Castles in the sand: Mali and the demise of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. CEPS Commentary, 28 January 2013

The threat posed by the crisis in Mali is direct, multidimensional and without regard to geographical proximity or historical and colonial heritage, writes Giovanni Faleg. France’s solitary intervention in Mali and the EU’s absence there raise two important questions for the future of the EU’s supposedly ‘Common’ Security and Defence Policy. The first has to do with the crisis itself; its nature and the threat posed by the terrorist groups and militias that are being countered by French armed forces. The second concerns the causes and implications of yet another example of the EU’s inability to take responsibility for security matters in its neighbourhood and beyond.

Stosunki Rosja-NATO przed i po 11 wrzesnia. Dazenia Litwy, Lotwy i Estonii do integracji z NATO i UE a stosunki tych krajow z Rosja. Prace OSW 4/2002. = Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's aspirations to integrate with NATO and the EU in the context of these countries' relations with Russia. OSW Study 4/2002

Membership of NATO and the EU is a priority of the foreign policies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The main stimulus that drives these membership aspirations is the will to ensure the security of these countries and to ultimately separate them from the post-Soviet space. Additionally, the authorities of the Baltic States believe that membership of both these organisations will make their counties more attractive for Western investors. The way to implement these priorities is not only through consistent adjustments to the standards prevailing in NATO and the EU, but it also involves refusing to join the post-Soviet structures and seeking out states that are willing to strongly support the Baltic States aspirations. The implementation of this policy has resulted in the status of the Baltic States preparations for membership in both international structures being assessed as good, and they are reckoned to be realistic candidates for NATO and EU enlargement.

Europejska prespektywa Balkanow Zachodnich. Unia Europejska a Moldawia. Relacje Turcji z Unia Europejska. Prace OSW 13/2004 = European prospects of the Western Balkans. The European Union and Moldova. Relations between Turkey and the European Union. OSW Study 13/2004

The relations between Turkey and the European Union are special for several reasons. Of all candidates, Turkey has been aspiring to EU membership for the longest time. With 70 million citizens, it is the most populous candidate country, and if it were admitted to the EU, around the year 2020 would become the single most populous Member State. It would also be the only UE Member State inhabited almost exclusively by Muslims. Like Cyprus, it lies almost entirely in the Asian continent. Because of the scale of Turkey's internal problems, the country faces much more serious reservations concerning its accession than the remaining candidates. Turkey's membership application meets with the strongest opposition in the European Union. This paper aims to discuss the history of the complex relations between Turkey and the European Union, the main issues that impede Turkey's integration with the Community, including the country's internal problems in particular, and the transformations taking place in Turkey under the influence of Community policy.

The fragile ‘reset’. The balance sheet and the prospects for changes in Russian-US relations. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), April 2011

The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the USA has brought Russia a number of geopolitical, prestigious and economic benefits. The most important of those are: the resumption of arms control, the USA’s withdrawal from plans to locate elements of its strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the entry into force of the so-called 123 Agreement. In response, Russia has assisted the United States in resolving the Iranian crisis, and offered help with the Afghanistan operation, covering the transit of supplies and supporting the Afghan government. Moscow has also eased up on its anti-American rhetoric. The changes which have taken place in Russian-US relations are not durable. The two parties have not resolved their major disputes (for example, regarding missile defence), and any differences are hushed up for tactical reasons.

Investment behaviour of EU arable crop farms in selected EU countries and the impact of policy reforms. Factor Markets Working Document No. 42, May 2013

This deliverable provides a comparative analysis, among selected EU member states, of the investment demand of a sample of specialised field crop farms for farm buildings, machinery and equipment as determined by different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support. It allows for the existence of uncertainty in the price of output farmers receive and for both long- and short-run determinants of investment levels, as well as for the presence of irregularities in the cost adjustment function due to the existence of threshold-type behaviours. The empirical estimation reveals that three investment regimes are consistently identified in Germany and Hungary, across asset and support types, and in France for machinery and equipment. More traditional disinvestment-investment type behaviours characterise investment in farm building in France and the UK, across support types, and Italy for both asset classes under coupled payments. The long-run dynamic adjustment of capital stocks is consistently and significantly estimated to be towards a – mostly non-stationary – lower level of capitalisation of the farm analysed. By contrast, the expected largely positive short-run effects of an increase in output prices are often not significant. The effect of CAP support on both types of investment is positive, although seldom significant, while the proxy for uncertainty employed fails to be significant yet, in most cases, has the expected effect of reducing the investment levels.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

What prospects for transport infrastructure and impacts on growth in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries? MEDPRO Report No. 3, February 2013

Lack of adequate infrastructure is a significant inhibitor to increased trade of the countries of the Mediterranean region. Bringing their transport infrastructure to standards comparable with countries of a similar per capita GDP will be costly but worthwhile. We compare the current quantities of six types of transport infrastructure with international benchmarks, and estimate the additional quantities needed to reach the benchmarks. We also estimate the cost of that infrastructure and express it as a percentage of GDP. Finally we make tentative estimates of how much trade might be generated and how this might impact on GDP. All the estimates are made for 11 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) under four scenarios. The greatest need for additional infrastructure is for airport passenger terminals (between 52% and 56%), whereas the least is for more unpaved roads (between 7% and 13%). The investment (including maintenance) cost would be between 0.9% of GDP and 2.4% of GDP, although the investments in some countries would be between 1.4% and 4.5% of GDP. The impact on non-oil international trade would be substantial, but with differences between imports and exports. The overall trade balance of the 11 countries would be an improvement of between 5.4% and 17.2%, although some countries would continue to have a negative balance. A final assessment is made of the benefit ratio between the increase in GDP and the cost of transport investment. This varies between about 3 and 8, an indication of the high return to be expected from increased investment in transport infrastructure.

Perspectives in Resource Management and Climate Change Adaptation in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 6, March 2013

This policy paper focuses on the sustainable management of some key natural resources in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) under climate change and anthropogenic pressures. In a business-as-usual and even more so in a failed cooperation scenario, water resources, ecosystems and biodiversity in the region are under stress, with negative consequences for agriculture, food security, tourism and development. However, proper adaptation strategies are shown to be effective in reconciling resource conservation with GDP, trade and population growth. These need be implemented in different ways: technological, institutional, behavioural; and at different levels: regional, national and international. There is ample room for fruitful cooperation between the EU and SEMCs in this area, which can take the form of EU direct financial and technical support when resources in SEMCs are scarce, and of multilateral and bilateral cooperation programmes to improve resource efficiency. The EU could also take on the role of coordinating these different bilateral actions and, at the same time, support SEMCs to establish a structured programme focused on the communication and dissemination of emerging best practices.