The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): China’s new multilateralism and the erosion of the West. Security Policy Brief No. 63, April 2015

China will launch a new development bank for Asia later this year, called the AIIB. 58 countries worldwide have already applied to become founding members, including numerous Western nations. This policy brief argues that the AIIB constitutes an important international development, as it reflects a new geopolitical reality and marks a new turn in China’s practice of multilateralism. It also looks critically at the European uncoordinated response to the AIIB, and what it tells about Europe’s shrinking role in the world.

Hybrid Hysteria. Security Policy Brief No. 64, June 2015

Is “hybrid” about to replace “comprehensive” as the favourite container notion of the Brussels foreign policy community? They might not be so different, in fact. Both a hybrid and a comprehensive approach mean the integrated use of a broad range of instruments of external action towards the achievement of a foreign policy objective. It’s just that the hybrid approach put into practice by Russia today seeks to achieve rather less friendly aims than the EU’s own comprehensive approach. The hybrid approach is the comprehensive approach gone over to the dark side of the force.

Considering DPRK [North Korea] Regime Collapse: Its Probability and Possible Geopolitical and Security Consequences. Security Policy Brief No. 66, August 2015

Both the EU and its member states are in a period of rethinking security strategy to adapt to contemporary challenges both in the European region and beyond, including Northeast Asia. In this Security Policy Brief, Mason Richey discusses what difficulties and risks a North Korean regime collapse would pose, the likelihood that it will occur sooner rather than later, and how Europe will be affected by such a scenario.

From Survival to Revival: The Riga Summit 2015 and the revised ENP. Egmont Security policy Brief No. 65, July 2015

With the European Parliament’s July report on the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) calling on the Commission to ‘go back to basics’, this article argues that such a move would be counter-productive and that instead, the ENP needs to move towards the future and break away with the historical elusiveness of this overarching policy. The Riga Summit serves as an illustration of what will not suffice if the EU is to strengthen or even maintain its role in its neighbourhoods. The revision of the ENP is described as 3Dimensional process which needs to yield a concrete and forward-looking new ENP. The recommendations put forth herein map out what a truly revised ENP would entail.

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The implementation of the Gender Perspective in the EU civilian and military missions: Leadership wanted. Security Policy Brief No. 67, October 2015

Fifteen years have passed since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, through which time the EU has grown as a security actor. The keys to produce a change in implementing gender mainstreaming in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are well known by member states; the EU and external implementation reports1 are repeated again and again, but real change requires real willingness on the part of member states, and leadership.

The EU-China Bilateral Investment Agreement: Between High Hopes and Real Challenges. Security Policy Brief No. 68, February 2016

In 2012, negotiations over an EU–China bilateral investment agreement were launched to fully tap into the potential of bilateral investments. This policy brief gives an overview of the current negotiation process and argues that the high hopes advanced politically and economically in the agreement must be weighed against the many challenges and obstacles the negotiations face, regarding current events in EU–China relations, in global trade and investment regimes, and the limits of EU competencies. Strategically, the agreement could be important, as it offers the potential to strengthen the EU’s global economic relevance. This brief concludes that there is much to gain if the EU follows a coordinated approach and remains mindful of these (potential) obstacles.

The Global Strategy – reinvigorating the EU’s multilateral agenda?. Security Policy Brief No. 69, March 2016

The EU’s effective multilateralism doctrine is hardly a defining characteristic of the international system of today. While established multilateral structures are far from reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century, multilateral practices remain dominant in most parts of the world. Multilateralism, however, carries a different meaning to different actors. Emerging powers have become increasingly assertive in promoting their own multilateral approach and now set the pace in international affairs. The EU remains, nonetheless, well-placed to respond to this challenge through a revision of its multilateral agenda.

Why Belgium Needs a Special Operations Command. Security Policy Brief No. 70, April 2016

The setting up of a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) constitutes a key element of the ongoing Belgian defence reforms. This Policy Brief aims to put the present demand for special operations forces in its historical context and engage in the discussion on how to structure and employ this special instrument of policy. Building on the legacy of the paracommando regiment, the future Belgian SOCOM constitutes a critical capability within an adaptive force structure. This new entity must be able to deliver results in a variety of unconventional missions that require high readiness, intellectual flexibility and maximum discretion or surprise. At the same time, special operations forces do not constitute a substitute for having a comprehensive security policy. They function best when used as force multipliers alongside other instruments of power towards joint effect. As the proverbial tip of the spear, they must lead the way for Belgian defence regeneration in general.

Information Guide: Security and Defence

A guide to Security and Defence within the European Union and in the wider Europe, with hyperlinks to sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites

ICT for growth: a targeted approach. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/10, June 2012

This Policy Contribution assesses the broad obstacles hampering ICT-led growth in Europe and identifies the main areas in which policy could unlock the greatest value. We review estimates of the value that could be generated through take-up of various technologies and carry out a broad matching with policy areas. According to the literature survey and the collected estimates, the areas in which the right policies could unlock the greatest ICT-led growth are product and labour market regulations and the European Single Market. These areas should be reformed to make European markets more flexible and competitive. This would promote wider adoption of modern data-driven organisational and management practices thereby helping to close the productivity gap between the United States and the European Union. Gains could also be made in the areas of privacy, data security, intellectual property and liability pertaining to the digital economy, especially cloud computing, and next generation network infrastructure investment. Standardisation and spectrum allocation issues are found to be important, though to a lesser degree. Strong complementarities between the analysed technologies suggest, however, that policymakers need to deal with all of the identified obstacles in order to fully realise the potential of ICT to spur long-term growth beyond the partial gains that we report.

Castles in the sand: Mali and the demise of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. CEPS Commentary, 28 January 2013

The threat posed by the crisis in Mali is direct, multidimensional and without regard to geographical proximity or historical and colonial heritage, writes Giovanni Faleg. France’s solitary intervention in Mali and the EU’s absence there raise two important questions for the future of the EU’s supposedly ‘Common’ Security and Defence Policy. The first has to do with the crisis itself; its nature and the threat posed by the terrorist groups and militias that are being countered by French armed forces. The second concerns the causes and implications of yet another example of the EU’s inability to take responsibility for security matters in its neighbourhood and beyond.