Environmental judgements by the Court of Justice and their duration. Research Papers in Law, 4/2008

From the Introduction. Little attention is paid, until now, to the duration of environmental procedures under Articles 226 and 228 EC Treaty, though these procedures are the only instrument at the disposal of the European Commission to enforce the application of EC environmental law1. Indeed, the Commission itself has no possibility to impose a fine or a penalty payment against a Member State, or to withhold sums under the Structural Funds, where a Member State persistently infringes Community environmental law. Rather, the Commission is obliged to first issue a Letter of Formal Notice against a Member State which infringes Community law. Where the infringement is not repaired, the Commission may issue a Reasoned Opinion against the Member State, and if also this does not lead to the compliance with EC law, it may appeal to the Court of Justice2.

Struggling with an Opportunity: The first 10 years with the EU for Central Europe and the Baltics - A few lessons. CEPS Essay No. 12, 2 May 2014

In 2004, ten new members joined the European Union, radically reshaping its geography and governance characteristics. Earlier expectations predicted a more gradual process of accession – like a more gradual earlier evolution had been expected for the new European currency that had been adopted in 1999 by no less than 11 members. But these were the times of euro-enthusiasm. In their new CEPS Essay, Kálmán Mizsei and Ádám Kullmann offer some interesting and instructive insights from the experience in the newest member states following their accession 10 years ago for improving the effectiveness with which the EU structural and cohesion funds are spent.

The History and Challenges of Cohesion Policies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 2, February 2014

From Introduction. Regional economic disequilibria was viewed as both an obstacle to and result of integration (European Commission 1965; European Commission 1962; European Commission 1969). Even within the Treaty of Rome, the Community tried to establish mechanisms to alleviate regional inequality. However, it was not until 1975 that the main mechanism of regional policy was established as a result of British and Irish enlargement: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Since then, cohesion policy has become a significant EU expenditure accounting for €347bn, or 35.7% of the total EU budget for 2007-13(European Commission Regional Policy-Info Regio 2012). It has also become a key policy linked to enlargement. The underlying principle of cohesion policy assumes that the market alone cannot solve development problems and therefore government intervention is needed. This notion is in direct contrast to the underlying principle of EU competition policy, which asserts that the free market can solve economic development problems (Meadows, interview by author, 2003). The logic underlying cohesion policy is not only counter to EU competition policy, but also regulatory policies. Unlike other EU policies, cohesion policy is not a sectoral policy, but rather territorial in nature (Leonardi, 2006). Thus at times EU regulatory policy has also unintentionally worked counter to the goals of regional policy, sometimes disadvantaging poorer regions (Dudek, 2005). As the Community has sought to ameliorate regional disparities, it meant that all levels of government: local, regional, national and supranational would need to be involved, however, member states have different territorial governance and European regional development programs have to varying degrees impacted the relationship and policy responsibility of different levels of government (Leonardi, 2006; Bachtler and Michie 1993; Marks, 1993). The very nature of regional development policy has provoked a re-examination of subsidiarity, or which level of government is the lowest and most appropriate level. The discussion of policy formulation and implementation at the lowest level possible also addresses the issue of the democratic deficit. Some argue that the closer government is to the people the more responsive and representative it is. Democracy, however, also implies that public funds are used in a transparent way and for public rather than private good. Yet, as we examine the history and current situation of EU regional funds we find that corruption and misuse still abound. Thus, to understand the history of regional policy it is imperative to look at the major transformations of the policy, how regional policy has impacted subsidiarity and the quality of democracy, become an important instrument of enlargement and contradicted or conflicted with other EU policies.

Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im Alpenraum: Wechselwirkung zwischen EUSALP und EVTZ? = Transnational cooperation in the Alpine region: interaction between EUSALP and EGTC? EDAP 2/2016

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) explicitly added - in Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) - the principle of territorial cohesion to the already existing principles of social and economic cohesion between the EU Member States. To concretely reach the objective of territorial cohesion, the EU created – on the one hand - the legal instrument of the “European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation” adopted through regulation n. 1082/2006 (EGTC). This allows cross-border cooperation between local and regional authorities. On the other hand, in 2009 a new form of European transnational cooperation has been introduced, the so called Macro Regional Strategy (MRS). This was firstly applied to the Baltic Sea Region in order to give to this cross - border geographical area a coordinated framework in specific policy fields, such as the environment and the infrastructures. Both concepts - EGTC and MRS - are based on the fundamental idea of supporting the territorial and cross - border cooperation between local, regional and national authorities and other stakeholders. Despite this common aspect, the two instruments differ profoundly in terms of form, structure and content. While the MRS is to be considered as a political integrated framework without its own financial resources, the instrument of the EGTC is based on a stable legal basis. To this extent, the alpine region - a large geographic area in the heart of Europe with a longstanding tradition in crossborder cooperation - represents an interesting practical example with regard to the implementation of these two forms of cooperation across borders. In fact, the countries and regions in the Alpine area are unified through the Alps and face, therefore, common challenges: that is why this “region” is ideally suited to be the ground for experiments regarding transnational tools and strategies.

European regions in Brussels: towards functional interest representation? Bruges Political Research Papers 53/2016

Opportunities structures for participation in EU policy-making are characterised by the inefficiency of institutional channels of territorial representation and the progressive inclusion of broad civil society in new systems of consultation and cooperation with EU institutions. Recent Multilevel Governance literature has recognised an increasing convergence in strategies of territorial and functional actors to respond to these challenges. Nevertheless, it has neglected the partial shift of European regions from territorial institutional representation to lobbying strategies based on acting as intermediaries for functional interests. Through strong cooperation with the private sector, regions go beyond their purely institutional roles, partly presenting themselves as actors of functional representation and thus playing by the same rules of most lobbying actors in Brussels: providing specialised and genuine information to EU institutions in exchange for inclusion in the policy-making process.