Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. OSW Report, December 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

Tug-of-war over EU's policy towards its neighbours. OSW Commentary No. 49, 2011-03-09

The revolutions in North Africa, the approaching end of the ‘strategic review’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiated by the European Commission, and the beginning of negotiations on the European Union’s new financial perspective, have intensified the debate among the member states and EU institutions on what policy the EU will adopt towards its neighbourhood in the future. The discussion concerns not only the shape of the ENP but also non-ENPI foreign policy instruments which Brussels applies towards neighbouring countries, such as the thematic instruments and loan support. Serious differences of opinion have emerged among the member states. The countries located in the southern part of the EU want Brussels to boost its policy towards North Africa, even at the expense of engagement in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Meanwhile Central European countries, including Germany, favour a more balanced approach towards both directions. The future shape of the ENP, as well as the EU’s other foreign policy instruments, will have a strong impact on the approach the EU adopts towards its Eastern neighbourhood. If some of the proposals are realised, especially the southern member states’ request to transfer some of the funds from the Eastern to the Southern neighbourhood, the chances of meeting the Eastern Partnership goals, such as the association of the partner countries with the EU and the creation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas, could be reduced.

Russia's policy in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. OSW Study 23/2006

The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are priority areas for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Russia mainly sees its influence in both regions as an important factor determining its international stature, and as a precondition for reinforcing its position as a world power. The Caucasus and Central Asia are also important for Russia from the points of view of economy, especially because of those area's natural resource wealth, and security, as both regions generate serious potential threats to the Russian Federation, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, the drugs trade and illegal migration.

Lessons for the EU from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crisis. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/01 • February 2013

Summary. From April until October 2012, China witnessed a series of public protests against the Japanese purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Besides providing further evidence of growing Chinese nationalism, this unrest is interesting for other reasons relevant to EU policy. The Beijing leadership, which is traditionally perceived as the only source of foreign policy decisions in China, faces a changing domestic constellation. Domestic opinion increasingly constrains Chinese foreign policy, and it becomes obvious that foreign policy decision-making in Beijing is not insulated from larger social developments. Even if foreign policy decisions in China are still made without direct input from civil society, the influence of social forces on Chinese foreign policies has to be taken seriously. The EU thus might want to reconsider its approach to China: as long as EU concerns about human rights are met with a rather uncompromising attitude by the Chinese political elites, Brussels should double its efforts to reach Chinese civil society.

American Attitudes on European Political Integration — The Nixon-Kissinger Legacy. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2007

This paper concentrates on the Nixon-Kissinger view of European political integration. In contrast with the mainstream position of the American Administrations during the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger was convinced that by encouraging European unity, the United States was in fact creating its own rival. The start of a new system of European foreign policy cooperation in 1970 was seen by Kissinger as a particularly important example of Europe’s attempt to challenge the American hegemony. Kissinger emphasized the need to maintain Western Europe in a subordinate role. Three main lines of action were pursued to keep the development of the European Community under control: maintaining bilateral contacts with key European allies, requesting a seat at the Community's decision-making table, and linking "obedient" European behavior to American military presence in Europe. The legacy of this policy still seems to influence the current American policy on the European Union. The Nixon-Kissinger term was, however, detrimental to rather than conducive of harmonious transatlantic relations. Tendencies to emulate it should therefore be discouraged.

Linking Policy and Practice:The Case of EU-UNICEF Cooperation on the Rights of the Child in Third Countries. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2013

This Working Paper offers detailed analysis of EU-UNICEF cooperation on the rights of the child in the European Union's external relations, in particular as regards linkages between the EU policy priorities and concrete actions to advance the protection and promotion of child rights in third countries. It addresses a number of crucial questions: how has the EU’s external policy on the rights of the child developed over the past decade, what were these developments influenced by and what role did UNICEF play in these processes; what is the legal and policy framework for EU-UNICEF cooperation in foreign policy and what added-value it brings; what mechanisms are used by the EU and UNICEF to improve child rights protection in third countries and what are the motivations behind their field cooperation. The study starts by examining the development of the EU’s foreign policy on the rights of the child and covers the legal basis enshrined in EU treaties, the policy framework, and the implementation instruments and then investigates the evolution of the EU’s relations with the United Nations. The paper focuses on the EU’s cooperation with UNICEF by looking into the legal and political framework for EU-UNICEF relations, the policy-oriented cooperation and joint implementation of projects on the ground in third countries. This section outlines the rationale behind the practical cooperation as well as the factors for success and obstacles hindering the delivery of sustainable results. Finally, the Working Paper concludes with suggestions on how EU-UNICEF cooperation could be further enhanced following recent developments, namely the 2012 EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on Human Rights as well as human rights country strategies.

Russia and Turkey - What does their partnership mean for the EU? EPC Policy Brief, 13 February 2015

Russia and Turkey have, over the past two decades, developed a very constructive relationship across a wide variety of policy areas. Imperial rivals during much of the Cold War, both countries have since then found common interests in matters of energy, trade and even defence. Besides their growing interdependence, it is hard not to notice the similarities between the two leaders of these countries, especially when it comes to the conspiracy mind-set of blaming dissent at home on foreign meddling. But does this mean that Turkey is fundamentally realigning its foreign policy strategy, away from the EU and towards Russia? And is the EU facing the emergence of an “axis of the excluded”? Not so according to Dimitar Bechev. In this Policy Brief, he argues that the ties between Russia and Turkey are driven by pragmatism and realpolitik. Contentious issues – such as the war in Syria - may be insulated from areas of overlapping interest, but deeper examination shows the glue holding the two countries together – their energy interdependence – is slowly weakening. Bechev believes the EU should take advantage of this divergence and try to (re-)anchor Turkey to its own initiatives and policies.

America’s global defence predicament – Why the Asia ‘rebalancing’ has little significance for European security. Egmont Paper No. 72, December 2014

Summary. This paper argues that the Obama Administration’s Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is mainly a rhetorical construct that has very little substantive effect on US security policy. In contrast to the widely held belief that a renewed emphasis on Asia would place meaningful restrictions on America’s willingness and ability to deal with European security problems there is little evidence to support this argument nor is it well-grounded conceptually. Furthermore, undue emphasis on this aspect of American policy has detracted attention from more important developments in Washington’s capacity to effectively project military power.

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

Germany's European Policy: A Constructivist Perspective. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.1, 1998

This paper sets out a constructivist analytical framework and applies it to post-reunification German policy towards the European Union. Although the structural constraints facing Germany shifted dramatically with the end of the Cold War and reunification, the direction of its European policy did not. The more powerful Federal Republic continued to press for deeper economic and political integration, eschewing a more independent or assertive foreign policy course. Neorealism, neoliberalism, and liberalism cannot adequately explain this continuity in the face of structural change; a constructivist account centered around state identity can. During and after reunification, German leaders across the political spectrum identified the Federal Republic as part of an emergent supranational community. This European identity, with roots in the postwar decades, drove Germany's unflagging support for deeper integration across the 1989-90 divide.

The “New World Order”: From Unilateralism to Cosmopolitanism. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, no. 04.1, 26 January, 2004

On January 26, 2004, the topic of the CES-Berlin Dialogues was "The 'New World Order': From Unilateralism to Cosmopolitanism." It was the second in a series of four meetings organized in Berlin under the med_title 'Redefining Justice.' The session was intended to examine successful and failed arenas of cooperation between the US and Europe; political misunderstandings and conscious manipulation; and models for future transatlantic relations. The presenters were Jeffrey Herf, Professor of History, University of Maryland, and Prof. Dr. Jürgen Neyer, Professor of International Political Economy, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, and Heisenberg Fellow of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the Freie Universität Berlin. Jeffrey Herf was asked to speak on the basic tenets of U.S. foreign policy in the administration of President George W. Bush, and Jürgen Neyer focused on the European view of international relations and conduct in the period since the invasion of Iraq.

America's global defence predicament-Why the Asia 'rebalancing' has little significance for European security. Egmont Paper No. 72, December 2014

This paper argues that the Obama Administration’s Asia ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ is mainly a rhetorical construct that has very little substantive effect on US security policy. In contrast to the widely held belief that a renewed emphasis on Asia would place meaningful restrictions on America’s willingness and ability to deal with European security problems there is little evidence to support this argument nor is it well-grounded conceptually. Furthermore, undue emphasis on this aspect of American policy has detracted attention from more important developments in Washington’s capacity to effectively project military power.

U.S. Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama. EUSpring Working Paper No. 1, April 2015

Throughout the twenty-first century the United States (U.S.) has attempted to balance its traditional national security interests, whilst also seeking to promote the long-term transformation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) towards democracy based on liberal values. With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks providing a catalyst for policy change, the U.S. has moved away from its twentieth-century policy of pursuing a regional status quo and instinctively balking at political change. Yet, the U.S. has not abandoned its reliance on autocratic regimes that cooperate on more immediate national security interests such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and the free-flow energy sources into the global market. Rather, U.S. democracy promotion in the MENA has become incremental by design and is characterized by its gradualist and often collaborative nature. U.S. foreign policy in the MENA is, therefore, depicted by a cautious evolutionary stance rather than supporting revolutionary shifts in power.

Hybrid Hysteria. Security Policy Brief No. 64, June 2015

Is “hybrid” about to replace “comprehensive” as the favourite container notion of the Brussels foreign policy community? They might not be so different, in fact. Both a hybrid and a comprehensive approach mean the integrated use of a broad range of instruments of external action towards the achievement of a foreign policy objective. It’s just that the hybrid approach put into practice by Russia today seeks to achieve rather less friendly aims than the EU’s own comprehensive approach. The hybrid approach is the comprehensive approach gone over to the dark side of the force.

Did quantitative easing affect interest rates outside the US? New evidence based on interest rate differentials. CEPS Working Document No. 416/January 2016

This paper explores the effects of non-standard monetary policies on international yield relationships. Based on a descriptive analysis of international long-term yields, we find evidence that long-term rates followed a global downward trend prior to as well as during the financial crisis. Comparing interest rate developments in the US and the eurozone, it is difficult to detect a distinct impact of the first round of the Fed’s quantitative easing programme (QE1) on US interest rates for which the global environment – the global downward trend in interest rates – does not account. Motivated by these findings, we analyse the impact of the Fed’s QE1 programme on the stability of the US-euro long-term interest rate relationship by using a CVAR (cointegrated vector autoregressive) model and, in particular, recursive estimation methods. Using data gathered between 2002 and 2014, we find limited evidence that QE1 caused the break-up or destabilised the transatlantic interest rate relationship. Taking global interest rate developments into account, we thus find no significant evidence that QE had any independent, distinct impact on US interest rates.