The European Economic Community's Third Enlargement. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12 No. 6, June 2012

The European Economic Community's third enlargement round brought up a series of tensions between member states, which would require a great amount of time and effort to be solved. Bigger issues, such as the British contribution, the community budget and the Common Agriculture Policy reforms, are going to be at the centre of EEC's agenda in the 1970-80's, and ultimately, British and French national interests on these matters will prevail. The basic argument of this article is that member states used the prospect of enlargement to achieve particular policy goals, such as improvements in decisionmaking procedures and budget reform, and only after those accomplishments, member states agreed on concluding the third enlargement.

European Criminal Law and General Principles of Union Law. Research Papers in Law, 5/2005

From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.

The Great Transformation: Memo to the Incoming EU Presidents. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/04, July 2014

The European Union’s leadership spent the last five years fighting an acute and existential crisis. The next five years, under your leadership, will be no less difficult. You will have to tackle difficult economic and institutional questions while being alert to the possibility of a new crisis. You face three central challenges: (1) The feeble economic situation prevents job creation and hobbles attempts to reduce public and private debt; (2) EU institutions and the EU budget need reform and you will have to deal with pressing external matters, including neighbourhood policy and the EU’s position in the world; (3) You will have to prepare and face up to the need for treaty change to put monetary union on a more stable footing, to review the EU’s competences and to re-adjust the relationship between the euro area and the EU, and the United Kingdom in particular.

Lessons from the Great War: Failure of leadership. CEPS Commentary, 1 July 2014

In his reflections on the intervening century since the start of the First World War, Erwan Fouéré acknowledges that the EU has brought enormous benefits to its citizens by extending the frontiers of peace and security to include 28 member countries. At the same time, however, he warns that the voices of populism are trying to destroy its very foundations and calls upon the European Union to work much harder at showing that the integration project is both vital and necessary for continued peace and prosperity in Europe.

With the Scottish vote, Brussels can heave a great big sigh of relief. CEPS Commentary, 19 September 2014

On the morning after the momentous vote in Scotland, Michael Emerson also breathes a deep sigh of relief that the nightmare scenario of secession will not unfold and expresses his hope that Brussels can now return to its own business, with its renewed leadership feeling a bit encouraged to go about their burdensome agenda with more confidence.

The Great Game around Turkmenistan. OSW Point of View, August 2008

The rise of a new leader of the state of Turkmenistan – President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who became ruler of the central Asian state after the 21-year rule of Saparmurad Niyazov, the self-proclaimed Turkmenbashi, who died on December 21, 2006 – has initiated changes in Turkmenistan’s political life. The new president has broken with the previous policy of self-isolation, and has directed the country towards openness to the outside world. Opportunities have thereby arisen for competitors in the ‘Great Game’, to gain political influence in Turkmenistan and access to hitherto unexploited Turkmen deposits of gas and oil. A new stage in the Great Game, which has been played for influence in Central Asia and control of access to its energy resources for many years, can thus be said to have been launched, and Turkmenistan has become the main setting for it. The major actors involved are Russia, the United States, China and the European Union.

Mutual recognition in goods and services: an economic perspective. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 2/2002

Mutual recognition is a remarkable innovation facilitating economic intercourse across borders. In the EU's internal goods market it has been helpful in tackling or avoiding the remaining obstacles, namely, regulatory barriers between Member States. However, there is a curious paradox. Despite the almost universal acclaim of the great merits of mutual recognition the principle has, in and by itself, contributed only modestly to the actual realisation of free movement in the single market. It is also surprising that economists have not or hardly underpinned their widespread appreciation for the principle by providing rigorous analysis which could substantiate the case for mutual recognition for policy makers. Business in Europe has shown a sense of disenc hantment with the principle because of the many costs and uncertainties in its application in actual practice. The purpose of the present paper is to provide the economic and strategic arguments for employing mutual recognition much more systematically in the single market for goods and services. The strategic and the "welfare" gains are analysed and adetailed exposition of the fairly high information , transaction and compliance costs is provided. The information costs derive from the fact that mutual recognition remains a distant abstraction for day-to-day business life. Understandably, verifying the "equivalence" of objectives of health and safety between Member States is perceived as difficult and uncertain. This sentiment is exacerbated by the complications of interpreting the equivalence of "effects". In actual practice, these abstractions are expected to override clear and specific national product or services rules, which local inspectors or traders may find problematic without guidance. The paper enumerates several other costs including, inter alia, the absence of sectoral rule books and the next-to-prohibitive costs of monitoring of the application of the principle. The basic problems in applying mutual recognition in the entire array of services are inspected, showing why the principle can only be used in a limited number of services markets and even there it may contribute only modestly to genuine free movement and competitive exposure. A special section is devoted to a range of practical illustrations of the difficulties business experiences when relying on mutual recognition. Finally, the corollary of mutual recognition - regulatory competition - is discussed in terms of a cost/benefits analysis compared to what is often said to be the alternative , that is "harmonisation" , in EU parlance the "new approach" to approximation. The conclusion is that the manifold benefits of mutual recognition for Europe are too great to allow the present ambiguities to continue. The Union needs much more pro-active approaches to reduce the costs of mutual recognition as well as permanent monitoring structures for its application to services (analogous to those already successfully functioning in goods markets). Above all, what is required is a "mutual recognition culture" so that the EU can better enjoy the fruits of its own regulatory ingenuity.

A "Triple-I" Strategy for the Future of Europe. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 10/2005

The paper lays down a strategy consisting of Innovation, Internalisation of Externalities, and Integration – called Triple I. ‘Innovation’ is seen along value chain management in a systems perspective, driven by competition and participation of stakeholders. ‘Internalisation’ refers to endogenous efforts by industry to assess externalities and to foster knowledge generation that leads to benefits for both business and society. ‘Integration’ highlights the role business and its various forms of cooperation might play in policy integration within Europe and beyond. Looking forward towards measures to be taken, the paper explores some frontiers for a partnership between public and private sector: i) Increasing resource productivity, lowering material cost, ii) Energy integration with Southeast Europe and Northern Africa, iii) Urban mobility services and public transport, iv) Tradable emission permits beyond Europe. Finally, some conclusions from the perspective of the College of Europe are drawn.

European Industrial Policy. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 15/2006

This survey of European industrial policy aims to set out and explain the great significance of European integration in determining (changes in) structure and performance of industry in the EU. This influence is explored from the policy side by analysing the transformation of the framework within which both EU and Member States' industrial policy can be pursued. Empirical economic analysis is not included because this BEEP Briefing was originally written for a handbook3 in which other authors were assigned a range of industrial economics subjects. In the last 25 years or so, the transformation is such that the nature and scope of industrial policy at both levels of government has profoundly changed as well. Indeed, the toolkit of measures has shrunk considerably, disciplines have been tightened and the economic policy views behind industrial policy have altered everywhere. The pro-competitive logic of deeper market integration itself is rarely questioned nowadays and industrial policy at the two levels takes on different forms. The survey discusses at some length the division of powers between, and the complementarity of, the Member States' and EU levels of government when it comes to industrial policy, based on a fairly detailed classification of industrial policy instruments. The three building blocks of the wide concept of industrial policy as defined in this BEEP Briefing consist of the EU framework of market integration, EU horizontal industrial policy and its EU sectoral or specific counterpart. Each one is surveyed at the EU level. Preceding these three sections is a discussion of three cross-cutting issues, namely, the indiscriminate use of the 'competitiveness' label in the EU circuit of business and policy makers, the relation between services and EU industrial policy and, finally, that of European infrastructure. One major conclusion is that, today, the incentive structure for industry and industrial markets is dominated by the stringency of the overall EU framework and to some moderate degree by the horizontal approach.

European Integration and Europeanisation: Benefits and Disadvantages for Business. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 29/2013

European integration is a project of great economic importance for the 500 million consumers and 21 million companies in Europe. With the economic borders between Member States removed, Europeanisation becomes inevitable for companies. The paper proposes a framework to analyse the benefits and disadvantages for business that come with the process of European integration, structured according to the logic of the four fundamental freedoms of movement within the Internal Market (freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people) complemented by the section on technology and innovation, and the general EU regulatory environment. Whereas the business decisions need to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration firm’s own capabilities and resources as well as industry specificities, several recommendations for companies willing to Europeanise are made, based on an analysis of the regulatory macro-environment of the EU. Above all, any company willing to be successful in the EU has to become a learning organisation, responsive to the advancements of the macro-environment. The ability to anticipate the regulatory developments and to adjust one’s own business and corporate strategy accordingly is the key to achieving sustainable competitive advantage in the European Union.

Riding or Reaping the Whirlwind? An Account of the EU’s Engagement with Insecurity in Northern Nigeria. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 9, November 2014

The relations of the European Union (EU) with Africa are increasingly spreading beyond the domain of humanitarian and development cooperation. The continent’s growing potential is producing vast webs of interlinkages in the realms of energy and commerce, among others. At the same time, such interdependencies bring with them increased vulnerabilities to insecurity on the continent. Nigeria exemplifies such a dilemma. The country has just taken the top spot as Africa’s largest economy. Of late, however, violent Islamic extremism ravages the north of the country, threatening the stability of one of Europe’s foremost energy suppliers and a growing trade partner. Thus, this paper sets out to uncover the EU’s response to such a crisis, as well as examining the factors lying behind this response. While the study argues that the issue is potentially ‘Europeaniz-able’ from a member state perspective, deep engagement is seen to be held back by the absence of an effective entry point for securitization with this important ally, as well as the intractability of the EU’s purported multi-functional approach to the idiosyncrasies of the conflict in question, in which not only transnational terrorist groups, but also the central government are centrally implicated in deepening insecurity.