329 resultados para European Convention on Humanh Rights, Article 5, right to liberty


Report drawn up on behalf of the Committeeon Agriculture on A. the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Doc. 1-893/83-COM(83) 548 final) for: I. a regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No. 804/68 on the common organization of the markets in milk and milk products. II. a regulation laying down general rules applying to the milk sector levy specified in Article 5(c) of Regulation (EEC) No. 804/68. III. a regulation laying down general rules applying to the milk sector levy specified in Article 5(d) of Regulation (EEC) No. 804/68. B. the proposals from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Doc. 1-996/83-COM(83) 611 final) for: I. a regulation amending Regulation (EEC No. 1723/81 as regards the possibility of granting aids for the use of butter in the manufacture of certain food-stuffs. II. a regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1411/71 as regards the fat content of drinking milk. III. a regulation laying down general rules on the granting of aid for concentrated skimmed milk and concentrated milk for use as animal feed. IV. a regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1269/79 with regard to the terms for the disposal of butter at a reduced price for direct consumption. C. the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Doc. 1-1113/83)-COM(83) 644 final) for a regulation amending Regulations (EEC) No. 1078/77 introducing a system of premiums for the non-marketing of milk and milk products and for the conversion of dairy herds.

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[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

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From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.