The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8

Implementing the AIFMD: Success or failure? ECMI Commentary No. 34, 28 March 2013

This commentary considers the implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) by the European Commission. The AIFMD creates an internal market for asset management and as an endeavour to develop market-based finance is an important piece of legislation for the European economy. The author, Mirzha de Manuel Aramendía, considers the implementation of some of the provisions that raised concern among industry participants. He finds that, on balance, a practical and flexible approach to implementation has been followed that should help secure the success of the framework, which at present is still uncertain. The commentary also considers the remuneration guidelines adopted recently by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). It encourages EU and national authorities to commit to the success of the AIFMD framework, as part of a broader effort to develop capital markets and reduce the historical reliance of the European economy on bank finance.

Informational Barriers to Energy Efficiency - Theory and European Policies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 15/2009

This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.

Capacity mechanisms. A credibility test for the Energy Union? EPC Policy Brief, 11 June 2015

Recently, few aspects of the debate surrounding energy have been as divisive as capacity markets. After having given a green light to a capacity remuneration scheme in the UK in 2014, the EU Commission is now considering starting a sector inquiry in several member states. This paper aims at shedding some light on what capacity markets are about and what are the EU-specific implications, arguing that the debate is ill framed within a market context still focused on conventional power generation, and making the case for a coordinated approach to solve the fallacies of the present system.

The rise of capacity mechanisms: are they inevitable in the European Union? Egmont Paper 80, September 2015

These last years, in multiple Member States, the electricity markets have seen the rapid emergence of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs). They are meant to guarantee the stability of the electricity system in a more uncertain context. The reactions of the European Commission were late towards them. It is thus essential to bring some clarity here, otherwise the legal uncertainty could become a new impediment for investment.

The Impact of the Collaborative Economy on the Labour Market. CEPS Special Report No. 138, June 2016

The digitalisation of work is creating new ways of intermediating work, with for example platforms intermediating work between individuals online. These so-called online collaborative platforms have the potential to fundamentally change the labour market, but for the moment, with an estimated 100,000 active workers or 0.05% of total employees in the EU, they do not seem to have a large impact on the offline/traditional labour market or the create/destroy impetus. This paper analyses the direct and indirect impact of the collaborative economy on the labour market. The findings, based on a collection of empirical studies, suggest that most workers do not earn their main income through online platforms and they obtain earnings from different types of platforms. Earnings from physical/local services are, in general, substantially higher than virtual services that can potentially be delivered globally. The paper also assesses the conditions, number of hours worked and employment status, compared to the offline labour market, and finds shows large differences across types of workers, platforms, and countries. The emergence of online collaborative platforms poses some challenges and opportunities for policy-makers. On the one hand, they may be challenged to ensure minimum remuneration, fair evaluation, tax declaration and social protection, and reduction of the administrative burden. On the other hand, the new technologies may provide opportunities to (partially) liberate some professional services and activate specific groups at a distance away from the labour market. This paper was commissioned by the European Commission as input into its European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy. This Ag