THE NEW WALLS AND FENCES: CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE. CEPS Middle East Working Paper No. 9, June 2003

Good fences make good neighbours’ wrote the poet Robert Frost. Israel and Palestine are certainly not good neighbours and the question that arises is will a fence between Israel and Palestine turn them into ‘good neighbours’. This paper deals with the Israeli decision to construct a fence that will divide Israel and the West Bank. Almost all public debate of the wall in Israel has been limited to the security aspects. In light of the success enjoyed so far by the wall or fence around the Gaza Strip in preventing suicide bombers from getting through, the defence for needing a similar wall around the West Bank seems like an easy task. One of the main proponents of the wall concept in Israel is Dan Scheuftan, whose book on the subject has served as a guide for policy-makers. The paper provides a critique of Scheuftan’s book. The paper addresses various aspects of the wall and focuses on the different consequences of building a barrier between the two entities. Significant attention is paid to the economic consequences of the wall. The paper also looks at other issues such as the impact the wall will have on future attempts of peace-making. The paper attempts to show that the prevention of Palestinian access to Israel – the main goal of the wall – may not really have the hoped for effect of enhancing Israel’s security

Reverse Offshoring of Services: The New Wave of Emerging Offshorers. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

Offshore outsourcing of services accelerated at the end of 1990s in developed countries. In recent years, developing countries have also offshored services, not only to developed countries but also to other developing countries. Yet, to date little attention has been paid to the emergence of this reverse offshoring. The focus of this research is on the determinants of reverse offshoring of services; as such we will investigate what drives these firms from developing countries to offshore services.

The New EU Criminal Law Competence in Action: The Proposal for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse the proposed Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (COM(2011)654 final), which represents the first exercise of the European Union competence provided for by Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The proposal aims at harmonising the sanctioning regimes provided by the Member States for market abuse, imposing the introduction of criminal sanctions and providing an opportunity to critically reflect on the position taken by the Commission towards the use of criminal law. The paper will discuss briefly the evolution of the EU’s criminal law competence, focusing on the Lisbon Treaty. It will analyse the ‘essentiality standard’ for the harmonisation of criminal law included in Article 83(2) TFEU, concluding that this standard encompasses both the subsidiarity and the ultima ratio principles and implies important practical consequences for the Union’s legislator. The research will then focus on the proposed Directive, trying to assess if the Union’s legislator, notwithstanding the ‘symbolic’ function of this proposal in the financial crisis, provides consistent arguments on the respect of the ‘essentiality standard’. The paper will note that the proposal raises some concerns, because of the lack of a clear reliance on empirical data regarding the essential need for the introduction of criminal law provisions. It will be stressed that only the assessment of the essential need of an EU action, according to the standard set in Article 83(2) TFEU, can guarantee a coherent choice of the areas interested by the harmonisation process, preventing the legislator to choose on the basis of other grounds.

The New Silk Road: a versatile instrument in China’s policy. OSW Commentary No. 161, February 10 2015

Introduction. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of infrastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk Road Fund worth US$40 billion. The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integration projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Visegrad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them as components of the New Silk Road concept.

Growth for Europe – Is the Juncker Plan the answer? EPC Discussion Paper, 20 March 2015

Executive Summary. The euro area is still suffering from low growth and high unemployment. For the recovery to become a reality, there needs to be a balance between fiscal discipline, supply side improvements and actions aimed at stimulating demand and growth. Increasing investment, both private and public, are important components in overcoming the recession. This becomes especially clear when comparing investment dynamics during the crisis with pre-crisis levels. Total investment is still much lower than before the crisis and public investment is well below its pre-crisis peak as well. In late November 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker submitted a long-awaited proposal for a European Investment Plan that aims to stimulate private investment. Apart from the creation of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), through which private investors will receive public guarantees, the investment plan also aims to provide project assistance and improve the Single Market by removing sector-specific or other financial barriers to investment. While generally perceived as a first positive step towards increasing private investment, some commentators have expressed reservations about the plan. These include, among others, the lack of fresh money for the initial contributions to EFSI. Since a substantial amount of these contributions is reshuffled from other places in the European budget, the question was raised whether EFSI can fund additional projects or just replicates investment projects that would have happened without the plan. Other criticism relates to the high estimate of the expected leverage ratio of 1:15, and to the risk that the plan will only have a limited impact on stressed economies. The Juncker Plan addresses private investment, but so far there really is no clear strategy to stimulate productive public investment on the European and national level. Countries with fiscal space are reluctant to engage in higher spending, while those willing and in need of it the most are restricted by the rules. Member States and the Commission should therefore discuss options for further improving the euro area's economic governance. In addition to urging countries with fiscal space to increase investing in national public goods, investment could be treated with budget flexibility. One could, for instance, upgrade the importance of public investment in the European Semester. Additional deficit granted for public investment purposes could be attached to certain Country-Specific Recommendations. Another solution would be to allow some form of budget flexibility, such as the formulation of a new Golden Rule for productive public investment becoming part of the Stability and Growth Pact's application. Besides relying on a larger amount of flexibility in the rules, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could be another solution to fund investment in European public goods. It will also be necessary to overcome the mistrust among Member States that is preventing further action. The political bargain of stronger conditionality, such as through contractual arrangements, could improve the situation. Increased trust will also be an important condition for tackling long-reaching economic governance reforms such as the creation of a Fiscal Capacity, which could take the form of a macroeconomic shock insurance. Such a Fiscal Capacity could make a real difference in providing the necessary funding to maintain productive public investment, even in times of deep recessions. The proposals presented do not attempt to be conclusive, but shall rather be an input for a wider debate on how to increase growth and employment in Europe. The paper draws heavily on the discussion of a Workshop on Growth and Investment, which the European Policy Centre (EPC) hosted on 10 December 2014 under Chatham-House Rule, with a group of economists and representatives from the European institutions.

The New Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II): Less Accession, More Assistance?. EIPA Working Paper 2014/W/01

The EU enlargement engine seems to have run out of political steam. Support within the member countries for future enlargement is at all-time low, while some of the candidate countries have also seemed to put the enlargement process on the backburner. However, at least rhetorically, the EU is still committed to the enlargement process and maintains its entire enlargement tool box, such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) – one of the most important EU external financial instruments. The new IPA regulation (IPA II), adopted in March 20141, clearly reflects the fact that the enlargement process is on a holding pattern.

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

Western Strategic Poverty: The Ukrainian Crisis and the New World Order. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 Special Issue, March 2014

From Introduction. The Ukrainian crisis, which deepened in February with the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, has exposed a serious poverty of strategy and leadership from Europe and the US. Such a lack of strategic vision in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, considered by Nicholas Burns among others, as one of the greatest crises in Europe since 1991, diverges between the European Union and the US. It is undeniable that the western leadership is unable to get its act together. In the US, the perpetual fratricide between the republicans and democrats over anything is affecting the development and implementation of sound foreign policies, while in the EU, there is no clear European leadership emerging, neither from the 28 Member States nor the High Representative and Presidents of the Council and Commission. The EU is once again facing its perpetual policy of risk aversion. On the one hand, the US remains conflicted in identifying its identity in this post-liberal world order, while the EU difficulty faces the inevitable limitation of its soft power. With a West in crisis, no decent strategy and/or policy to unravel, or at least contain, the Ukrainian crisis can emerge in this axiomatic moment with the making of the new world order.

The new Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 12, July 2014

The objectives of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (LT) include ways to improve the democratic and international images of the European Union (EU). The focus of the literature has so far focused on the overall treaty impact and on the EU´s international role. This paper considers instead its impact on the question of the democratic accountability of the EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including its Common Security and Defence Policy dimension (CSDP). This paper consists of three parts: (1) The first part describes the changes the LT has made for the European Parliament (EP) in terms of its external relations. (2) The second part presents the many deficits that the EU suffers from in its foreign, security and defence policies. (3) The third part offers a preliminary analysis of the recently created Inter-Parliamentary Conference (IPC) on CFSP/CSDP, which in addition to MEPs (EP members) includes parliamentarians from the national EU parliaments. The paper concludes that although the IPC is a positive development in trying to bridge those existing democratic gaps, it remains only a step in the right direction due to the existence of many such deficits in the foreign, security and defence policies of the EU and of its member states.

Alone in virtue. The "New Turkish" ideology in Turkey's foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 49, April 2015

Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.

Can the new refugee relocation system work? Perils in the Dublin logic and flawed reception conditions in the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 332, October 2015 Thursday, 1 October 2015

This Policy Brief argues that the newly adopted EU temporary relocation (quota) system constitutes a welcome yet timid step forward in addressing a number of central controversies of the current refugee debate in Europe. Two main challenges affect the effective operability of the new EU relocation model. First, EU member states’ asylum systems show profound (on-the-ground) weaknesses in reception conditions and judicial/administrative capacities. These prevent a fair and humane processing of asylum applications. EU states are not implementing the common standards enshrined in the EU reception conditions Directive 2013/33. Second, the new relocation system constitutes a move away from the much-criticised Dublin system, but it is still anchored to its premises. The Dublin system is driven by an unfair and unsustainable rule according to which the first EU state of entry is responsible for assessing asylum applications. It does not properly consider the personal, private and family circumstances or the preferences of asylum-seekers. Policy Recommendations In order to respond to these challenges, the Policy Brief offers the following policy recommendations: The EU should strengthen and better enforce member states’ reception capacities, abolish the current Dublin system rule of allocation of responsibility and expand the new relocation distribution criteria to include in the assessment (as far as possible) asylum-seekers’ preferences and personal/family links to EU member states. EU member countries should give priority to boosting their current and forward-looking administrative and judicial capacities to deal and welcome asylum applications. The EU should establish a permanent common European border and asylum service focused on ensuring the highest standards through stable operational support, institutional solidarity across all EU external borders and the practical implementation of new distribution relocation criteria.

Jokowi's Victory: The End of the New Order in Indonesia? Asia Policy Brief 2014/05, August 2014

Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. It is of immense importance for the security situation and economic integration in Pacific Asia. Political events in Indonesia have a profound impact on the whole region of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections were hardly reported in the foreign media. The presidential elections in particular turned out to be a hard test for the young democracy.