Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank? CEPS Special Report No. 122, 25 November 2015

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) will be responsible for the resolution of banks in the euro area from 1 January 2016. However, the resources of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) at the disposal of the SRB will only gradually be built up until 2023. This paper provides estimates of the potential financing needs of the SRF, based on the euro area bank resolutions that actually occurred between 2007 and 2014. We find that the SRF would have been asked to put a total amount of about €72 billion into these failing banks, which is more than the target for the SRF (€55 billion) but less than the amount the SRF could draw on, if the ex-post levies are also taken into account. As this sum would have been required over eight years, the broad conclusion is that bridge financing, in addition to the existing alternative funding, would only have been needed in the early years of the transition.

Completing the Banking Union: Deposit Insurance. CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, 3 December 2015

It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. So far, however, agreement has been reached in the EU on only the first two of these functions. The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is an innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function.

Banking Union as a Shock Absorber: Lessons for the eurozone from the US. CEPS Paperback, December 2015

This book illustrates how the structure of the US banking market and the existence of federal institutions allowed regional financial shocks to be absorbed at the federal level in the US, thus avoiding local financial crisis. The authors argue that the experience of the US shows the importance of a ‘banking union’ to avoid severe regional (national) financial dislocation in the wake of regional boom and bust cycles. They also discuss the extent to which the institutions of the partial banking union, now in the process of being created for the euro area, should be able to increase its capacity to deal with future regional boom and bust cycles, thereby stabilising the single currency.

Relaunching the European Retail Finance Market: Comments on the Commission's Green Paper. ECRI Commentary No. 20, 15 December 2015

The European Commission’s Green Paper on retail financial services, published on December 10th, provides valuable insights into the possible benefits of a single market, as well as the obstacles to its development and the possible remedies. While a greater diversity of products within countries could have a positive impact on both consumers and providers, it is also important to highlight that it could contribute to more effective macroeconomic policies at European level. The development of such a single market for Europe where consumers can confidently purchase more profitable financial products abroad necessitates the establishment of a European body along the lines of the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), or at least the establishment of closer European supervisory cooperation and enforcement. A framework for the digitalisation of financial services should not only focus on mitigating specific types of risk, such as cyber insecurity, lack of privacy and financial exclusion, but it should also continue to maintain a “space of creation” for innovative financial firms.

Greece is solvent but illiquid. What should the ECB do? CEPS Commentary, 15 June 2015

There is one feature of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece that is widely misunderstood, namely the effective debt burden of the country’s government. Since the start of the crisis, its sovereign debt has been subjected to several restructuring efforts

Should the ‘outs’ join the European banking union? Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/03 February 2016

For political reasons, European Union member states’ opinions on joining banking union range from outright refusal to active consideration. The main stance is to wait and see how the banking union develops. The wait-and-see positions are often motivated by the consideration that joining banking union might imply joining the euro. However, in the long term, banking union’s ultimate rationale is linked to cross-border banking in the single market, which goes beyond the single currency. This Policy Contribution documents the banking linkages between the nine ‘outs’ and 19 ‘ins’ of the banking union. We find that some of the major banks based in Sweden and Denmark have substantial banking claims across the Nordic and Baltic regions. We also find large banking claims from banks based in the banking union on central and eastern Europe. The United Kingdom has a special position, with London as both a global and European financial centre. We find that the out countries could profit from joining banking union, because it would provide a stable arrangement for managing financial stability. Banking union allows for an integrated approach towards supervision (avoiding ring fencing of activities and therefore a higher cost of funding) and resolution (avoiding coordination failure). On the other hand, countries can preserve sovereignty over their banking systems outside the banking union.

Banking crisis yet again and how to fix it. CEPS Commentary, 15 February 2016

Almost out of the blue, a combination of diverse factors has elicited a run on bank stocks and junior and senior debt, raising the spectre of a renewed systemic bank crisis within the European Union. The policy response cannot come from the European Central Bank but, instead, must consist of regulatory responses capable of dispelling the uncertainty over future prudential capital requirements while also temporarily suspending the rules on state aid cum bail-in that had ignited the crisis.

The United States dominates global investment banking: does it matter for Europe? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2016/06, March 2016

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the market share of US investment banks is increasing, while that of their European counterparts is declining. We present evidence that US investment banks are on the verge of taking over pole position in European investment banking. Meanwhile, since 2015, Chinese investment banks have overtaken American and European investment banks in the Asia-Pacific market. Credit rating agencies and investment banks are the gatekeepers of the capital markets. The European supervisory institutions can effectively supervise the European operations of these US-managed players. On the political side, we suggest that the European Commission should continue to view its, albeit declining, banking industry as a strategic sector. The Commission, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England should jointly develop a strategic agenda for the EU-US Regulatory Dialogue. Finally, corporates rely on investment banks to issue new securities. We recommend that the big European corporates should cherish the (few) remaining European investment banks, by giving them at least one place in otherwise US- dominated banking syndicates. That could help to avoid complete dependence on US investment banks.

Is there a need for additional monetary stimulus? Insights from the original Taylor Rule. CEPS Policy Brief No. 342, April 2016

Central banks in the developed world are being misled into fighting the perceived dangers of a ‘deflationary spiral’ because they are looking at only one indicator: consumer prices. This Policy Brief finds that while consumer prices are flat, broader price indices do not show any sign of impending deflation: the GDP deflator is increasing in the US, Japan and the euro area by about 1.2-1.5%. Nor is the real economy sending any deflationary signals either: unemployment is at record lows in the US and Japan, and is declining in the euro area while GDP growth is at, or above potential. Thus, the overall macroeconomic situation does not give any indication of an imminent deflationary spiral. In today’s high-debt environment, the authors argue that central banks should be looking at the GDP deflator and the growth of nominal GDP, instead of CPI inflation. Nominal GDP growth, as forecasted by the major official institutions, remains robust and is in excess of nominal interest rates. They conclude that if the ECB were to set the interest rate according to the standard rules of thumb for monetary policy, which take into account both the real economy and price developments of broader price indicators, it would start normalising its policy now, instead of pondering over additional measures to fight deflation, which does not exist. In short, economic conditions are slowly normalising; so should monetary policy.

European Union Bailouts and Credibility. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 4, October 2015

Since the Great Recession started, there have been eight bailouts to EU Member States, which approximate cost to the EU has been of around 380 billion euros. The aim of this paper is to analyze the legal-constitutional issues that this major bailing out operation has brought about. The conclusion is that the EU was not only ill-prepared from an economic perspective to make bailouts; it was also ill-prepared from a constitutional perspective as well, above all if one understands law, as this paper does, as a credibility device. Absent further reforms and clarifications, the current EU system of bailout governance may be prone to generate important credibility problems in the future.

The Business Models and Economics of Peer-to-Peer lending. ECRI Research Report No 17, May 2016

This paper reviews peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, its development in the UK and other countries, and assesses the business and economic policy issues surrounding this new form of intermediation. P2P platform technology allows direct matching of borrowers’ and lenders’ diversification over a large number of borrowers without the loans having to be held on an intermediary balance sheet. P2P lending has developed rapidly in both the US and the UK, but it still represents a small fraction, less than 1%, of the stock of bank lending. In the UK – but not elsewhere – it is an important source of loans for smaller companies. We argue that P2P lending is fundamentally complementary to, and not competitive with, conventional banking. We therefore expect banks to adapt to the emergence of P2P lending, either by cooperating closely with third-party P2P lending platforms or offering their own proprietary platforms. We also argue that the full development of the sector requires much further work addressing the risks and business and regulatory issues in P2P lending, including risk communication, orderly resolution of platform failure, control of liquidity risks and minimisation of fraud, security and operational risks. This will depend on developing reliable business processes, the promotion to the full extent possible of transparency and standardisation and appropriate regulation that serves the needs of customers.

The effectiveness of the European Central Bank’s Asset Purchase Programme. Bruegel Policy Contribution issue 2016 10 June 2016

Since the end of 2014, inflation has been at or very close to zero. With very little ability to move the actual interest rate further into negative territory, the ECB has resorted to unconventional measures. The latest of these includes a programme to purchase corporate bonds, which started on 8 June 2016.