of. Ever since the Prawo and Sprawiedliwość (PiS, a member of European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament) government took power after the elections in November, Poland has experienced political turmoil and is now facing accusations that the rule of law is in danger. This constitutes a major challenge for the European Union and for its other member states, which are looking for ways to deal with a recalcitrant state that makes a rapid U-turn on democratic fundamentals and takes any criticism hysterically. This is not the first time that the organisation has had to deal with such a case, yet solutions have not yet been found. Hungary is a case in point. And now Polish leaders too seem convinced about the virtues of the concept of illiberal democracy. Which prescription should the EU use to buck the trend and what are the potential side-effects?

Creating Stability: National Preferences and the Origins of European Monetary System. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.9, December 2000

This essay compares the preferences of France, Italy, and Britain on the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979, especially the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which stabilised nominal exchange rates. My claim is that the different conclusions reached by the governments (France and Italy in, Britain out) cannot be explained by economic circumstances or by interests, and I elaborate an intervening institutional variable which helps explain preferences. Deducing from spatial theory that where decisionmakers `sit' on the left-right spectrum matters to their position on the EMS, I argue that domestic constitutional power-. sharing mechanisms privilege certain actors over others in a predictable and consistent way. Where centrists were in power, the government's decision was to join. Where left or right extremists were privileged, the government's decision was negative. The article measures the centrism of the governments in place at the time, and also reviews the positions taken by the national political parties in and out of government. It is intended to contribute to the growing comparativist literature on the European Union, and to the burgeoning literature on EU-member-state relations.