Germany's energy transformation: difficult beginnings. OSW Report, March 2013

Initiated in May 2011, several months after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Germany’s energy transformation (Energiewende) has been presented as an irrevocable plan, and – due to the speed of change required – it represents a new quality in Germany’s energy strategy. Its main objectives include: nuclear energy being phased out by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources (OZE), the expansion of transmission networks, the construction of new conventional power plants and an improvement in energy efficiency.The cornerstone of the strategy is the development of renewable energy. Under Germany's amended renewable energy law, the proportion of renewable energy in electricity generation is supposed to increase steadily from the current level of around 20% to approximately 38% in 2020. In 2030, renewable energy is expected to account for 50% of electricity generation. This is expected to increase to 65% in 2040 and to as much as 80% in 2050. The impact of the Energiewende is not limited to the sphere of energy supplies. In the medium and long term, it will change not only to the way the German economy operates, but also the functioning of German society and the state. Facing difficulties with the expansion of transmission networks, the excessive cost of building wind farms, and problems with the stability of electricity supplies, especially during particularly cold winters, the federal government has so far tended to centralise power and limit the independence of the German federal states with regard to their respective energy policies, justifying this with the need for greater co-ordination. The Energiewende may also become the beginning of a "third industrial revolution", i.e. a transition to a green economy and a society based on sustainable development. This will require a new "social contract" that will redefine the relations between the state, society and the economy. Negotiating such a contract will be one of the greatest challenges for German policy in the coming years.

Chasing globalisation: Germany's economic relations with the BRIC countries. OSW Report, November 2013

The Eurozone crisis has forced German exporters to speed up their expansion onto the emerging markets, in particular Brazil, Russia, India and China. The development observed in those countries has become an important substitute for the consequences of the economic slowdown in Europe.To illustrate the scale of cooperation between Germany and the BRIC countries, it is enough to quote figures concerning Germany’s trade. Between 2000-2011 the share of trade with the BRIC states in the entire German trade exchange rose from 5.5% to 13.3%. In the same period opposite tendencies were observed in the figures relating to trade with the USA, whose share in German trade fell from 9.6% to 6.2%. The report discusses the major tendencies present in Germany’s cooperation with the BRIC countries, and examines how the German state supports German companies in their business activities on these markets. The main method used to investigate these processes is the economic analysis of trade and capital flows between Germany and the BRIC countries, supplemented by conclusions drawn from discussions with German experts. The main issue discussed in the text is the role of the state in stimulating the expansion of German companies onto the BRIC markets. In the context of these activities, political relations and the proper use of export and investment guarantees and development aid are of major importance.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

The fiscal compact - Europe's "hard core" based on German economic conditions. OSW Commentary No. 71, 2012-03-07

On 2 March, the leaders of 25 EU member states signed the Treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union. It will introduce new fiscal constraints and officially vest new competences in the eurozone countries. Thus, their right to coordinate economic policy among them will be sanctioned. So far, the Lisbon Treaty has only provided for organisation of informal Eurogroup meetings, to be attended by representatives of the European Commission. The principles introduced by the compact, if the eurozone countries are really determined to observe its provisions, will create a new way of managing the single currency. Within the next few years, the most indebted countries will have to carry out radical reforms to boost their competitiveness and adjust it to German standards. During this period the Federal Republic of Germany will most probably decide to offer higher loan guarantees to relieve these countries’ budgets. The compact’s political consequences are also of great significance, especially considering how the treaty was finalised. The eurozone states have in fact accepted that the direction for changes will be devised by France and Germany, and the role of European institutions such as the Commission or the Parliament may weaken. From the perspective of eurozone candidate countries, the introduction of the fiscal compact means expanding the scope of conditions they must meet to become members of the single currency area. In the future, a country, in order to adopt the single currency, will have to meet the structural deficit criterion, and also most probably carry out economic reforms such as unifying its fiscal system. These goals will be achieved across the eurozone gradually, in the subsequent stages of the economic governance reform.

The expensive energy revolution in Germany. The implementation of the Energiewende is behind schedule. OSW Commentary No. 77, 2012-05-10

One year after the events of Fukushima the implementation of the new German energy strategy adopted in the summer of 2011 is being verified. Business circles, experts and publicists are sounding the alarm. The tempo at which the German economy is being rearranged in order that it uses renewable energy sources is so that it has turned out to be an extremely difficult and expensive task. The implementation of the key guidelines of the new strategy, such as the development of the transmission networks and the construction of new conventional power plants, is meeting increasing resistance in the form of economic and legal difficulties. The development of the green technologies sector is also posing problems. The solar energy industry, for example, is excessively subsidised, whereas the subsidies for the construction of maritime wind farms are too low. At present, only those guidelines of the strategy which are evaluated as economically feasible by investors or which receive adequate financial support from the state have a chance of being carried through. The strategy may also turn out to be unsuccessful due to the lack of a comprehensive coordination of its implementation and the financial burden its introduction entails for both the public and the economy. In the immediate future, the German government will make efforts not only to revise its internal regulations in order to enable the realisation of the energy transformation; it is also likely to undertake a number of measures at the EU forum which will facilitate this realisation. One should expect that the German government will actively support the financing of both the development of the energy networks in EU member states and the development of renewable energy sources in the energy sector.

Niemcy wobec wieloletnich ram finansowych unii Europejskiej na lata 2014-2020. Uwarunkowania i interesy. Raport OSW, pazdziernik 2011. = Germany and the multiannual financial framework of the European Union for the period 2014-2020. Considerations and interests. OSW Report, October 2011

No abstract.

Germany's stance on the TTIP. Background, interests and concerns. OSW Studies 52, March 2015

Co-operation between the United States and Germany has for many years been a subject of disputes. In addition to the differences over the US engagement in the resolution of international conflicts, bilateral relations have been strained as a consequence of the so-called Snowden scandal and the unproved allegations that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s telephone was wiretapped. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership offers a chance for improving relations between Germany and the USA for the first time in many years. Companies from the two countries may benefit from the lifting of some barriers to transatlantic economic co-operation. Furthermore, the emergence of in fact an internal EU and US market, with reduced customs tariffs and harmonised legal and economic rules, will pressure the emerging economies to make their markets more open. The TTIP may create conditions for exporting US raw materials from unconventional sources to the European Union; and this will be a benefit of geopolitical significance for Germany. The German government is aware of the fact that diversification of supplies of fossil fuels will make Europe less dependent on pressure from Moscow.

The role of Central Europe in the German economy. The political consequences. OSW Report June 2016

Recent publications allow us to conclude that the economic relations between Germany and Central Europe have come to the ‘end of history’, and nothing new will happen. However, a deeper analysis of these relationships reveals interesting new trends. Since joining the European Union the states of Central Europe have not settled for maintaining the average level of economic development, but have continued to narrow the distance between them and Western Europe, something which the global financial crisis did not prevent. Their improved economic situation also affected their relations with Germany. The latest results from the Visegrád Group states show them to be Germany’s most important trading partner, and their balance of trade in goods is in a state of equilibrium, while many euro area countries have recorded high trade deficits with Germany. The aim of this report is to display the trends in trade and investment between Germany and Central Europe, based on the example of the Visegrád Group. The author will also attempt to answer the question of whether the advancing economic cooperation between Germany and the V4 countries will lead to the further modernisation of those countries’ economies, or whether it will run the risk of leaving them in the ‘middle income trap’.