The Business Models and Economics of Peer-to-Peer lending. ECRI Research Report No 17, May 2016

This paper reviews peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, its development in the UK and other countries, and assesses the business and economic policy issues surrounding this new form of intermediation. P2P platform technology allows direct matching of borrowers’ and lenders’ diversification over a large number of borrowers without the loans having to be held on an intermediary balance sheet. P2P lending has developed rapidly in both the US and the UK, but it still represents a small fraction, less than 1%, of the stock of bank lending. In the UK – but not elsewhere – it is an important source of loans for smaller companies. We argue that P2P lending is fundamentally complementary to, and not competitive with, conventional banking. We therefore expect banks to adapt to the emergence of P2P lending, either by cooperating closely with third-party P2P lending platforms or offering their own proprietary platforms. We also argue that the full development of the sector requires much further work addressing the risks and business and regulatory issues in P2P lending, including risk communication, orderly resolution of platform failure, control of liquidity risks and minimisation of fraud, security and operational risks. This will depend on developing reliable business processes, the promotion to the full extent possible of transparency and standardisation and appropriate regulation that serves the needs of customers.

The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.