Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe. Impact of visa abolition. OSW Report, July 2014

This book is the result of one year of solid work among a multinational research team assembled from seven states (Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). It aims at a detailed analysis of migration patterns and migration forecasts from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova to the EU/V4. In particular, the nexus between EU visa policy and migration dynamics as well as the impact of economic, political and institutional factors on migration from Eastern Europe have been investigated. The importance of migration policy must be stressed here. Together with demand for the foreign labour force (labour market needs, level of wages, existing work opportunities) and migration networks (including ethnic links), migration policy has a powerful influence on the scale, directions and characteristics of human flows.

EPC Special Collection: Moldavan Elections, 29 November 2014. Collection of papers recently published by the European Policy Centre on the economic, social and political situation in Moldova

In time for the Moldovan elections on 30 November, this special collection combines the latest publications written by EPC experts and partner organisations on Moldova to provide the essential background reading to the Moldova-EU-Russia nexus. This package covers issues from trade exports, to elections, to the geostrategic position of Moldova.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

An Analysis of the Capitalisation of CAP Payments into Land Rental Rates in Ireland. Factor Markets Working Document No. 68, August 2013

EDITED VERSION SOON TO BE PUBLISHED In this paper the effect of decoupling on the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into agricultural rents in Ireland are analysed using a dynamic rental equations estimated with a two step system GMM estimator that accounts for expectation error and endogenous regressors. The findings illustrate the importance of institutional details in determining the extent to which subsidies are capitalised. In the period prior to decoupling Pillar 1 subsidies were highly capitalised into Irish agricultural rents in both the short and the long run. Depending on the farm system considered between 58 to 80 cents per euro of subsidies were capitalised into agricultural rents. In the post decoupling period the rate at which Pillar 1 subsidies are capitalised into Irish agricultural rents is found to have declined. This change is likely due to short term character of the Irish agricultural land rental market, where 11 month rental periods predominate, and the freedom that the 2003 reform of the CAP offered farmers to consolidate entitlements established on rented land. The generally very short term nature of Irish agricultural rental contracts offered farmers an opportunity to consolidate entitlements that is unlikely to have arisen in other Member States with agricultural land rental markets characterised by long term contracts. The results in both the pre and post decoupling periods highlight the high degree of inertia of agricultural rents in Ireland, and the importance of accounting for dynamics when investigating the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into land rents. The high degree of inertia in rents means that the impact of previously capitalised agricultural policy persists through time.

The finance-welfare state nexus. ACES Cases No. 2013.1

At the height of the financial crisis, the Western welfare state prevented a repeat of the Great Depression. But there were also suggestions that social policy had contributed to the crisis, particularly by promoting households’ access to credit in pursuit of welfare goals. Others claim that it was the withdrawal of state welfare that led to the disaster. Against this background that motivated our interest, we propose a systematic way of assessing the relationship between financial market and public welfare provisions. We use structural vector auto-regression to establish the causal link and its direction. Two hypotheses about this relationship can be inferred from the literature. First, the notion that welfare states ‘decommodify’ livelihoods or that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff would suggest that welfare states substitute to varying degrees for financial market offers of insurance and savings. By contrast, welfare states may support private interests selectively and/or help markets for households to function better; thus the nexus would be one of complementarity. Our empirical strategy is to spell out the causal mechanisms that can account for a substitutive or complementary relationship and then to see whether advanced econometric techniques find evidence for the existence of either of these mechanisms in six OECD countries. We find complementarity between public welfare (spending and tax subsidies) and life insurance markets for four out of our six countries, notably even for the United States. Substitution between welfare and finance is the more plausible interpretation for France and the Netherlands, which is surprising. Data availability constrains us from testing the implications for the welfare state contribution to the crisis directly but our findings suggest that the welfare state cannot generally be blamed for the financial crisis.

Don’t complicate it even further: Macroeconomic Conditionality as a Substitute for new Structural Reform Contracts. European Policy Brief No. 15, May 2013

The idea of introducing contracts between Member States and the EU on structural reforms has its merits, it also has several disadvantages. Most notably, the contracts risk rendering European economic governance even more complex and cumbersome. It is therefore sensible to first try to integrate the structural reform contracts into one of the foreseen economic governance instruments. This Policy Brief argues that macroeconomic conditionality can serve this purpose. With some minor reforms, it could even become a full-fledged substitute for structural reform contracts – without suffering some of latter’s disadvantages.

Primary Raw Materials (1986-89) Volume 1 (Summary Reports of the R&D Programme). EUR 13647/I EN, 1992

"This document contains the Summary Reports of cost sharing Research and Development contracts funded under the "Primary Raw Materials" subprogramme of the Commission of the European Communities. This programme was part of the research and development programme on "Raw Materials and Advanced Materials" (1986 - 1989). The main objectives of the "Primary Raw Materials" subprogramme were to enhance the competitiveness of the European Community mining and metallurgical Industries and to reduce European Community vulnerability for minerals, particularly those of critical or strategic interest." Three research areas: Research and development exploration; Mining technology; Mineral processing.

TTIP and Public Procurement: Going beyond the tip of the iceberg. CEPS Policy Brief No. 339, March 2016

Trade negotiations involving international public procurement rules are on the rise, stimulating a growing interest in having a clear picture of the economic stakes involved, including the current level of international openness. A recent paper published by the European Centre for International Political Economy (Messerlin, 2016) made an attempt to provide a range of estimates for the EU and the US and found relatively low rates of import penetration. This analytical approach, however, looked only at the ‘tip of the procurement iceberg’, as the data used covered primarily only one modality of international procurement (direct cross-border), which is not the main avenue for international government procurement. Other modalities, such as procurement from foreign subsidiaries established in Europe, account for much more. Such an approach therefore ignores the main modalities through which foreign firms win EU contracts. Once these other main procurement modalities are taken into account, EU openness in procurement is much higher. Comparable data across all modalities do not yet exist for the US, but we do have clear evidence that the US has introduced the largest number of protectionist procurement measures since 2008 affecting all modalities for international procurement. Against this background, this Policy Brief makes four basic points: i. Public procurement is a key area of trade negotiations, and TTIP is no exception to this rule. ii. The existing levels of openness in procurement markets need to be assessed across all three main procurement modalities and not based only on direct cross-border procurement, which is not the main procurement avenue. According to this comprehensive metric, the EU market already has a high foreign participation rate, including by US companies. iii. Unfortunately, similar data do not exist for the US market. But there is growing evidence of discriminatory measures introduced in recent years, which impede the ability of EU firms to compete on a level-playing field in US procurement markets. iv. The importance of procurement as a key negotiating area requires better data and a greater analytical engagement.