When the rising dragon sees fading stars: China's view of the European Union. CEPS Special Report No. 73, 29 November 2012

This CEPS Special Report gives an overview of China’s perceptions of the EU and the protection of Chinese investments in Europe since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis, especially since the more concrete talks in late 2011 on possible financial support from China. Although the top leadership of the communist party of China (CPC) changed in its recent handover, the perceptions described in this paper are likely to remain the same, just as the main tenets of China’s foreign policy are unlikely to change in the near future. The report argues that while the EU’s image has suffered greatly from the sovereign debt crisis and the way it has been handled, there is room to improve China’s view of Europe and for the EU to maintain a relatively strong negotiation position towards China.

The Arab Spring: A Litmus Test for the EU’s Women’s Rights Policy in the Euro-Mediterranean Area? Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Paper 1/2013

The promotion of women’s rights is described as a priority within the external action of the European Union (EU). As a result of the Arab Spring uprisings which have been ongoing since 2011, democracy and human rights have been pushed to the forefront of European policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean region. The EU could capitalise on these transformations to help positively reshape gender relations or it could fail to adapt. Thus, the Arab Spring can be seen to serve as a litmus test for the EU’s women’s rights policy. This paper examines how and to what extent the EU diffuses women’s rights in this region, by using Ian Manners’ ‘Normative Power Europe’ as the conceptual framework. It argues that while the EU tries to behave as a normative force for women’s empowerment by way of ‘informational diffusion’, ‘transference’ ‘procedural diffusion’ and ‘overt diffusion’; its efforts could, and should, be strengthened. There are reservations over the EU’s credibility, choice of engagement and its commitment in the face of security and ideological concerns. Moreover, it seems that the EU focuses more intently on women’s political rights than on their social and economic freedoms.

Od demokracji "wirtualnej" ku europejskiej: Geneze i konsekwencje przelomu politycznego w Moldawii. Prace OSW 32/2009. = From "virtual" to European democracy - the origins and consequences of the political breakthrough in Moldova. OSW Study 32/2009

2009 may become a turning point in the history of post-Soviet Moldova. The country’s political class and society are faced with a fundamental choice. On the one hand, if the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, which has governed the country since 2001, remains in power, this would mean a consolidation of the authoritarian rule of the party leader Vladimir Voronin, perpetuation of the superficial nature of democratic institutions and a continuation of the manoeuvring between the European Union and Russia (with the increasing risk of falling into the latter’s exclusive zone of influence). On the other hand, the take over of political power by the opposition parties creates an opportunity for Moldova to resume building a democratic, pluralistic political system based on the rule of law and to develop closer links with the European Union within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Eastern Partnership.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

Svodboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene. OSW Commentary No. 56, 2011-07-04

Even though the national-level political scene in Ukraine is dominated by the Party of Regions, the west of the country has seen a progressing increase in the activity of the Svoboda (Freedom) party, a group that combines participation in the democratically elected local government of Eastern Galicia with street actions, characteristic of anti-system groups. This party has brought a new quality to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, as it refers to the rhetoric of European anti-liberal and neo-nationalist movements, and its emergence is a clear response to public demand for a group of this sort. The increase in its popularity plays into the hands of the Party of Regions, which is seeking to weaken the more moderate opposition parties (mainly the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc). However, Svoboda retains its independence from the ruling camp. This party, in all likelihood, will become a permanent and important player in Ukrainian political life, although its influence may be restricted to Eastern Galicia. Svoboda is determined to fight the tendencies in Ukrainian politics and the social sphere which it considers pro-Russian. Its attitude towards Russia and Russians, furthermore, is unambiguously hostile. In the case of Poland, it reduces mutual relations almost exclusively to the historical aspects, strongly criticising the commemoration of the victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s (UPA) crimes. This may cause tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations, where they are affected by decisions made by local governments controlled by the Svoboda Party.

Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election. OSW Commentary No. 89, 2012-07-12

After two and a half years under President Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the state the country’s economy is currently in and the direction it has been developing in. There has also been a significant drop in stability and social security with the general public increasingly feeling that the government has little interest in their problems. Only 16% of Ukrainians believe that the current government has performed better than their predecessors, although overall confidence in both the ruling party and the opposition remains low. Nonetheless, falling support for the president and the Cabinet does not seem to have translated into greater popularity for the country’s opposition parties; these currently enjoy the confidence of only a quarter of the electorate. The clear lack of credibility for politicians on either side of the political spectrum, coupled with an almost universal preoccupation with the bare necessities of life, has shifted the political processes in Ukraine further down the agenda for the majority of Ukrainians. Ukraine’s poor economic performance, which over the last two years has been addressed through a series of highly unpopular economic reforms, has resulted in a growing mood of discontent and increased civil activity, with the Ukrainian people reporting a greater willingness than ever to join protests on social issues. Most of them, however, have shown much less interest in political rallies. This is likely to stem from low levels of trust in the opposition and the general belief that opposition politicians are not a viable alternative to the current government. One may therefore assume that there will be little public scrutiny of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October, and that the likelihood of mass demonstrations during it is low. However, in the event of large-scale vote rigging and a dismissive response from the government, spontaneous unsanctioned rallies cannot be ruled out. What is more likely, however, is a series of protests after the elections, when the already difficult economic situation is further exacerbated by a predicted rise in the price of gas for Ukrainian households and a possible move to devalue the Ukrainian hryvnia.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

Ukraine in deadlock - What next? EPC Commentary, 12 February 2014

Some two months since Ukrainians took to the streets, a political solution to the standoff between the EuroMaidan protestors and the Ukrainian authorities remains out of reach, with the situation on the ground remaining volatile. As the clock ticks there is fear that further violence and instability could be on the horizon. Further turmoil risks Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with talk of division and calls for Moscow to intervene coming from a number of Party of Regions speakers. It also increases the likelihood of new security threats going beyond Ukraine’s border including refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, as the political crisis deepens, Ukraine’s economic situation becomes more perilous with the chances of default on its debts rising.

Citizenship in post-awakening Tunisia: power shifts and conflicting perceptions

With the passing of its new Constitution, Tunisia is rightly celebrated as the Arab state that has advanced the most in strengthening democratic rights provisions. The Constitution formally enshrines the progress Tunisia has made especially on women’s rights; the rights of expression and assembly; freedom of the press; the rights of political parties; and the formal recognition of social and economic rights. However, the Constitution does not definitively resolve tensions between individual and religious rights. In order to maintain consensus between the differing opinions in Tunisia, the document remains ambivalent on the state’s precise role in protecting the ‘sacred’. Tunisia has made much progress, but the Constitution is likely to perpetuate rather than close debates over different concepts of rights.

The Ukrainian government's strategy towards the opposition. OSW Commentary No. 47, 2011-09-02

In recent months in Ukraine, there has been a toughening of measures targeted at opposition leaders, in particular the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the former interior minister Yuri Lutsenko. These two have been charged with abuses of office when in power. The way in which the criminal investigations are being conducted shows that these measures are actually meant to prevent the two politicians from conducting regular political activities, or at least to make this practically impossible for them. These actions are an element of the Party of Regions’ long-term strategy, as it tries during the pre-election period to eliminate Yulia Tymoshenko from political life and weaken or even destroy her powerbase. Similar measures, although to a more limited extent, are being taken against other opposition groups. These actions are leading to the lowering of democratic standards in Ukraine, although these are still much higher than in Belarus or Russia; this has been proved, among other things, by the militia’s more restrained behaviour towards the protesters, and the fact that abuses of the law during the current investigations have not yet slipped into actual violations. The Ukrainian opposition is fragmented and disorganised; even the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc is unable to stage a major campaign in defence of its leader. This allows the authorities to feel free to tighten their policy towards the opposition.

Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15

The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provided for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; however, as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up. As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s economic policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt. The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Regions promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the interests of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however, these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover, the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect public support for the ruling group. Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.