Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement process for the Western Balkans. CEPS Commentary, 16 May 2013.

Ten years have passed since the EU-Western Balkans summit was held in Thessaloniki in June 2003. In this new CEPS Commentary, CEPS Associate Senior Fellow Erwan Fouéré exhorts the EU to mark the occasion by reaffirming with greater determination the European perspective for the countries of the region in the hope of keeping the Balkan ghosts at bay.

Regional government and the "New Europe"

Introduction. Regional government in contemporary western Europe corresponds to a type of society and economy variously labeled "post-industrial", "post-bourgeois" or merely "the New Europe."l This New Europe evolved historically from the interconnected strands of capitalism; industrialism and pluralistic democracy. It resembles in many respects the type of economy and society familiar to us in North America. Regional government in such a society is thus merely an adaptation on the scale of half a continent of forms of social and economic organization which evolved historically at the national level. Regional government in the New Europe is the institutional and political recognition that societies have changed dramatically since 1945, so dramatically that they cannot be adequately described in the doctrines and ideologies made familiar by nineteenth and early twentieth century political thought. Hence the New Europe and its regional government is the future of that part of history which has also been aptly described as "the end of ideology."

The Theory of Interhybridity: Socio-political Dimensions and Migration Experiences of Post-communist Western Balkan States

The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the Soviet socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how the hybridization of state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related problems. The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model of Basu (2009) is overlapping with the multidimensional empirical framework of interhybridity. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of communication.

The global race for talent: Europe's migration challenge. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/02, March 2014

In an ageing world with demographic and economic imbalances, the number of international migrants is likely to rise during the twenty-first century. The geography of migration flows is changing, however. Mobile people will be increasingly attracted by faster-growing economies. Therefore, some traditional destinations in western Europe will face stronger competition for skilled labour-not least from countries like China where the working-age population will shrink after 2020. At the same time, the sentiment in many European receiving societies is turning against migration and intra-European Union mobility.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Greater Europe. Putin's vision of European (dis)integration. OSW Study 46/2013

On several occasions since 2001 Vladimir Putin has raised the concept of ‘Greater Europe’, a partly-integrated common space comprising mainly Russia and the European Union. This concept has never been recast into a detailed political programme. While it has been championed as‘a Europe without dividing lines’, the concept would in practice permanently split Europe into two geopolitical blocs – the Western bloc of the European Union, with Germany in the dominant role, and the Eastern bloc, consisting of the emerging Eurasian Union, with Russia in a hegemonic position. In recent years Russia has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at implementing some elements of the concept. However, most of these have failed to become reality. In this context, we should expect Russia’s policy to focus on implementing its priority project of Eurasian integration, based on the structures of the Customs Union/the Eurasian Union. The Greater Europe project, on the other hand, will be postponed until the time when, as Moscow believes, a weakened EU will be ready to accept Russian proposals.

Europejska prespektywa Balkanow Zachodnich. Unia Europejska a Moldawia. Relacje Turcji z Unia Europejska. Prace OSW 13/2004 = European prospects of the Western Balkans. The European Union and Moldova. Relations between Turkey and the European Union. OSW Study 13/2004

The relations between Turkey and the European Union are special for several reasons. Of all candidates, Turkey has been aspiring to EU membership for the longest time. With 70 million citizens, it is the most populous candidate country, and if it were admitted to the EU, around the year 2020 would become the single most populous Member State. It would also be the only UE Member State inhabited almost exclusively by Muslims. Like Cyprus, it lies almost entirely in the Asian continent. Because of the scale of Turkey's internal problems, the country faces much more serious reservations concerning its accession than the remaining candidates. Turkey's membership application meets with the strongest opposition in the European Union. This paper aims to discuss the history of the complex relations between Turkey and the European Union, the main issues that impede Turkey's integration with the Community, including the country's internal problems in particular, and the transformations taking place in Turkey under the influence of Community policy.

Review of the Economic Development in the Western Balkan States. OSW STUDIES No. 19, 2005-08-10

Foreword. Ten years after the end of the armed conflict, the Western Balkans1 are still being considered as the “land of the unsuccessful policies”. Enormous financial and technical assistance transferred by the International Community has not managed to meet the goals of integrating the region within itself as well as within the European markets. Explanation for this can be found in the consequences of the war and the remnants of the socialist state. The complexity of current institutional/ political arrangements combined with the limited willingness of the regional actors to introduce and implement much of the needed reforms have additionally contributed to the current state of affairs. The economy and politics in the region intertwine to an extent as probably in none of the other post-communist states. Therefore, the paper presents the recent economic performance of the Western Balkan countries in the light of their limited institutional development and lack of efficient regional cooperation. The paper discusses the importance of foreign direct investments’ inflow for the economic growth of the “latecomer” states and presents major drawbacks which limit the influx of the foreign capital to the region. It presents private sector activity and regional cooperation programmes. It discusses the role of the International Community with the main focus on the activities of the European Union. The EU is examined not only as the main aid donor but more importantly as a foreign trade partner. Furthermore, it analyses the impact of the presence of the International Community and their strategies towards the region with the special attention to the EU. Finally, it presents recommendations for the improvement of the economic performance in light of the enhanced political cooperation between the EU and the region.

The Western Balkans: deadlock in the EU enlargement process. OSW Commentary No. 43, 2010-11-24

On 9 November the European Commission presented the annual reports assessing the progress of the Balkans states in their preparations for EU membership, the enlargement strategy up to autumn 2011, and the assessment of the EU membership applications submitted by Albania and Macedonia. All these documents show that the reform process in the Balkan states has slowed down in comparison to previous years. The main reason for this slowdown is the negative consequences of the global economic crisis for these countries. Nonetheless, the transformation process is continuing, despite these difficulties. Another increasingly serious challenge for integrating the Balkan states is the EU's growing reluctance to enlarge any further. Among other measures, the EU states have blocked the formal acknowledgement of the integration progress (objections have been raised to the submission of membership applications by Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and to granting Albania candidate status), which has significantly prolonged the accession process. In fact, this illustrates the lack of political will to accept new members. The European Commission is aware that the integration process may be blocked, and so in the coming year it is planning to focus on fostering the idea of enlargement among the EU member states. It will also focus on persuading the Balkan states to move on with reforms, especially those designed to strengthen state institutions (administration, the judiciary), even if their progress will not be formally considered during the integration process. The Commission assumes that by the end of next year, the reforms implemented by the Balkan states will be comprehensive enough to persuade the EU states to step up the integration process in subsequent years. However, if the EU member states' standpoint on the enlargement process does not change, the Commission's efforts will not bring about the expected results. Considering that their prospects for EU membership are receding, the Balkan states may not have sufficient motivation to go on with long-term reform efforts. As a result, the transformation process may become impeded, and in the longer perspective, the situation in the entire region may be destabilised.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Involving Central Asia in Afghanistan’s future – what can Europe do? EUCAM Policy Brief No. 20, August 2011

The EU argues in its Central Asia policy that it wants to take greater account of Afghanistan. But what does this mean in practice? There is a case for engaging the Central Asian states beyond agreements over supply and material transport routes to Afghanistan. Central Asian states themselves have the most to gain from a stabilised Afghanistan. Cultural ties and the increasing economic linkages between Central Asia and Afghanistan need to be taken into consideration so that Central Asian states can be assisted in playing a positive role in Afghanistan together with Western actors.

Can Policy Make Us Happier? Individual characteristics socioeconomic factors, and life satisfaction in Central and Eastern Europe. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 22/November 2011

In the last decade, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have witnessed a rapid economic convergence vis-à-vis Western Europe. However, this rapid growth has not been matched by a similarly rapid increase in life satisfaction, which has remained low in the European context. This paper sets out to address this conundrum, by looking at the individual and macro-level determinants of individual life satisfaction in ten CEE countries. The results highlight that while Central and Eastern Europeans share the same individual determinants of happiness as people in the West (despite some significant cross-country variation), macroeconomic and institutional differences are the key factors behind the lack of convergence in life satisfaction. On the macroeconomic side, GDP growth is still a source of increasing well-being, but the happiness bonus associated with it is becoming smaller. The different levels of individual happiness in CEE are therefore mostly determined by institutional factors such as corruption, government spending and decentralisation, making policies aimed at enhancing institutional quality capable of bringing about substantial improvements in the overall life satisfaction of the people in the region.

Bringing South Caucasus Closer to Europe: Achievements and Challenges in ENP Implantation. Natolin Research Paper 03/March 2011

While the initial Commission Communication on Wider Europe (March 2003) did not include Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the forthcoming policy for the EU’s new neighbourhood, the Southern Caucasus region has now gained considerable attention in the framework of the ENP and beyond, not least because of security considerations. The ENP undoubtedly represents a step forward in the EU’s policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, yet its implementation highlights major differences between the three countries and important weaknesses in all three of them. The Eastern Partnership addresses some of these weaknesses and it also significantly strengthens the EU’s offer to South Caucasus countries, which is now fully in line with the perspectives proposed to the Western NIS. The paper highlights five main conclusions and recommendations: • Political, economic, social and diplomatic developments in the South Caucasus in the 2000's highlight both diverging trends and the persistence of tensions between the three countries. They also have different aspirations vis-à-vis the EU and different records in ENP implementation. The EU should therefore mainly rely upon an individual approach towards each country. • While bilateral relations should form the basis of the EU's approach, most of the challenges faced by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not confined to national borders and require regional solutions. This applies primarily, but not exclusively, to the unresolved conflicts. The EU should promote targeted regional cooperation including, inter alia, confidence-building measures to address indirectly the protracted conflicts and measures supporting drivers of change, which play a critical role in the confidence-building process; • Under the ENP, especially since the opening of negotiations for association agreements and with the perspective of DCFTA, trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform have become prominent in the EU's relations with all three Caucasus countries. At the same time, the priorities identified when the ENP was launched, i.e. good governance and the rule of law, still correspond to major challenges in the South Caucasus. The EU should more clearly prioritise good governance and the rule of law as the basis of both the ENP and successful reforms; • In all partner countries (but even more so in the South Caucasus), ENP implementation has been adversely affected by poor administrative capacities and weak institutional coordination. The EU should increasingly focus on institutional reform/capacity building in its support to partner countries and ensure that the link between the ENP and domestic reform processes is strengthened; • In the South Caucasus the EU has recently concentrated on a few assistance tools such as budget support, Twinning and TAIEX. While these instruments undoubtedly bring an added value, they should be better combined with tools allowing for greater flexibility and targeting non-governmental actors, e.g. EIDHR/NSA.

Western Strategic Poverty: The Ukrainian Crisis and the New World Order. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 Special Issue, March 2014

From Introduction. The Ukrainian crisis, which deepened in February with the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, has exposed a serious poverty of strategy and leadership from Europe and the US. Such a lack of strategic vision in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, considered by Nicholas Burns among others, as one of the greatest crises in Europe since 1991, diverges between the European Union and the US. It is undeniable that the western leadership is unable to get its act together. In the US, the perpetual fratricide between the republicans and democrats over anything is affecting the development and implementation of sound foreign policies, while in the EU, there is no clear European leadership emerging, neither from the 28 Member States nor the High Representative and Presidents of the Council and Commission. The EU is once again facing its perpetual policy of risk aversion. On the one hand, the US remains conflicted in identifying its identity in this post-liberal world order, while the EU difficulty faces the inevitable limitation of its soft power. With a West in crisis, no decent strategy and/or policy to unravel, or at least contain, the Ukrainian crisis can emerge in this axiomatic moment with the making of the new world order.

What Does Globalization Have to Do with the Erosion of Welfare States? Sorting Out the Issues. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.5, 1996

Is it really true that the economic processes described as globalization are eroding West European and North Ameri­ can welfare states (WS) ? This paper is a first step in a project aimed at answering the question. Focusing on conflict­ ing arguments about the economic mechanisms which generate pressures on WS, it groups them into three answers to the title question: globalization has everything, nothing, or something to do with it. Tentatively concluding that the third answer, that domestic and international economic mechanisms do interact in specific ways to strain WS, it sets the stage for the second stage of the project. That is to analyze the political mechanisms shaping the policy re­ sponses to those strains and perhaps themselves contributing to those strains. To expore the issues to be addressed in this second step. a brief preliminary exploration of recent social policy patterns suggests that domestic political fac­ tors go a long way toward explaining them without much recourse to globalization, especially in the U.S. but also, if to a lesser extent, in Western Europe.