The Services Dimension of TTIP. Paper No. 6 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’ and CEPS Special Report No. 106, 8 May 2015

This CEPS Special Report examines the main facets of the debate about TTIP and services. First, it looks at the political and economic context and the various alternatives in terms of political support, stressing that only a partnership that ensures substantial economic gains will attract the support of the top policy-makers. Second, the paper makes the point that large economic gains in services require deep discussions on regulatory issues, and third, such discussions cannot rely on the negotiating techniques normally used for goods. There is thus a need to adopt a new approach, based on the mutual recognition and equivalence of regulations enforced in the services concerned, preceded by a mutual evaluation to grant such equivalence – all measures to be carried out by the regulatory bodies concerned, not by trade negotiators. This new game is a complex one but it has huge side benefits: it induces each TTIP partner to review the quality of their own regulations; it is at ease with the notion of a ‘living’ (evolving) agreement; and it can easily be open to third countries. All these benefits should reassure a general public that is fearful of a hastily baked deal.

This time it’s different: Turbo-charging regulatory cooperation in TTIP. Paper No. 7 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 110/June 2015

Regulatory cooperation is both one of the most ambitious and contentious parts of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. In this paper, having identified the many levels of international regulatory cooperation, we show that TTIP regulatory cooperation will be significant, but not ambitious, while political and legal limits on cooperation in both the EU and the US minimise the concerns. For transatlantic regulatory cooperation to work, it must accept these political and legal constraints, build trust and confidence among counterpart regulators so they see that their transatlantic partner can help them do their work better, and provide tools to help regulators on both sides make informed decisions while retaining their regulatory autonomy and accountability to their politicians and citizens. A TTIP that provides these tools – and some more detailed instruments to that effect – will be more ambitious than previous trade agreements, and should, over the longer term, provide both the economic and regulatory benefits that the two sides envisage. The paper incorporates comparisons with the relevant chapters of recent FTAs the US and the EU have concluded, so as to clarify the approaches and degrees of ambition in this area. This comparison suggests that the TTIP regulatory cooperation will probably be more ambitious in terms of commitments and have a wider scope than any of these FTAs.

Telecommunications and Internet Services: The digital side of the TTIP. Paper No. 8 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 112/July, 17 July 2015

In the overall negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the digital chapter appears to be growing in importance. This is due to several factors, including the recent Datagate scandal that undermined trust between the negotiating parties and led to calls to suspend the US-EU Safe Harbour agreement as well as the furious debate currently ongoing in both legal systems on key issues such as policies to encourage broadband infrastructure deployment, network neutrality policies and the application of competition policy in cyberspace. This paper explores the current divergences between the two legal systems on these key issues and discusses possible scenarios for the ultimate agreement to be reached in the TTIP: from a basic, minimal agreement (which would essentially include e-labelling and e-accessibility measures) to more ambitious scenarios on network neutrality, competition rules, privacy and interoperability measures.

Greater TTIP Ambition in Chemicals: Why and how. CEPS Special Report, 28 July 2015. Paper No. 10 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 114/July 2015.

To date, the negotiations over chemicals in the Translatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have not shown sufficient ambition. The talks have focused too much on the differences in the two ‘systems’, rather than on the actual levels of health and environmental protection for substances regulated by both the US and the EU. Given the accomplishments within the OECD and the UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), the question is whether TTIP can be any more ambitious in the area of chemicals? We find that there is no detailed or systematic knowledge about how the two levels of protection in chemicals compare, although caricatures and stereotypes abound. This is partly due to an obsessive focus on a single US federal law, the Toxic Subtances Control Act (TSCA), whereas in practice US protection depends on many statutes and regulations, as well as on voluntary withdrawals (under pressure from the Environmental Protection Agency) and severe common law liability. This paper makes the economic case for firmly addressing the regulatory barriers, discusses the EU’s proposals, finds that the European Parliament’s Resolution on TTIP of July 2015 lacks a rationale (for chemicals), argues that both TSCA and REACH ought to be improved (based on ‘better regulation’), discusses the link with a global regime, advocates significant improvement of market access where equivalence of health and environmental objectives is agreed and, finally, proposes to lower the costs for companies selling in both markets by allowing them to opt into the other party’s more stringent rules, thereby avoiding duplication while racing-to-the-top. The ‘living agreement’ on chemicals ought to be led by a new TTIP institution authorised to establish the level of health and environmental protection on both sides of the Atlantic for substances regulated on both sides. These findings will lay the foundation for a highly beneficial lowering of trading costs without in any way affecting the level of protection. Indeed, this is exactly what TTIP is, or should be, all about.This paper is the 10th in a series produced in the context of the “TTIP in the Balance” project, jointly organised by CEPS and the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) in Washington, D.C. It is published simultaneously on the CEPS (www.ceps.eu) and CTR websites (http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu).

Energising the TTIP: Political economy of the trade policy rationale. Paper No. 9 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the Balance’’and CEPS Special Report No. 113/July 2015

Despite accounting for a significant share of global trade and the resulting interdependencies from it, energy governance remains largely fragmented and there is no global framework or agreement defining the rules of energy trade. This paper, after presenting the main global and regional energy market developments, discusses the opportunities to ‘energise the TTIP’, i.e. to include a chapter dedicated to trade and cooperation in the sphere of energy. The shale revolution in the US, the ever-rising interconnectedness of energy markets (recently proven by the disappearance of the ‘Asian gas premium’) and the EU’s quest to diversify its energy supplies generally sets favourable conditions to reinforce energy relations between the EU and the US. The question, as is often the case, is whether there is sufficient political will to tighten relations in a strategic sphere with connotations for national security and sovereignty.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities for Consumer Protection. Paper No. 11 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 115/July 2015

This paper examines options for regulatory cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and assesses the challenges and opportunities posed by regulatory cooperation for consumer protection. It looks at existing approaches to regulatory cooperation by referencing a range of case studies. Based on established practice and on the European Commission’s recently published proposal on regulatory cooperation, we discuss a possible approach that could be adopted in the TTIP. Against the significant potential gains from improved regulatory cooperation, one must set the significant challenges of reconciling the different regulatory philosophies of the US and the EU as well as some differences in their respective approaches to cooperation. In broad terms, this analysis finds that regulatory powers on both sides of the Atlantic will not be significantly affected by the TTIP, but suggests that European and American legislators will need to ensure that their priorities shape the TTIP regulatory cooperation agenda and not the other way around.

TTIP’s Hard Core: Technical barriers to trade and standards. Paper No. 13 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 117/August 2015

Michelle Egan and Jacques Pelkmans provide an overview of the TBT chapter in TTIP and the various issues between the US and the EU in this area, which in turn requires extensive expositions of domestic regulation in the US and the EU. TBTs, outside heavily regulated sectors such as chemicals, automobiles or medicines (which have separate chapters in TTIP), can be caused by divergent (voluntary) standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment. Indeed, in all three the US and the EU have long experienced frictions with considerable trading costs. The 1998 Mutual Recognition Agreement about conformity assessment only succeeded in two out of six sectors. The US and European standardisation traditions differ and this paper explains why it is so hard, also economically, to realise convergence. However, the authors reject the unproductive ‘stand-off’ between US and EU negotiators on standardisation and suggest to clarify the enormous economic ‘installed base’ of prominent US standards in the world economy and build a solution from there. As to technical regulation, the prospect of converging regulation (via harmonisation) is often dim, but equivalence (given similar levels of regulatory protection) can be an option.

Quantifying Non-Tariff Measures for TTIP. Paper No. 12 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 116/July 2015

This paper provides an overview of methods employed to quantify non-tariff measures (NTMs) and then analyses their differences and looks at what these mean for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The authors find several similarities in the approaches taken. Because all studies conclude that NTMs matter, they argue that policy-makers are right to focus on ‘regulatory cooperation’ in TTIP. Given the significant differences in NTMs across sectors, policy-makers are urged to dive deep into sector-specific elements of NTMs and focus on those sectors where the largest potential gains can be made (i.e. where NTMs are highest, such as in agriculture, automobiles, steel, textiles and insurance services). An area identified for further research is the fact that unlike trade taxes (i.e. tariffs), regulatory barriers to trade are not generally targeted as the primary policy objective, but rather stem from other strategic policy concerns such as consumer safety and/or social and environmental protection. This element should be further investigated.

State Transformation and the European Integration Project. Lessons from the financial crisis and the Greek paradigm. CEPS Special Report No. 130/February 2016

The financial crisis that erupted in the eurozone not only affected the EU’s financial governance mechanisms, but also the very nature of state sovereignty and balances in the relations of member states; thus, the actual inequalities between the member states hidden behind their institutional equality have deteriorated. This transformation is recorded in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the member states’ constitutional courts, particularly in those at the heart of the crisis, with Greece as the most prominent example. It is the issue of public debt (sovereign debt) of the EU member states that particularly reflects the influence of the crisis on state sovereignty as well as the intensely transnational (intergovernmental) character of European integration, which under these circumstances takes the form of a continuous, tough negotiation. The historical connection between public debt (sovereign debt) and state sovereignty has re-emerged because of the financial crisis. This development has affected not only the European institutions, but also, at the member state level, the actual institutional content of the rule of law (especially judicial review) and the welfare state in its essence, as the great social and political acquis of 20th century Europe. From this perspective, the way that the Greek courts have dealt with the gradual waves of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms from 2010 to 2015 is characteristic. The effect of the financial crisis on the sovereignty of the member states and on the pace of European integration also has an impact on European foreign and security policy, and the correlations between the political forces at both the national and European level, thus producing even more intense pressures on European social democracy. In light of the experience of the financial crisis, the final question is whether the nation state (given the large real inequalities among the EU member states) currently functions as a brake or as an engine for future European integration.