Europe's LNG Strategy in the Wider EU Gas Market. CEPS Policy Brief No. 333, October 2015

In its Communication on an Energy Union published in February 2015, the European Commission committed itself to ���explore the full potential of liquefied natural gas (LNG), including as a back-up in crisis situations when insufficient gas is coming into Europe through the existing pipeline system��� and to address the potential of gas storage in Europe by developing a comprehensive LNG and storage strategy by the end of 2015 or early in 2016. This is a comprehensible move in the current context. Geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia explain the EU���s willingness to further diversify its supply sources of natural gas to reinforce its long-term energy security on the one hand, and to strengthen its ability to solve future crises on the other hand. Moreover, the current market dynamics could support diversification towards LNG. Increasing the flexibility of LNG trade, decreasing LNG prices and LNG charter rates and an apparent price convergence between the European and the Asia-Pacific LNG imports would all reinforce the economic viability of such a strategy. This Policy Brief makes three main points: ��� For the LNG and gas storage strategy to work, it needs to be embedded in the realities of the natural gas market. ��� The key to a successful LNG strategy is to develop sufficient infrastructure. ��� The LNG strategy needs an innovation component.

Gas demand for power generation peaked as early as 2010. CEPS Commentary, 12 February 2016

The outlook for natural gas demand is often considered bright, especially for gas used to generate electricity. This is because gas is the cleanest of all fossil fuels. The carbon intensity of modern gas-fired power stations is less than 50% that of modern coal plants. Moreover, gas-fired units are well-suited to follow rapid swings in supply and demand due to their flexibility. In the future, these balancing tasks will become more and more important given the intermittent character of the supply of wind and solar power. Gas seems to hold out the promise of being a key pillar of the energy transition and the perfect partner of renewables. Given the EU���s long-term climate policy goals, however, there is strong evidence that demand for gas for purposes of power generation peaked as early as 2010.

Malta Transformed by Multi-level Governance: More Than Just an Outcome of Europeanisation. Occasional Paper 03/2014

Malta has been transformed in many ways with and by EU Membership. This paper goes beyond the more obvious impacts of ���Europeanisation��� and instead reviews the implications of an explosion of multi-level governance on doing politics in Malta. While for most of its recent political history, there has been a clawing back of power by the central government ��� as when the Gozo Civic Council (1960-1973), an early foray into regional government, was ���unceremoniously dissolved��� in 1973 ��� this trend was reversed with the setting up of local councils as from 1994, an advisory Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) in 2001, and then EU membership in 2004. These events have created a profligacy of decision-making tiers and multiplied the tensions that exist between different levels of governance in this small archipelago state. Malta has never experienced such pluralism before. In fact, since 1966, only two political parties have been represented in the national legislature and, therefore, there has been no division of powers between the executive and the national parliament. This paper reviews the implications of these developments on two hot political issues in 2014: the International Investor Programme (IIP) proposed by the Labour Government in its 2014 Budget; and the location of a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG)-storage vessel inside Marsaxlokk harbour.

A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom's monopoly on exports. OSW Commentary No. 121, 26.11.2013

An act restricting Gazprom���s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conducted for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom���s competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. The ���liberalisation��� they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom���s competitors, they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia���s share on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road to breaking Gazprom���s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system.

A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea���s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin���s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow���s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy ��� tourism. Crimea���s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region���s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region���s economy and will raise people���s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea���s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people���s��� expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector���s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people���s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU - co-operation or domination? OSW Report, April 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government���s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ���What next?���, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government���s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ���energy shift is a huge opportunity��� and that this process will be carried out on condition that ���the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient���1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.

Ukrainian economy on the verge of recession. OSW Commentary No. 96, 2012-11-21

In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine���s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country���s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow���s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev���s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.

Iranian-Saudi tensions: the energy dimension. EPC Policy Brief, 9 February 2016

Following the execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Nimr Baqer al-Nimr, the deep rooted rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia entered a new phase in January 2016. While the main objective for both countries still is regional hegemony, the Iranian-Saudi competition takes many different forms and shapes, and also extends into the field of energy. In this Policy Brief, David Ramin Jalilvand gives a detailed analysis of the energy-related aspects of the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and its possible consequences for Europe���s energy market; both countries hold giant hydrocarbon reserves, so European energy will probably be affected by their competition in several regards; increased oil supplies will be available for the European market, while the cycle of low oil prices will be prolonged. According to Jalilvand, this is a mixed blessing; Europe���s energy import bill will be reduced, but its indigenous production will suffer, while Russia���s role in European natural gas will only continue to grow.

Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09

In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America���s ExxonMobil, Italy���s Eni, and Norway���s Statoil. In exchange for access to Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or in South America). Rosneft���s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce their positions in international markets. The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen to twenty years at the earliest.