German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

The ICC Debate and the EU-U.S. Struggle for Influence: The Case of the Balkan-6. ACES Working Paper No. 11, October 2007

The objectives of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) for the countries of the Balkan region are generally assumed to be complementary. They both stress and condition their support and assistance on the progress that these countries make with regards to economic modernization, build-up of social institutions, and respect for international law. However, this rhetoric doesn't always match the facts on the ground. Often, instead of dealing with a cohesive set of policy recommendations, the countries in the region are faced with contradictory alternatives and zero-sum choices. The debate over the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was such a case. It centered on whether the countries in the region should exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court while in the country and thus rendering them immune from prosecution for any crimes committed for which the US courts were not willing or able to take any action. The final outcome was mixed. Three of the countries - Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and Slovenia - decided not to give in to US pressure, while the remaining three - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia - ignored the pleas and threats of the EU and of the various international non-governmental organizations and decided to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with the US. How can one explain such divergent outcomes? I argue that the credibility of actors involved played an important role in determining whether threats coming from the US or the EU were more credible, thus tipping the scales in favor of signing BIAs with the US. However, the issue of threat credibility serves only to narrow down the choices of actors. Further determination of the outcome necessitates a look at the nature of the security context in which these countries exist and operate.

Solidarity and asylum seekers: member states agreed to disagree. EPC Commentary, 29 June 2015

At the June 2015 European Council, European leaders were meant to come to an agreement in order to help Italy and Greece cope with the increasing number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving on their shores. They were invited to give their agreement on a proposal from the European Commission to set up a mandatory relocation scheme, i.e. a scheme defining the precise number of asylum seekers that should be relocated to each member state over the next two years.

Reform #1. Why Ukraine has to reform its gas sector. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 181/01.09.2015

In April 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed a long-awaited law on the gas sector which paves the way for the extremely difficult process of reforming and de-monopolising the Ukrainian gas sector. The law will come into force on 1 October 2015 and involves the break-up of the state-owned company Naftogaz, the current monopolist, and the gradual creation of a competitive gas market in line with the so-called Third Energy Package. At the same time, a threefold increase in the price of gas paid by individual customers and the public sector was introduced. The price had been subsidised for years and no previous government had ever decided to raise it.

A European Border and Coast Guard: Fit for purpose? CEPS Commentary, 24 February 2016

In December 2015, The Commission proposed to set up a European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) as one of the key responses to the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’. The initiative intends to give Frontex, the EU’s current border agency, more competences, staff and equipment, and to rename it the EBCG. The new EBCG would work together with the member states’ national border and coast guard authorities.

Georgia and the EU – maintaining the momentum. EPC Commentary, 1 July 2016

The Association Agreement (AA) between Georgia and the European Union (EU), signed in June 2014, will enter into force on 1 July 2016 after having been ratified by the parliaments of the 28 member states. The AA, with its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), foresees far-reaching political and economic integration with the EU by significantly deepening political and economic ties. Many provisions of the agreement have already begun to be implemented, and some are even beginning to give tangible results, such as the opening up of European markets to Georgian exports. Yet this benchmark moment was somehow overshadowed by the EU’s failure to extend visa free travel to Georgians, as had been expected, despite acknowledging that Georgia had fulfilled all the criteria that had been set. Whilst this was quickly explained by the EU as being only a temporary setback, based on reasons more related to other countries, such as Turkey and Ukraine, with which similar arrangements were being negotiated, it exposed the fragility of maintaining the necessary momentum in Georgia-EU relations.