The German reaction to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict- shock and disbelief. OSW Commentary No. 132, 03.04.2014

The crisis in Ukraine and the Russian intervention have brought about a situation in which it is necessary for Germany to make decisions and take action. No one in Berlin was prepared for this nor did anyone want this to occur. The effect of this is that the government has adopted a clearly critical stance on Russia, albeit in tandem with cautious diplomatic moves; it has given its consent to limited sanctions on representatives of the Russian elite, and has disapproved of economic sanctions. On the other hand, voices have been heard in the political debate in Germany not only warning of the catastrophic consequences of a deterioration in German-Russian relations but also those in fact expressing understanding for the Russian reaction. Although it is typical above all of the business circles engaged in Russia and the authors of Germany’s Ostpolitik to downplay the Kremlin’s moves, political parties and the German public are divided over how Germany should respond to Moscow’s policy, and this dispute will worsen. Berlin will take a whole array of actions to de-escalate the conflict, since the imposition of radical political and economic sanctions on Russia would also have a strong adverse effect on Germany. As regards sanctions, Germany would not only sustain economic losses, but they would also undermine the ideological foundations for the still popular vision for Germany’s strategy towards Russia in which great emphasis is laid on a strong “respect for the EU’s most important neighbour and its interests”.

The Paradoxes of Moldovan Sports. An insight into the nature of the Transnistrian conflict. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Mutual relations in the area of sports, which in contemporary international contacts often not only reflect the true nature of political relations but sometimes even affect them, can be a valuable contribution to the analysis of this conflict’s nature. Why did the Transnistrian government, despite the use of anti-Moldovan rhetoric, agree to Transnistrian athletes representing Moldova during the Olympics and in other international competitions? Why does it accept the presence of sports teams from both banks of the Dniester playing in the same leagues? Why does Transnistria, despite being much smaller, predominate in many sports? How is it that Sheriff Tiraspol, the flagship football club of the business and political circles controlling Transnistria, managed to win the Moldovan championship ten times in a row and is the main source of players for Moldova’s national team? Does sport really ‘know no borders’ or perhaps the border on the Dniester is different than seems at first sight?

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

Niemcy wobec wieloletnich ram finansowych unii Europejskiej na lata 2014-2020. Uwarunkowania i interesy. Raport OSW, pazdziernik 2011. = Germany and the multiannual financial framework of the European Union for the period 2014-2020. Considerations and interests. OSW Report, October 2011

No abstract.

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.