Scanning the Options for a Structural Reform of the EU Emissions Trading System. CEPS Special Report 107, 19 May 2015

This paper provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of different options to reform the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The options discussed include changes to address the rigidity of supply on the auctioning side, as well as reforms to add flexibility to free allocation. Additionally, other options that may enhance the functionality of the EU ETS are covered, drawing on examples and practices in other carbon-pricing mechanisms around the world. It is crucial to note that any reform of the EU ETS must consist of a package of options. Taken separately, the options may very well have beneficial effects, but they would also leave intact clear imperfections in the current design. Specifically where the auctioning supply mechanism and the flexibility in free allocation are concerned, we assess multiple options in each category, and present evidence for each option. Where appropriate, we suggest complementing these reform options with additional elements (presented in section 3.3). The aim of any structural reform should be to arrive at a set of options that forms a consistent and credible package. With this paper, we provide an evidence-based assessment of the various building blocks of such a reform.

The Emission Trading Scheme reform: will the Commission's proposal save the system? EPC Policy Brief, 29 May 2015

The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), proposed by the Commission in 2001, entered into force in 2005. It was the flagship instrument of an ambitious policy aiming to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses in the EU by making emission allowances a freely tradable ‘financial commodity’. However, in recent years, the cracks in the system have begun to show as the price of these CO2 emission allowances has dropped. In this Policy Brief, Jørgen Knud Henningsen argues that the envisaged ETS reform may not be enough to address the system’s shortcomings, and that there should be a more open discussion about its potential if it is to contribute to the EU’s goal of a largely de-carbonised economy by 2050.

Greece is insolvent but illiquid. CEPS Commentary, 18 June 2015

In a new CEPS Commentary, Paul De Grauwe argues that the Greek government is solvent but is trapped in a liquidity dilemma in which cannot find liquidity because markets believe it cannot find liquidity. He then explores the role of the European Central Bank in this self-fulfilling problem and ask specifically whether its outright monetary transactions (OMT) programme, introduced in September 2012, should be used to ease the constraints on Greece.

Something Worth Fighting For: The Evolution of Lobbying Coalitions in the Emissions Trading System. Bruges Political Research Papers 50/2015.

This thesis attempts to understand who fought for influence within the European Union’s policy area of the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS is a key aspect of the European Union’s (EU) climate change policy and is particularly important in light of the conclusions at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. It was first established in 2003 with Directive 2003/87/EC and completed its first major revision in 2008 with Directive 2009/29/EC. Between these two key Directives, the interplay between industrial and environmental incentives means that the ETS has created a dynamic venue for divergent interest groups. So as to identify the relevant actors, this paper applies the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) of Sabatier. Using position papers, semi-structured interviews, and unpublished documents from the EU institutions, this paper answers it primary research question in its identification of an economy-first and an environment-first lobbying coalition. These coalitions have expanded over time with the environment-first coalition incorporating Greenpeace and the economy-first coalition expanding even further in both scope and speed. However, the economy-first coalition has been susceptible to industry-specific interests. In its application of the ACF, the research shows that a hypothesised effect between the ACF’s external events and these lobbying coalitions is inconclusive. Other hypotheses stemming from the ACF relating to electricity prices and the 2004 enlargement seem to be of significance for the relative composition of the lobbying coalitions. This paper finds that there are certain limitations within the ACF. The findings of this thesis provide a unique insight into how lobbying coalitions within a key EU policy area can form and develop.

Productivity, labour cost and export adjustment: Detailed results for 24 EU countries. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/11, 12 July 2012

As a background document for Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/11 ‘Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustment’, this working paper presents detailed results for 24 EU countries on: • The sectoral changes in the economy; • The unit labour costs (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER) and its main components; • Export performance. • The ULC-REERs are calculated: • For the total economy, the business sector (excluding agriculture, construction and real estate activities), and some main sectors; • Using both actual aggregates and fixed-weight aggregates, as the latter are free from the impacts of compositional changes; • Against 30 trading partners and against three subsets of trading partners: euro-area, non-euro area EU, non-EU.

Europe’s New Post-Trade Infrastructure Rules. ECMI Policy Brief No. 20, 8 November 2012

After more than a decade of indecision, the EU is finally now set to implement a consistent regulatory architecture for clearing and settlement. Following the agreement on a European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), the European Commission has proposed harmonised rules for centralised settlement depositaries (CSDs), while the European Central Bank is moving forward with its plans for a central eurozone settlement engine. This paper analyses three components of the new post-trade infrastructure measures: 1) the regulatory framework for and supervision of central counterparties under the new EMIR legislation, 2) the authorisation requirements of trade repositories and 3) the draft CSD Regulation and the progress with the ECB’s Target 2 Securities project. It then discusses the impact of the new rules, and argues that, analogous to the unexpected impact of MiFID on trading infrastructures, a similar EMIR revolution may be on its way.

Backloading: A necessary, but not sufficient first step. CEPS Special Report No. 72, 20 November 2012

In July 2012, the European Commission issued an invitation for public consultation to review the ‘auctioning time profile’ for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” in order to collect views from stakeholders and experts in the field of the EU carbon market on a draft for a future amendment of the Commission Regulation on the timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning of greenhouse gas emission allowances. In this submission, the CEPS Carbon Market Forum addresses the following questions and offers its views on the Commission’s proposed amendments: Is back loading a good idea? Is there a need for following up the back loading with structural measures? What should the number be? If this cannot be addressed, what are the considerations for deciding upon that number? What price expectations are linked to the number? On what basis are they construed?

Reviewing the EU ETS review? Report of the CEPS TAsk Force on "Does the ETS market produce the 'right' price signal"? CEPS Task Force Report, 12 November 2012

Drawing on discussions within a CEPS Task Force on the revised EU emissions trading system, this report provides a comprehensive assessment of the pros and cons of the various measures put forward by different stakeholders to address the level and stability of the price of carbon in the EU. It argues that the European Commission, the member states, the European Parliament and other stakeholders need to give serious consideration to introducing some kind of ‘dynamic’ adjustment provision to address the relatively inelastic supply. The report also suggests that there is a need to improve communication of market-sensitive information, for example by leaving the management of the ETS to a specialised body.