Shale Gas and the EU Internal Gas Market: Beyond the Hype and Hysteria. CEPS Working Document No. 369, September 2012

This paper analyses the interplay between shale gas and the EU internal gas market. Drawing on data presented in the 2012 International Energy Agency’s report on unconventional gas and additional scenario analyses performed by the Joint Research Centre, the paper is based on the assumption that shale gas will not fundamentally change the EU’s dependence on foreign gas supplies. It argues that attention should be shifted away from hyping shale gas to completing the internal gas market. Two main reasons are given for this. First, the internal gas market is needed to enable shale gas development in countries where there is political support for shale gas extraction. And second, a well-functioning internal gas market would, arguably, contribute much more to Europe’s security of supply than domestic shale gas exploitation. This has important implications for the shale gas industry. As it is hard to see how subsidies or exemptions from environmental legislation could be justified, shale gas development in Europe will only go ahead if it proves to be both economically and environmentally viable. It is thus up to the energy industry to demonstrate that this is the case.

When and how to support renewables? Letting the data speak. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/01, February 2014

Low-carbon energy technologies are pivotal for decarbonising our economies up to 2050 while ensuring secure and affordable energy. Consequently, innovation that reduces the cost of low-carbon energy would play an important role in reducing transition costs. We assess the two most prominent innovation policy instruments (i) public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) subsidies and (ii) public deployment policies. Our results indicate that both deployment and RD&D coincide with increasing knowledge generation and the improved competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. We find that both support schemes together have a greater effect that they would individually, that RD&D support is unsurprisingly more effective in driving patents and that timing matters. Current wind deployment based on past wind RD&D spending coincides best with wind patenting. If we look into competitiveness we find a similar picture, with the greatest effect coming from deployment. Finally, we find significant cross-border effects, especially for winddeployment. Increased deployment in one country coincides with increased patenting in nearby countries. Based on our findings we argue that both deployment and RD&D support are needed to create innovation in renewable energy technologies. However, we worry that current support is unbalanced. Public spending on deployment has been two orders of magnitude larger (in 2010 about €48 billion in the five largest EU countries in 2010) than spending on RD&D support (about €315 million). Consequently, basing the policy mix more on empirical evidence could increase the efficiency of innovation policy targeted towards renewable energy technologies.

Federation without federalism. Relations between Moscow and the regions. OSW Study 49/2014

The regions of the Russian Federation are immensely diverse economically and geographically as well as when it comes to their national identity, civic awareness and political activity. We are in fact dealing with a ‘multi-speed Russia’: along with the post-industrial regions with their higher living standards and a need for pluralism in politics, there are poverty-stricken, inertial regions, dependent on subsidies from the centre. As a result of the policy of centralisation pursued by the Kremlin since 2000, the autonomy of the regions has been reduced fundamentally. This has affected the performance of the regional elites and made it difficult for the regions to use their natural advantages (such as resources or location) to their benefit. One of the effects of this policy has been the constantly decreasing number of the donor regions. The current model promotes the role of the region as a passive supplicant, for whom it is easier to seek support from the central government, offering loyalty in exchange, than to implement complex systemic reforms that would contribute to long-term development. Moscow’s control (political, economic and administrative) over the regions is currently so thorough that it contradicts the formally existing federal form of government in Russia.

An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013. OSW Commentary No. 103, 2013-02-20

The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the inefficiency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate sustainable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far beyond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.

Do agricultural subsidies crowd out or stimulate rural credit institutions? The Case of CAP Payments. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 4, September 2011

In this paper we estimate the impact of subsidies from the EU’s common agricultural policy on farm bank loans. According to the theoretical results, if subsidies are paid at the beginning of the growing season they may reduce bank loans, whereas if they are paid at the end of the season they increase bank loans, but these results are conditional on whether farms are credit constrained and on the relative cost of internal and external financing. In the empirical analysis, we use farm-level panel data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network to test the theoretical predictions for the period 1995–2007. We employ fixed-effects and generalised method of moment models to estimate the impact of subsidies on farm loans. The results suggest that subsidies influence farm loans and the effects tend to be non-linear and indirect. The results also indicate that both coupled and decoupled subsidies stimulate long-term loans, but the long-term loans of large farms increase more than those of small farms, owing to decoupled subsidies. Furthermore, the results imply that short-term loans are affected only by decoupled subsidies, and they are altered by decoupled subsidies more for small farms than for large farms; however, when controlling for endogeneity, only the decoupled payments affect loans and the relationship is non-linear.

Influence of the Common Agricultural Policy and Heterogeneous Land Quality on Land Rent and Land Allocation. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 38, March 2013

Against the background of the current discussion about the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) after 2013, the question of the impact of government support on land prices is crucially important. Validation of the CAP’s success also hinges on a proper assessment of a choice of policy instruments. This study therefore has the objective of investigating on a theoretical basis the effects of different government support measures on land rental prices and land allocation. The different measures under consideration are the price support, area payments and decoupled single farm payments (SFPs) of the CAP. Our approach evaluates the potential impact of each measure based on a Ricardian land rent model with heterogeneous land quality and multiple land uses. We start with a simple model of one output and two inputs, where a Cobb-Douglas production technology is assumed between the two factors of land and non-land inputs. In a second step, an outside option is introduced. This outside option, as opposed to land use of the Ricardian type, is independent of land quality. The results show that area payments and SFPs become fully capitalised into land rents, whereas in a price support scheme the capitalisation depends on per-acreage productivity. Moreover, in a price support scheme and a historical model, the capitalisation is positively influenced by land quality. Both area payments and price supports influence land allocation across different uses compared with no subsidies, where the shift tends to be larger in an area payment scheme than in a price support scheme. By contrast, SFPs do not influence land allocation.

Direct Payments and Land Rents: Evidence from New Member States. Factor Markets Working Document No. 62, August 2013

This Factor Markets Working Paper analyses the impact of increasing direct payments on land rents in six new EU member states in which agricultural subsidies largely increased as a result of their EU accession. The authors find that up to 25 eurocents per additional euro of direct payments is capitalised in land rents. In addition, the results show that capitalisation of direct payments is higher in more credit constrained markets, while capitalisation of direct payments is lower in countries where more land is used by corporate farms.

The Relationship between Energy and Socio-Economic Development in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 27/February 2013

This report aims to identify, explain and detail the links and interactions in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) between energy supply and demand and socio-economic development, as well as the potential role of energy supply and demand policies on both. Another related aim is to identify and analyse, in a quantitative and qualitative way, the changing role of energy (both demand and supply) in southern Mediterranean economies, focusing on its positive and negative impact on socio-economic development. This report investigates in particular: o The most important channels through which resource wealth can contribute to or hamper economic and social development in the analysed region; o Mechanisms and channels of relations between energy supply and demand policies and economic and social development. The burdens of energy subsidies and ‘oil syndrome’ are of particular relevance for the region. An integrated socio-economic development and energy policy scenario approach showing the potential benefits and synergies within countries and the region is developed in the final part of the report.

The Fate of Greece in a ‘Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’: Lessons from a small island state. CEPS Hi-Level Brief, 19 June 2015 Friday, 19 June 2015

As the Greek debt drama reaches another supposedly decision point, Daniel Gros urges creditors (and indeed all policy-makers) to think about the long term and poses one key question in this CEPS High-Level Brief: What can be gained by keeping Greece inside the euro area at “whatever it takes”? As he points out, the US, with its unified politics and its federal fiscal transfer system, is often taken as a model for the Eurozone, and it is thus instructive to consider the longer-term performance of an area of the US which has for years been kept afloat by massive transfers, and which is now experiencing a public debt crisis. The entity in question is Puerto Rico, which is an integral part of the US in all relevant economic dimensions (currency, economic policy, etc.). The dismal fiscal and economic performance of Puerto Rico carries two lessons: 1) Keeping Greece in the eurozone by increasing implicit subsidies in the form of debt forgiveness might create a low-growth equilibrium with increasing aid dependency. 2) It is wrong to assume that, further integration, including a fiscal and political union, would be sufficient to foster convergence, and prevent further problems of the type the EU is experiencing with Greece.