China on Central-Eastern Europe: ‘16+1’ as seen from Beijing. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 166/15.04.2015

From the Introduction. In 2012, China approached the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal concerning regional cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. According to Chinese analysts, the rationale behind this breakthrough decision was Beijing’s acknowledgment of the growing importance of the region’s states within the European Union as well as a partial elimination of the ideological differences which had hamstrung cooperation in previous years. It seems that the eurozone crisis may be perceived as the reason for the CEE states’ increased interest in developing their cooperation with China. These circumstances have opened a ‘window of opportunity’ which Beijing has decided to exploit to create a kind of bridgehead in the region which it could later use in its further economic expansion in Europe. Apart from opening the CEE region up for investments, the ‘16+1’ format was intended to facilitate the shaping of relations between China and the EU and to become a tool in building a positive image for China. Chinese experts agree that after three years of functioning, the ‘16+1’ regional cooperation format has helped Beijing achieve its goals only to a limited extent. The major obstacles have included: the immense diversification of the region, barriers related to EU law, insufficient expertise on the part of Chinese companies, the asymmetry of economic needs on both sides, and no willingness within the region itself to develop cooperation. Regardless of the limited effectiveness of activities carried out so far, China has continued its ‘16+1’ initiative. This continuation and the progressing institutionalisation of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ format have often seemed superficial. China has been using this multi-party formula to improve its long-term bilateral relations with selected states in the region and thereby to create a basis for Beijing’s political and economic presence in Central-Eastern Europe.

A partial success of trade cooperation within the ‘16+1’ formula: the case of food exports to China. OSW COMMENTARY #189, 2015-10-29

When in 2012 China approached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with a proposal of cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula, it declared it was willing to meet the needs of CEE countries. Beijing had been aware of the political importance of the problem of trade deficit (which has been ongoing for years) and launched cooperation with the governments of 16 CEE countries to boost imports from these states. The years 2011–2014 brought an improvement in the balance of trade between China and: Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The remaining ten CEE countries recorded an increase in their trade deficits. Changes in CEE countries’ balance of trade with China resulted only slightly from political actions. Instead, they were due to the macroeconomic situation and to a deterioration of the debt crisis in the EU which, for example, caused a decline in the import of Chinese goods in some of these countries. Multilateral trade cooperation was successfully developed in the entire region only in the agricultural and food production sector – the area of greatest interest to China. The pace of bilateral cooperation with specific countries varied, with the fastest being Poland, Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Actions by governments of CEE countries resulted in Chinese market opening up to hundreds of local companies which, in turn, translated into an increase in the volume of foodstuffs sold by ‘the 16’ to China from US$ 137 million in 2011 to US$ 400 million in 2014. The success achieved in the agricultural and food production sector has demonstrated the effectiveness of trade cooperation in the ‘16+1’ formula. It is, however, insufficient to generate a significant improvement of the trade balance. At present, the sector’s share in the total volume of goods sold to China by CEE states is a mere 3.7%, and any reduction of the trade deficit would require long-term and more comprehensive solutions still to be implemented by the governments of individual CEE states.

Tomorrow's silk road: Assessing an EU-China Free Trade Agreement.

Foreword. The Foreign Trade Association, which represents the European and international distribution and retail sector, commissioned this study in light of the importance of China as a sourcing country and its attractiveness as a rapidly growing consumer market. We believe that open borders and free trade can contribute to a broader choice and lower costs for consumers and create growth and employment in both Europe and China. This independent study aims to provide an in-depth contribution on the status of bilateral economic exchanges and persistent trade barriers that exist between the European Union and China. The second objective of the report is to encourage a frank and open dialogue, based on a scientific evaluation and without prejudice, on the possibility of a preferential trade agreement between the two sides. This study should be read by anyone who is interested in economic relations between the EU and China and in trade policy in general. The report provides many interesting findings and raises a number of surprising points. Overall, this study is one of the most significant contributions to the discourse on EU-China relations in recent years. We hope that this study will stimulate fresh thoughts on the benefits of closer future cooperation between two regions that have been interlinked since the times of antiquity and the first Silk Road.

Continental regionalism: Brazil's prominent role in the Americas. CEPS Working Document No. 374, February 2013

Brazil has a dual identity as a Latin American country and one of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The regional and global dimensions of Brasilia’s foreign policy have been closely intertwined. Inspired by the idea of development and autonomy in the last ten years, Brazil has assumed a stronger regional leadership role. The result has been the emergence of a South American space, with Mercosur and Unasur as the main integration schemes. For Brazil, regionalism is not only a goal in itself but also an instrument for exerting global influence and for ‘soft-balancing’ the United States. Washington’s lower profile in the region has facilitated Brazil’s rise as a regional and even continental player, with a strong influence on the Latin American puzzle composed of many different pieces or concentric circles.

Will income inequality cause a middle-income trap in Asia? Bruegel Working Paper 2013/06, 10 October 2013

The Asian economy is expected to realise favourable growth during the first half of this century, but there is no guarantee. There is a discussion about a ‘middle-income trap’, which refers to a country that has realised rapid growth to become a middle-income country but is unable to grow further. A middle-income trap could occur not only if there is a delay in shifting the economy toward a productivity-driven structure, but also if there is a worsening of income distribution.We consider this in line with the theories of development economics and through a quantitative analysis. The relationship between income inequality and the trap can be explained by the Kuznets hypothesis and the basic-needs approach. Our quantitative analysis supports the Kuznets hypothesis, and indicates that,although a low-income country can accelerate its economic growth with the worsening of income distribution as an engine, a middle income country would experience a decreasing growth rate if it fails to narrow the income gap between the top and bottom income groups. The results also show that the basic-needs approach is also applicable in practice, and imply that the improvement of access to secondary education is important. A sensitivity analysis for three Asian upper-middle-income countries(China, Malaysia and Thailand) also shows that the situation related to a middle-income trap is worse than average in China and Malaysia. These two countries, according to the result of the sensitivity analysis, should urgently improve access to secondary education and should implement income redistribution measures to develop high-tech industries, before their demographic dividends expire. Income redistribution includes the narrowing of rural urban income disparities, benefits to low-income individuals, direct income transfers, vouchers or free provision of education and health-care, and so on, but none of these are simple to implement.

Germany as Scapegoat. CEPS Commentary, 10 December 2013

Germany has been an attractive target for external-deficit countries in Europe and beyond, but beating up on Germany alone appears to be the wrong way to get results. This CEPS Commentary by Daniel Gros argues that the discussion of Germany’s surplus confuses the issues in two ways. First, he points out that although the German economy and its surplus loom large in the context of Europe, an adjustment by Germany alone would only modestly benefit the eurozone periphery. Second, in the global context, he finds that adjustment by Germany alone would benefit many countries a little, but other surplus countries including Russia, China and Japan, would benefit disproportionally.

The Great Game around Turkmenistan. OSW Point of View, August 2008

The rise of a new leader of the state of Turkmenistan – President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who became ruler of the central Asian state after the 21-year rule of Saparmurad Niyazov, the self-proclaimed Turkmenbashi, who died on December 21, 2006 – has initiated changes in Turkmenistan’s political life. The new president has broken with the previous policy of self-isolation, and has directed the country towards openness to the outside world. Opportunities have thereby arisen for competitors in the ‘Great Game’, to gain political influence in Turkmenistan and access to hitherto unexploited Turkmen deposits of gas and oil. A new stage in the Great Game, which has been played for influence in Central Asia and control of access to its energy resources for many years, can thus be said to have been launched, and Turkmenistan has become the main setting for it. The major actors involved are Russia, the United States, China and the European Union.

The New Silk Road: a versatile instrument in China’s policy. OSW Commentary No. 161, February 10 2015

Introduction. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of infrastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk Road Fund worth US$40 billion. The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integration projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Visegrad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them as components of the New Silk Road concept.

Renewables: The great uncertainty of the EU energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 71, November 2014

Summary. For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a 1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target, to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new industries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its development. Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point, fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1 The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly, Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production. This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global developments: the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply. Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found. To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply. The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching these three strategic objectives. The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system. However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020, combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this downside. Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability and costs.

The EU Global Strategy: going beyond effective multilateralism? EPC Discussion Paper, June 2016

The ongoing consultation process on the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) presents an occasion for the European Union (EU) to redress the European Security Strategy’s (ESS) shortcomings and update its stance on multilateralism. As rule-based multilateralism remains deeply entrenched in the Union’s DNA, the EUGS is unlikely to represent ground-breaking innovations as to how the EU should act in international affairs. The key challenge in respect of the EU’s multilateralism is twofold. The first challenge lies in setting out clear priorities for the EU’s multilateral action to be pursued collectively by the member states; and the second in determining the form of multilateralism that would best suit the promotion of the priorities concerned. In this collection of six essays, policy analysts and academics are presented with the question: Over a five year horizon, what do you think should be the focus of the EU’s multilateral agenda? The answers dwell on the EU playing a proactive role in relation to emerging powers especially China, and Latin America as a whole; furthering the EU’s soft power through ‘science diplomacy’; and EU leadership in building a global energy and climate community, and counter terrorism measures.