The Paradoxes of Moldovan Sports. An insight into the nature of the Transnistrian conflict. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Mutual relations in the area of sports, which in contemporary international contacts often not only reflect the true nature of political relations but sometimes even affect them, can be a valuable contribution to the analysis of this conflict’s nature. Why did the Transnistrian government, despite the use of anti-Moldovan rhetoric, agree to Transnistrian athletes representing Moldova during the Olympics and in other international competitions? Why does it accept the presence of sports teams from both banks of the Dniester playing in the same leagues? Why does Transnistria, despite being much smaller, predominate in many sports? How is it that Sheriff Tiraspol, the flagship football club of the business and political circles controlling Transnistria, managed to win the Moldovan championship ten times in a row and is the main source of players for Moldova’s national team? Does sport really ‘know no borders’ or perhaps the border on the Dniester is different than seems at first sight?

Nagorno-Karabkh - conflict unfreezing. OSW Commentary No. 65, 2011-10-26

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh poses the greatest challenge to the security and stability of the Southern Caucasus. Although a ceasefire has been in place and a peace process under way since 1994, there is growing concern that the threat of the resumption of military action is growing. Proof of that is provided by, for example, the arms race dictated by Azerbaijan and its use of war rhetoric. A major factor, in addition to Azerbaijan’s increasing potential and ambitions, which is destabilising the situation concerning Karabakh seems to be the changing geopolitical situation in this region. Although the outbreak of a new war over Nagorno-Karabakh seems unlikely (as this would be risky to all the actors involved) within the next year, if the current trends continue, this will be difficult to avoid in the future. A further increase in the tension, and especially a military conflict (whatever its outcome), will lead to deep changes in the situation in the Southern Caucasus and in the policies of the countries which are active in this region.

Russia and its Near Neighborhood: Competition and Conflict within the EU. Natolin Research Paper 04/May 2011

Russia in 2004 politely rejected the offer to become a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy, preferring instead to pursue bilateral relations with the EU under the heading of ‘strategic partnership’. Five years later, its officials first reacted with concern to the ENP’s eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership initiative. Quickly, however, having become convinced that the project would not amount to much, their concern gave way to indifference and derision. Furthermore, Russian representatives have failed to support idealistic or romantic notions of commonality in the area between Russia and the EU, shunned the terminology of ‘common European neighbourhood’ and replaced it in EU-Russian documents with the bland reference to ‘regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders’. Internally, the term of the ‘near abroad’ was the official designation of the area in the Yeltsin era, and unofficially it is still in use today. As the terminological contortions suggest, Moscow officials consider the EU’s eastern neighbours as part of a Russian sphere of influence and interest. Assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, they look at the EU-Russia relationship as a ‘zero-sum game’ in which the gain of one party is the loss of the other. EU attempts to persuade the Russian power elite to regard cooperation in the common neighbourhood not as a competitive game but providing ‘win-win’ opportunities have been to no avail. In fact, conceptual approaches and practical policies conducted vis-à-vis the three Western CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) and the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) confirm that, from Moscow’s perspective, processes of democratisation, liberalisation and integration with Western institutions in that region are contrary to Russian interests. In each and every case, therefore, the area’s ‘frozen conflicts’ have not been regarded by the Kremlin as an opportunity to promote stability and prosperity in the countries concerned but as an instrument to prevent European choices in their domestic and foreign policy. The current ‘reset’ in Russia’s relations with the United States and the ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU have as yet failed to produce an impact on Russia’s policies in ‘its’ neighbourhood. The EU is nevertheless well advised to maintain its course of attempting to engage that country constructively, including in the common neighbourhood. However, its leverage is small. For any reorientation to occur in Moscow towards perceptions and policies of mutual benefit in the region, much would depend on Russia’s internal development.

The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine. OSW Commentary [no doc #] 2015-01-23

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

The Mirage of the State: Why the West has failed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 15, July 2014

The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.

Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Concerning Trade Issues. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 13, July 2014

From the Introduction. Transatlantic relations have undergone significant changes within the past twenty-five years. During the Cold War era, the United States and Western Europe were bound together by a perceived common threat from the Soviet Union. Consequently, economic issues commanded less attention than security issues. After the Cold War ended, economic issues were thought to be the glue that would hold the transatlantic relationship together. Much attention was given for several years to fostering economic cooperation through the development of intergovernmental initiatives. After the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, security issues again came to the forefront of the relationship. However, in contrast to the earlier era that was mainly characterized by close cooperation, disagreements between the United States and major countries of Western Europe about how to deal with the terrorist threat created severe strains in the relationship. By 2003, the third year of the George W Bush administration, transatlantic political relations had reached perhaps their lowest point since World War II. They have gradually improved since then, but with a significant setback from Wikileaks revelations, and even more serious strains resulting from the revelations by Edward Snowden concerning United States surveillance activities. Security issues have come to the forefront also in connection with regional unrest in the Middle East, EU nations’ dependence on Russian oil and gas, and Russian intrusions into Ukraine.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

Germany’s engagement in the resolution of the Syrian conflict. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 194/25.01.2016

German Tornado Recce aircraft have been engaged in reconnaissance operations over Syria since January 2016. In December 2015 the German government and parliament decided that up to 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers would take part in the international coalition fighting Islamic State in Syria. This decision marks a new chapter in Germany’s activity in the Middle East. The increasing destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood and the consequences this has for the EU and Germany have forced the German government to increase its level of engagement in the region. Even though Germany is a third-rate player in the Middle Eastern game, it is nonetheless ever more engaged politically and wants to be viewed as a neutral mediator between the competing actors in the region. It has also allocated more funds on regional development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Germany, whose attention has been directed towards Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, is currently turning its attention to the South. The Middle East (and Africa) is taking on increasing significance in German foreign and security policy. This may affect NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since part of Germany’s instruments and funds may be redirected to the South.

The EU cannot remain a passive observer of the Karabakh conflict. EPC Commentary, 7 April 2016

When Federica Mogherini visited the South Caucasus in March, she was quoted as saying that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a top priority for the EU. Facts, however, do not seem to match the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. As violent clashes in the conflict zone unfolded over the past week, the EU was a passive observer, with few visible signs of engagement apart from a cursory phone call urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint. The escalation has shown how quickly and dangerously the situation can develop, and the unassailable nature of the Line of Contact (LoC). If the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict show no progress, a repetition is very probable. Furthermore, it is likely the next incident will be more devastating in human and material costs than this recent one, and may not be contained so quickly. The EU needs to be part of the renewed diplomatic effort.