Progress on the “Juncker Plan” continues – but are Member States behind it? EPC Commentary, 18 March 2015

Introduction. The draft regulation on the Juncker Investment Plan was presented by the European Commission in January and has been discussed by the Ecofin Council on 10 March. This leaves sufficient time for the European Parliament to express its views and to make the Plan operational by the summer, as aimed for by President Juncker. But while governments agreed swiftly, ministers did not decide on two issues that are of importance: the eligibility of projects that have benefited from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and the Horizon 2020 programmes and the contributions of the national promotional banks (NPBs) to the investment plan. This commentary argues that the foreseeable engagement of NPBs remains unsatisfactory.

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

EU citizenship, Citizenship and identity beyond national borders. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 10, October 2013

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of European Union citizenship. All citizens of the 28 EU member states are also EU citizens through the very fact that their countries are members of the EU. Acquired EU citizenship gives them the right to free movement, settlement and employment across the EU, the right to vote in European elections, and also on paper the right to consular protection from other EU states' embassies when abroad. The concept of citizenship in Europe – and indeed anywhere in the world – has been evolving over the years, and continues to evolve. Against this time scale, the concept of modern citizenship as attached to the nation-state would seem ephemeral. The idea of EU citizenship therefore does not need to be regarded as a revolutionary phenomenon that is bound to mitigate against the natural inclination of European citizens towards national identities, especially in times of economic and financial crises. In fact, the idea of EU citizenship has even been criticised by some scholars as being of little substantive value in addition to whatever rights and freedoms European citizens already have. Nonetheless the ‘constitutional moment’ that the Maastricht Treaty achieved for the idea of EU citizenship has served more than just symbolic value – the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, for instance. The idea of EU citizenship also put pressure on the Union and its leaders to address the perceived democratic deficit that the EU is often accused of. In attempts to cement the political rights of EU citizens, the citizens’ initiative was included in Lisbon Treaty allowing citizens to directly lobby the European Commission for new policy initiatives or changes.

National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.4, 2002

In spite of domestic and international political changes, French and German foreign policies have displayed high degrees of continuity between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s. Over the same time period, the directions of the two states’ foreign policies have also continued to differ from each other. Why do states similar in many respects often part ways in what they want and do? This article argues that the French and German national role conceptions (NRCs) account for both of these continuities. NRCs are domestically shared understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena. As internal reference systems, they affect national interests and foreign policies. This article reestablishes the NRC concept, empirically codes it for France and Germany for the time period under consideration, and demonstrates comparatively how different NRCs lead to varying interests and policies across the major policy areas in security, defense, and armament.

Special Education and the Risk of Becoming Less Educated in Germany and the United States. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.1, 13 December, 2004

Over the twentieth century, a growing group of students has been transferred into considerably expanded special education systems. These programs serve children with diagnosed impairments and disabilities and students with a variety of learning difficulties. Children and youth “with special educational needs” constitute a heterogeneous group with social, ethnic, linguistic, and physical disadvantages. An increasingly large percentage of those students at risk of leaving school without credentials participate in special education, a highly legitimated low status (and stigmatizing) school form. While most countries commit themselves to school integration or inclusive education to replace segregated schools and separate classes, cross-national and regional comparisons of special education’s diverse student bodies show considerable disparities in their (1) rates of classification, (2) provided learning opportunities, and (3) educational attainments. Analyzing special education demographics and organizational structures indicates which children and youth are most likely to grow up less educated and how educational systems distribute educational success and failure. Findings from a German-American comparison show that which students bear the greatest risk of becoming less educated depends largely on definitions of “special educational needs” and the institutionalization of special education systems.

How European Integration Impacts on National Legislatures: The Europeanization of The German Bundestag. CES Germany and Europe Working Papers, No. 06.2, 2006

In looking at the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper brings together two different debates: the well-established debate on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union sees national Parliaments as guarantor of one branch of a "dual" legitimacy. The more recent debate on "Europeanization" addresses the impacts that European integration has had on its Member States. Analyzing the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper identifies and analyzes three dimensions: legislative Europeanization – the extent to which legislative decision making by the German Bundestag has been influenced by European stipulations over the last twenty years; institutional Europeanization – how the Bundestag as an institution reacted to this loss of function by establishing institutional and procedural provisions for influencing the government's Euro-politics; and strategic Europeanization – the ways in which individual MPs started more recently to develop euro-political strategies that go beyond controlling the national government. The paper shows that the Bundestag only hesitantly reacted to the increasing loss of functions through legislative Europeanization by establishing effective institutional and procedural provisions for controlling the government's Euro-political activities. What is more, the establishment of institutions does not guarantee their effective use. All in all, Euro- politics continues to remain the activity of few MPs. These few, however, have more recently started to europeanize their strategies. The empirical findings support the claim that the traditional concept of chains of legitimacy is inadequate, both in conceptual and in empirical terms. With regard to the democ- ratic legitimacy of EU governance, this indicates that, apart from major reform projects, especially with regard to everyday legislation, not too great a burden should be placed on national Parliaments.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Basic Statistics for Fifteen European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. 3rd Edition, November 1961

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six

Statistiques de base de douze pays Europeens. Comparaison avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietiques. Deuxieme Edition. Octobre 1958 = Basic Statistics for Twelve European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Second Edition. October 1958

Population; produit national; agriculture; industrie; transports; niveau de vie; commerce exterieur

Statistiques de base de douze pays Europeens. Comparaison avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietiques. First Edition. Fevrier 1958 = Basic Statistics for Twelve European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. First Edition. February 1958

Population; produit national; agriculture; industrie

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fourth Edition. November 1963

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1952-62; supplementary statistics in an social field-employment, earnings, expenditure, social security

Statistiques de base de douze pays Europeens. Comparaison avec les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietiques. Novembre 1961 = Basic Statistics for Twelve European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. 3rd Edition, November 1961

Population; produit national; agriculture; energie; industrie; transports; commerce exterieur; niveau de vie; evolution de donnees economiques importantes pour les six pays

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fifth Edition. November 1964

Population; labour force; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; social statistics; standar5d of living; trends of major economic indicators in the countries of the community; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1956-63

Statistiques de base de la Communaute. Comparaison avec certains pays europeens, le Canada, les Etats-Unis d'Amerique et l'Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietiques. Sixieme Edition. 1965. = Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, Canada, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Sixth Edition. 1965.

Population; main-d'oeuvre; produit national; agriculture; energie; industrie; transports; commerce exterieur; statistiques sociales; niveau de vie; evolution des donnees economiques importantes dans les six pays; donnees complementaires sur le siderurgie-evolution de 1959 a 1964

EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans. EPC ISSUE PAPER No. 79, July 2015

From the Executive Summary. The European Union’s enlargement to the Balkans seems to be running on autopilot since Croatia’s accession in 2013 and amidst the on-going crisis. While the region still has a clear European perspective, progress on the dossier has been marred not just by outstanding challenges in individual Balkan countries but often also by hurdles which develop within the Union – more specifically in the member states. While the EU’s internal procedures for handling enlargement have always been intergovernmental in nature, the frequency of incursions and opportunities for the member states to interfere and derail the process has increased over the past years, suggesting a so-called ‘nationalisation’ of enlargement. In 17 case studies and two theoretical chapters, this Issue Paper investigates whether the dossier has shifted more under the control of the member states, and looks at the kind of considerations and potential ‘roadblocks’ that influence the positions of key national actors on enlargement.