What distinguishes the euro crisis from a ‘normal’ financial crisis? CEPS Commentary, 6 November 2012

This Commentary attempts to discern the distinguishing features between the present euro crisis and the financial crisis brought on in the US by the subprime lending disaster and the ensuing collapse of banks and other financial institutions in 2007-08. It finds that whereas the US was able to bring its crisis to an end by socialising the dubious debt and stabilising its valuation so that it could migrate to other investors capable of bearing the risk, this pattern can be only partly repeated in the eurozone, where both debt socialisation and a return to normal risk assessment are more problematic.. It concludes, nevertheless, that the crisis should now abate somewhat given that most risk-averse institutions have by now sold their holdings of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt and especially in light of the ECB’s assurances that it will not allow the euro to disintegrate.

Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal Market for services. Research Papers in Law, 6/2007

Introduction. The internal market for services is one of the objectives set by the founding fathers of the EC back in 1957. It is only in the last ten-fifteen years, however, that this aspect of the internal market has seriously attracted the attention of the EC legislature and judiciary.1 With the exception of some sector-specific directives dating back in the late ‘80s, it is only with the deregulation of network industries, the development of electronic communications and the spread of financial services, in the ‘90s that substantial bits of legislation got adopted in the field of services. Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court) left the principles established in Van Binsbergen back in 1973, hibernate for a long time before fully applying them in Säger and constantly thereafter.2 Ever since, the Court’s case law in this field has grown so important that it has become the compulsory starting point for any study concerning the (horizontal) regulation of the internal market in services. The limits inherent to negative integration and to the casuistic approach pursued by judiciary decisions have prompted the need for a general legislative text to be adopted for services in the internal market. This text, however, hotly debated both at the political and at the legal level, has ended up in little more than a complex restatement of the Court’s case law. It may be, however, that this ‘little more’ is not that little. In view of the ever expanding application of the Treaty rules on services, promoted by the ECJ (para. 1),3 the Directive certainly appears to be a limited regulatory attempt (para. 2). This, however, does not mean that the Directive is a toothless, or useless regulatory instrument (conclusion: para. 3).

Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean: Diagnosis and Prospects. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2013

The global financial crisis, which started in the summer of 2007 and deepened in the aftermath of the Lehman failure in September 2008, has led to a virtual collapse in economic activity and increased financial volatility worldwide. For the developing countries, the main channel of transmission has been a drop in external transactions, such as trade, financial and capital flows, and remittances. The emerging economies in the southern and eastern Mediterranean have also faced declining economic activity, although there seems to be considerable variation in the relative magnitude and timing. Most of these economies have shown a delayed but more lasting response to the crisis, driven mostly by their close trade and investment ties with the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This book explores the fiscal, monetary and financial effects of the crisis in the region and provides an in-depth analysis of the fiscal, monetary and banking policies in the post-crisis era, the viability of their exit strategies and the future of reforms in the region. These analyses not only provide a comprehensive comparison between the countries but also provide a solid basis for assessing future economic and financial developments and reforms in the region.

The G20 financial reform agenda. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/11, September 2014

Five years ago, the declarations of the G20 in landmark leaders’ summits in London and Pittsburgh listed specific commitments on financial regulatory reform. When measured against these declarations, as opposed to the surrounding rhetorical hype, most (though not all) commitments have been met to a substantial degree. However, the effectiveness of these reforms in making global finance more stable is not so far proven. This uncertainty on impact mirrors the absence of an analytical consensus on the 2007-08 financial crisis itself. In addition, unintended consequences of the reforms are appearing gradually, even as their initial implementation is still unfinished. At a broader level, the G20 has established neither an adequate institutional infrastructure nor a consistent policy vision for a globally integrated financial system. This shortcoming justifies increasing concerns about economically harmful market fragmentation. One key aim should be to make international regulatory bodies more representative of the rapidly-changing geography of global finance, not only in terms of their membership but also of their leadership and location.