Transaction Banking: Respecting its role in the real economy. ECRI Policy Brief No. 6, 6 December 2013

This paper sketches the main features and issues related to recent market developments in global transaction banking (GTB), particularly in trade finance, cash management and correspondent banking. It describes the basic functioning of the GTB, its interaction with global financial markets and related implications of global regulatory developments such as Basel III. The interest in GTB has recently increased, since its low-risk profile, tendency to follow growth rates worldwide and relative independence from other financial instruments became an interesting diversification opportunity both for banks’ business models and for investors. Transaction banking has been a resilient business during the crisis, despite the reduction in world trade figures. In the post crisis period, GTB must cope with new challenges related to increased local and global regulation and the risk of inconsistency in regulatory approaches, which could negatively impact the global network and increased competition by new market entrants. Increased sophistication of corporate clients, as well as the pressure to develop and adopt technological innovations more quickly than other areas of banking continues to impact the business. The future of the industry closely depends on its ability to adjust to complex regulatory developments while at the same time being able to operate a global and efficient network.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism: A Sound First Step in Europe’s Banking Union? Egmont European Affairs Paper, March 2013

The financial and economic crisis has hit Europe in its core. While the crisis may not have originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy framework. Both public finances and the banking sector have been heavily affected. For a long time, the EU failed to take into account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the two. Negative evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its downward spiral. In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the eurozone finally decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign debt crises. Faced with soaring public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they decided to allow for the direct European recapitalisation of banks when the Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange, supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by means of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, or SSM in the EU jargon, is a first step in the broader revision of policies towards banks in Europe. The eventual goal is the creation of a Banking Union, which is to carry out effective surveillance and – if needed – crisis management of the banking sector. The SSM is to rely on national supervisors and the ECB, with the ECB having final authority on the matter. The involvement of the latter made it clear that the SSM would be centred on the eurozone – while it is to remain open to other Member States willing to join. Due to the ongoing problems and the link between the creation of the SSM and the recapitalisation of banks, the SSM became one of the key legislative priorities of the EU. In December 2012, Member States reached an agreement on the design of the SSM. After discussions with the European Parliament (which were still ongoing at the time of writing), the process towards making the SSM operational can be initiated. The goal is to have the SSM fully up and running in the first half of 2014. The decisions that were taken in June 2012 are likely to have had a bigger impact than the eurozone’s Heads of State and Government could have realised at the time for two important reasons. On the one hand, creating the SSM necessitates a full Banking Union and therefore shared risk. On the other hand, the decisions improved the ECB’s perception of the willingness of governments to take far-reaching measures. This undoubtedly played a significant role in the creation of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme by the ECB, which has led to a substantial easing of the crisis in the short-term. 1 These short-term gains should now be matched with a stable long-term framework for bank supervision and crisis management. The agreement on the SSM should be the first step in the direction of this goal. This paper provides an analysis of the SSM and its role in the creation of a Banking Union. The paper starts with a reminder of why the EU decided to put in place the SSM (§1) and the state of play of the ongoing negotiations on the SSM (§2). Subsequently, the supervisory responsibilities of the SSM are detailed, including its scope and the division of labour between the national supervisors and the ECB (§3). The internal functioning of the SSM (§4) and its relation to the other supervisors are discussed afterwards (§5). As mentioned earlier, the SSM is part of a wider move towards a Banking Union. Therefore, this paper sheds light on the other building blocks of this ambitious project (§6). The transition towards the Banking Union is important and will prove to be a bumpy ride. Before formulating a number of conclusions, this Working Paper therefore provides an overview of the planned road ahead (§7).

Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean: Diagnosis and Prospects. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2013

The global financial crisis, which started in the summer of 2007 and deepened in the aftermath of the Lehman failure in September 2008, has led to a virtual collapse in economic activity and increased financial volatility worldwide. For the developing countries, the main channel of transmission has been a drop in external transactions, such as trade, financial and capital flows, and remittances. The emerging economies in the southern and eastern Mediterranean have also faced declining economic activity, although there seems to be considerable variation in the relative magnitude and timing. Most of these economies have shown a delayed but more lasting response to the crisis, driven mostly by their close trade and investment ties with the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. This book explores the fiscal, monetary and financial effects of the crisis in the region and provides an in-depth analysis of the fiscal, monetary and banking policies in the post-crisis era, the viability of their exit strategies and the future of reforms in the region. These analyses not only provide a comprehensive comparison between the countries but also provide a solid basis for assessing future economic and financial developments and reforms in the region.

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

Europe's Ungainly Banking Revolution. CEPS Commentaries, 24 March 2014

In assessing the compromise agreement reached on March 20th on how to deal with banks in difficulty in the eurozone, Daniel Gros finds that the Single Resolution Fund represents an awkward step in the right direction in that it leaves as many problems unresolved as it addresses. But the end result is likely to be quite strong, because it establishes a key innovation: a common fund that effectively mutualises much of the risk resulting from bank failures.

Banking Business Models Monitor 2014: Europe. CEPS Paperbacks, 14 October 2014

CEPS and the International Observatory on Financial Services Cooperatives (IOFSC) at HEC Montreal have initiated an annual monitoring exercise on banking business models in the EU. Based on their balance sheet structures, 147 European banks that account for more than 80% of the industry assets were categorised in four business models. The Monitor emphasises the ownership structures and assesses the financial and economic performance, resilience and robustness, before, during and after the financial and economic crises across retail diversified-, retail focused-, investment-, and wholesale oriented banks. Inter alia, this edition of the Monitor finds that banks that engage more in traditional retail banking activities with a mix of funding sources fared well as compared to other bank models during the different phases of the crisis.

A Monetary Union Requires a Banking Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 33/2014

This paper argues that a monetary union requires a banking union. While the USA developed both during a time span of two centuries, the EMU was created in the course of two decades and remains unfinished as the economic pillar is largely missing. The financial crisis and the Eurocrisis have shown that a genuine banking union is even more needed for the Eurozone than a budget or a fiscal union to let the euro survive.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

Banking Sector Soundness, Innovation, and Development: Emerging Europe and South Asia. ACES Working Papers, 2012

While most academic and practitioner researchers agree that a country’s commercial banking sector’s soundness is a very significant indicator of a country’s financial market health, there is considerably less agreement and substantial confusion surrounding what constitutes a healthy bank in the aftermath of 2007+ financial crisis. Global banks’ balance sheets, corporate governance, management compensation and bonuses, toxic assets, and risky behavior are all under scrutiny as academics and regulators alike are trying to quantify what are “healthy, safe and good practices” for these various elements of banking. The current need to quantify, measure, evaluate, and compare is driven by the desire to spot troubled banks, “bad and risky” behavior, and prevent real damage and contagion in the financial markets, investors, and tax payers as it did in the recent crisis. Moreover, future financial crisis has taken on a new urgency as vast amounts of capital flows (over $1 trillion) are being redirected to emerging markets. This study differs from existing methods in the literature as it entail designing, constructing, and validating a critical dimension of financial innovation in respect to the eight developing countries in the South Asia region as well as eight countries in emerging Europe at the country level for the period 2001 – 2008, with regional and systemic differentials taken into account. Preliminary findings reveal that higher stages of payment systems development have generated efficiency gains by reducing the settlement risk and improving financial intermediation; such efficiency gains are viewed as positive financial innovations and positively impact the banking soundness. Potential EU candidate countries: Albania; Montenegro; Serbia

The Political Economy of Financial Crisis Policy. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/06, July 2015

Highlights • Government intervention to stabilise financial systems in times of banking crises ultimately involves political decisions. This paper sheds light on how certain political variables influence policy choices during banking crises and hence have an impact on fiscal outlays. • We employ cross-country econometric evidence from all crisis episodes in the period 1970-2011 to examine the impact political and party systems have on the fiscal cost of financial sector intervention. • Governments in presidential systems are associated with lower fiscal costs of crisis management because they are less likely to use costly bank guarantees, thus reducing the exposure of the state to significant contingent and direct fiscal liabilities. Consistent with these findings we find further evidence that these governments are less likely to use bank recapitalisation and more likely to impose losses on depositors.

Restructuring the Greek banking sector with an empty purse. CEPS Commentary, 13 July 2015

Greek banks are close to collapse, even if a new bail-out programme is agreed soon. The deterioration of the economy means that their fragile capital position is deteriorating further. In this CEPS Commentary, Daniel Gros observes that any new programme needs to include recapitalisation, comprising possibly a bail-in and restructuring to get the banking system working again. With only a small part of the assets unencumbered and a government with empty pockets, the depositors might have to take a large part of the burden. As private investors are unlikely to participate in a recapitalisation, foreign official funds will be needed. A direct equity investment by the EIB or the EBRD could be used to transfer control rights, and special ESM bonds could be used to provide additional capital without entailing additional risk to the creditors

The Great Financial Plumbing: From Northern Rock to Banking Union. CEPS Paperback, 19 October 2015

The financial and economic crises have led to an enormous plumbing exercise, involving a fundamental re-design of the global and European regulatory and supervisory system. This book systematically assesses the big items on the G-20 and EU agendas and the effectiveness with which they have been implemented in the EU. Its publication coincides with the demand by European Commissioner Jonathan Hill, in the context of the Capital Markets Union, for a 'comprehensive review' of the impact and coherence of EU legislation in the area of financial services. Karel Lannoo argues in the book that much has been done by European policy-makers to make the financial system safer and to prevent banking crises of the magnitude that erupted in 2008 and 2011, but that the new framework puts an enormous burden on banks and supervisors to implement and enforce it correctly. With the huge amount of secondary or 'level-2' legislation in place, this process has spiralled out of control, and as member states always find new ways of ‘gold-plating’ EU rules, the EU always finds further reasons to achieve a 'single rulebook'. This process has to be brought to a halt, and mutual recognition, a basic single-market principle, reinforced. The new framework also brings huge advantages, which should offer benefits to all parties. Banking Union is a huge step forward, which introduces 'one-stop shopping' for banks in the eurozone, another basic single market principle, and a true single supervisor. The clarity of the new resolution framework should, if correctly applied, trigger early intervention and bring an end to forbearance, thereby enforcing market discipline in the banking sector. It should also avoid reliance on taxpayers' money to bail-out banks in trouble, which totalled 14% of EU GDP during the crisis.

Firmer foundations for a stronger European Banking Union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/13, November 2015

The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and resolution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking.The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data, however, suggests the decline has been halted. About 14 percent of the assets of banks in Banking Union come from other EU countries, while about a quarter of the assets of the top 25 banks in the Banking Union are held in other EU countries.While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely been completed, the crisis-management framework remains incomplete, potentially creating instability. There is no governance mechanism to resolve disputes between different levels of crisis-management agencies, and incentives to promote optimum oversight are lacking. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of clarity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out.To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions should move to the euro-area level, breaking the sovereign-bank loop. A fully-fledged single deposit insurance (and resolution) fund should be favoured over a reinsurance scheme for reasons of cost and simplicity.

What caused the eurozone crisis? CEPS Commentary, 27 November 2015

After five years of crisis there are now signs that the eurozone economy is recovering, but it is far from being back to normal. The authors of this CEPS Commentary sound a note of caution: although progress has been made with the banking union and new institutions like the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), more needs to be done. The eurozone crisis may be in remission now but when interest rates start to rise, or if confidence evaporates again due to global shock, the systemic cracks could reappear at an alarming rate.

Banking Union as a Shock Absorber: Lessons for the eurozone from the US. CEPS Paperback, December 2015

This book illustrates how the structure of the US banking market and the existence of federal institutions allowed regional financial shocks to be absorbed at the federal level in the US, thus avoiding local financial crisis. The authors argue that the experience of the US shows the importance of a ‘banking union’ to avoid severe regional (national) financial dislocation in the wake of regional boom and bust cycles. They also discuss the extent to which the institutions of the partial banking union, now in the process of being created for the euro area, should be able to increase its capacity to deal with future regional boom and bust cycles, thereby stabilising the single currency.