Road to Proscription: The EU and Hezbollah since the Arab Spring. EU Diplomacy Paper 07/2013

The European Union (EU) has traditionally taken a rather nuanced view of the activities of Hezbollah. Despite historic links to violent activity, Europe always remained reluctant to place the Lebanese militant group on its list of terrorist organisations. Internal divergences among member states, as well as the strategic-realist goals of the EU in both Lebanon and the Middle East more generally meant that such a listing never materialised. This remained the case even in the initial turmoil following the Arab uprisings, when Hezbollah’s relatively moderating objectives were viewed as a force for stability. However, the EU shifted policy in July 2013 by listing the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist entity. This paper will investigate the reasons behind this decision, as well as the likely implications and effectiveness of the new policy. Two principal catalysts were behind the decision. The first was a Hezbollah-linked bombing in Bulgaria which provided the focal point around which a consensus of the EU member states could emerge in the Council. Secondly, the escalation both of the Syrian conflict and Hezbollah’s role in it provided a more political and strategic impetus for the decision. This paper maintains that although a change in policy was somewhat necessary, it is questionable whether the artificial separation of Hezbollah’s political and military wings and the symbolic proscription of the latter is the most propitious choice to achieve European objectives.

2002 Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: Events, results and consequences; Ukraine's Parliamentary system after the elections. OSW Study 8/2003

2002 elections: On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. The communists emerged significantly weaker from the vote, and the "party of power" achieved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral law (half of the deputies were elected in single-mandate districts), the latter block, firmly supported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as the main force in Parliament. The results of particular parties and blocks were as follows: Viktor Yuschenko's Block received 23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist Party of Ukraine - 19.98% of votes and 66 seats, the "For One Ukraine" block - 11.77% of votes and 101 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko's Block - 7.26% of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukraine - 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 6.27% of votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed electoral regulations favour "For One Ukraine" and act against Yuschenko's block. One should note, however, that the latter gained the support of less than one quarter of voters. After the election: The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign. In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

What scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean in 2030 in the wake of the Arab spring? MEDPRO Policy Paper No. 2, October 2011 (Updated 25 February 2013)

In the wake of the Arab Spring, the Southern Mediterranean region has reached a turning point in its history, presenting many opportunities and challenges for the EU. In this MEDPRO Policy Paper, Rym Ayadi and Carlo Sessa explore various possible scenarios that could play out in EU-Mediterranean relations over the next two decades but find, lamentably, that the EU has set itself on a ‘business as usual’ course, leaving the region open to further polarisation and the involvement of other external players.

EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations? MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012

The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’ – now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security actors. This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM as well as the wider prospects for the Southern Mediterranean?

The ECB’s QE: Time to break the doom loop between banks and their governments. CEPS Policy Brief No. 328, March 2015

The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to default. Applying a large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure towards breaking the bank-government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss-given government default. But what would be the impact of the application of the large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This CEPS Policy Brief presents the results of a simulation exercise performed for 109 systemic banks in the eurozone, showing that their eurozone government debt portfolios would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion, if a 50% of own-funds cap would be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset purchase programme further creates momentum to start gradually implementing the restriction.