A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

Performance Indicators in Agricultural Financial Markets. Factor Markets Working Document No. 43, May 2013

This study attempts to develop performance indicators for the financial markets based on the findings in an earlier Factor Markets Working Paper (No. 33, “Agricultural credit market institutions: A comparison of selected European countries”) and on FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) data. Two indicators were developed. One measured the long-term economic sustainability of agricultural firms since the financial characteristics of the firms were perceived as important factors when rejecting a loan applicant. If the indicator works, it should show that a low value in this indicator is related to the performance in the financial markets. The second indicator was the loan-to-value (LTV), or debt-to-asset ratio, the reasoning behind this indicator is that low values can point to credit constraints, and in WP 33 we saw that the interviewed experts expected LTVs to be much higher than what is actually the case. We find that the first indicator can’t be used to measure the performance of the financial institutions, since we can’t show any relationship between the indicator and activities in the financial markets. However, the indicator is valuable for its measurement of the long-term financial sustainability of the agricultural sector, or of the firms. The loan-to-value indicator does imply that most countries would have room to increase the credit.

Enhancing European Cooperation in Financial Supervision and Crisis Management. ACES Working Papers, August 2009

To overcome the regulatory pitfalls, regulatory capacity and resources in financial markets governance need to be enhanced, not only at national but also at global levels. In order to shed light on policy issues and agendas in international financial policy cooperation, this paper focuses on the case of European financial integration and regulations. The analysis of policy developments at the European level in coordinating differing national interests, supervisory systems, and practices among EU member states highlights fundamental elements of global financial regulatory cooperation.

EU Sanctions Policy towards Russia: The Sanctioner-Sanctionee’s Game of Thrones. CEPS Working Document No. 402/January 2015

Since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the start of the conflict in the Donbass region, the EU has introduced three waves of restrictive measures against Russia, which are regularly updated. Having thus expanded from measures targeting individuals to entire sectors, the current EU sanctions policy impacts Russia’s financial markets, energy sector and defence industry. On top of this, new bans affect EU investments, services and trade in Crimea and Sevastopol. While they hurt the Russian economy, the EU sanctions also have a boomerang effect, especially in conjunction with the countersanctions imposed by the Kremlin on EU food imports. In this lose-lose situation, the usefulness of the EU sanctions has been called into doubt, in particular in those EU member states that are the most economically intertwined with Russia. How successful has the EU been so far in pushing its case with the Kremlin and what moves are left for the two main actors in the sanctioner-sanctionee ‘Game of Thrones’? This Working Document offers a SWOT analysis of the EU sanctions policy towards Russia and identifies the Strengths for the EU to cultivate, Weaknesses to minimise, Opportunities to seize and Threats to counteract.

What if the Next Financial Crisis Hits the Banking Union? A Call for an “If All Else Fails” Clause. European Policy Brief No. 16, September 2013

This Policy Brief argues that the envisaged design of the Banking Union risks not being sufficient to deal with the next large-scale financial crisis. Therefore, an “if all else fails” clause should be approved, stating that the Banking Union members can provide joint last resort financing to deal with a future crisis. An agreement on the clause should be feasible because it is beneficial to all Member States.

Building a Capital Markets Union….or designing a financial system for the euro area? CEPS Commentary, 2 June 2015

In this CEPS Commentary, economists Anton Brender, Florence Pisani and Daniel Gros challenge the foundation on which the European Commission launched a key debate earlier this year on the development of the EU’s financial system, with publication of its Green Paper "Building a Capital Markets Union". While acknowledging that a single capital market could be useful in the European Union, they argue that it is extremely dangerous to conduct one and the same monetary policy in an area with broadly varying financial practices and structures – as the first 15 years of the euro area's history have vividly shown. They conclude that financial integration of the countries in EMU must receive top priority in a process that the rest of the European Union may then subsequently join.

Achieving European Policy Objectives through Financial Technology. ECRI Commentary No. 17, 16 November 2015

Alistair Milne argues in this ECRI Commentary that ‘FinTech’ (newly emerging Financial Technologies) can play a crucial role in achieving European policy objectives in the area of financial markets. These notably include increasing access by smaller firms to trade credit and other forms of external finance and completing the banking and capital markets unions. He points out, however, that accomplishing these objectives will require a coordinated European policy response, focused especially on promoting common business processes and the adoption of shared technology and data standards.

Financial regulatory transparency: new data and implications for EU policy. Bruegel Policy Brief 2015/20, December 2015

International financial institutions have promoted financial regulatory transparency, or the publication by supervisors of financial industry data. Financial regulatory transparency enhances market stability and increases democratic legitimacy. • We introduce a new index of financial regulatory data transparency: the FRT Index. It measures how countries report to international financial institutions basic macroprudential data about their financial systems.The Index covers 68 high-income and emerging-market economies over 22 years (1990-2011). • We find a number of striking trends over this period. European Union members are generally more opaque than other high-income countries.This finding is especially relevant given efforts to create an EU capital markets union. • Globally, financial regulatory data transparency has increased. However, there is considerable variation. Some countries have become significantlymore transparent, while others have become much more opaque. Reporting tends to decline during financial crises. • We propose that the EU institutions take on a greater role in coordinating and possibly enforcing reporting of bank and non-bank institution data. Similar to the United States, a reporting requirement should be part of any EU general deposit insurance scheme.