Enhancing the Prospects of the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas in the Mediterranean: Lessons from the Eastern Partnership. CEPS Commentary, 24 June 2015

In their March 2015 Consultation paper on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Commission and the High Representative raised the question whether the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) “are the right objective for all or should more tailor-made alternatives be developed, to reflect differing interests and ambitions of some partners?” Such ambitious but complex trade agreements have now finally been signed with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, but they are still on the table for several Mediterranean ENP countries. Although these Mediterranean partners have a completely different political, economic and legal relationship with the EU, some important lessons can be drawn from the ‘Eastern DCFTA experience’. In particular, the DCFTA negotiators should avoid overly ambitious and ill-defined legislative approximation commitments and develop a comprehensive implementation strategy.

Brexit – lessons from four referenda on the European Union (EU) in Denmark. EU Centre, Policy Brief No. 8, June 2015

From 1972 to 1993 Denmark staged four referenda on the EU. Two of them in particular hold valuable lessons for Britain seeking new terms - in June 1992 on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Danes voted “NO” with a slim majority; this was followed by another vote on the treaty in May 1993 on the Edinburgh Agreement with a “YES” vote. Joergen Oerstroem Moeller was directly involved in all four referenda and served 1989-1997 as State-Secretary in the Royal Danish Foreign Ministry. The result of a referendum may and often will be decided by policy decisions shaping the electorates’ perception long before the voting takes place. The majority votes according to instinct and intuition and is often guided by emotions. The Danish case highlights the importance of defining clearly specific exceptions, working hard to explain the case (at home and abroad), establishing good-will, and conveying that exceptions are in principle temporary and do not require treaty changes. The objectives laid out at the start of the process must be achievable. The member state in question should not manoeuvre itself into humiliating back-pedalling at the final negotiation round: if so it arouses suspicion among the electorate that it is being manipulated and deceived. During the campaign media attention will primarily focus on dissent and scepticism presenting the establishment with the tedious task of confuting accusations of all kinds. The YES camp will be pushed into the defensive by the NO camp setting the agenda. Time and effort and political capital needed to be invested for the positive outcome.

The European Union’s Response to Piracy: Are the Lessons Learned in the Horn of Africa a Model for the Gulf of Guinea? EU Diplomacy Paper/2015

The European Union (EU) is seen as the leading actor in successfully fighting piracy around the Horn of Africa. As a global trade power with strong economic interests, the EU is also challenged by similar maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis to assess the potential transfer of successful EU instruments from the Horn of Africa to the piracy situation in West African waters. This paper examines to what extent the EU can draw on its experience made in the Horn of Africa to deter piracy in West African waters. Based on qualitative research interviews, lessons learned from East Africa are identified and subsequently applied to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The results show that the EU is only partially drawing on its experience made in the Horn of Africa. One the one hand, it is rather reluctant to use crisis management instruments such as naval operations. On the other hand, the EU is drawing on its successful leadership in international political and military cooperation from around the Horn of Africa in order to make more effective use of available resources in the Gulf of Guinea.

Banking Union as a Shock Absorber: Lessons for the eurozone from the US. CEPS Paperback, December 2015

This book illustrates how the structure of the US banking market and the existence of federal institutions allowed regional financial shocks to be absorbed at the federal level in the US, thus avoiding local financial crisis. The authors argue that the experience of the US shows the importance of a ‘banking union’ to avoid severe regional (national) financial dislocation in the wake of regional boom and bust cycles. They also discuss the extent to which the institutions of the partial banking union, now in the process of being created for the euro area, should be able to increase its capacity to deal with future regional boom and bust cycles, thereby stabilising the single currency.

State Transformation and the European Integration Project. Lessons from the financial crisis and the Greek paradigm. CEPS Special Report No. 130/February 2016

The financial crisis that erupted in the eurozone not only affected the EU’s financial governance mechanisms, but also the very nature of state sovereignty and balances in the relations of member states; thus, the actual inequalities between the member states hidden behind their institutional equality have deteriorated. This transformation is recorded in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the member states’ constitutional courts, particularly in those at the heart of the crisis, with Greece as the most prominent example. It is the issue of public debt (sovereign debt) of the EU member states that particularly reflects the influence of the crisis on state sovereignty as well as the intensely transnational (intergovernmental) character of European integration, which under these circumstances takes the form of a continuous, tough negotiation. The historical connection between public debt (sovereign debt) and state sovereignty has re-emerged because of the financial crisis. This development has affected not only the European institutions, but also, at the member state level, the actual institutional content of the rule of law (especially judicial review) and the welfare state in its essence, as the great social and political acquis of 20th century Europe. From this perspective, the way that the Greek courts have dealt with the gradual waves of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms from 2010 to 2015 is characteristic. The effect of the financial crisis on the sovereignty of the member states and on the pace of European integration also has an impact on European foreign and security policy, and the correlations between the political forces at both the national and European level, thus producing even more intense pressures on European social democracy. In light of the experience of the financial crisis, the final question is whether the nation state (given the large real inequalities among the EU member states) currently functions as a brake or as an engine for future European integration.

Oslo terrorist attacks: Analysis, consequences and lessons learned. Transatlantic Security Paper No. 4, August 2011

The attack in Norway, like every attack with a major impact, should and will be carefully analyzed, both by police and by terrorists. If the Norwegian authorities have officially called for a technical evaluation of Counter-terrorism (CT) and rescue national services, many sensitive aspects still remain unsure.

Investor-State Dispute Resolution as an Issue in Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: Lessons from NAFTA. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 3, August 2015

A major issue in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations is investor-state dispute resolution as it relates to foreign investments. The United States would like to have strong investor protections similar to those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) included in the TTIP agreement. Civil society groups on both sides of the Atlantic object to binding arbitration of investment disputes, fearing that arbitration awards could endanger environmental and other types of regulations. This paper examines the experience with investor-state dispute resolution under NAFTA to determine whether judgments rendered in these cases have had adverse effects.