The gas target model for the Visegard 4 Region: conceptual analysis. OSW Report, May 2013

The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the Visegrad 4 countries (V4) to undertake closer collaboration in natural gas policy, notably by agreeing on a common security of supply strategy, including regional emergency planning, and a common implementation of the Gas Target Model (GTM) that European regulators have proposed for the medium-long term design of the EU gas market, and which has been endorsed by the Madrid Regulatory Forum. As a contribution to this collaboration, the present paper will analyse how the GTM may be implemented in the V4 region, with a view to maximize the benefits that arise from joint implementation. A most relevant conclusion of the GTM is that markets should be large enough to attract market players and investments, so that sufficient diversity of sources may be reached and market power indicators are kept below dangerous levels. In most cases, this requires physical and/or virtual interconnection of present markets, which is also useful to achieve the required security of supply standards, as envisaged in the Regulation 994/2010/EC.

The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

The EU internal market - a stake or a tool in European-Russian gas relations. OSW Commentary No. 54, 2011-06-24

Since 2010 we have observed a new quality in EU energy policy. It is related to the European Commission’s more or less direct engagement in the bilateral gas relations of a part of the new member states – Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania – with Russia. Although the long term outcome of this activity of the EC is as yet unclear it seems to be important for several reasons. Firstly it might increase the possibilities of the enforcement of the EU’s directives liberalising the internal gas market and specifically their implementation in individual gas agreements with suppliers from third countries (Gazprom). The consistency and determination of the EC in this field may be decisive for the future direction and depth of the liberalisation of the EU gas market. Furthermore, present developments may lead to an increase in EU and specifically EC competence in the field of energy policy, especially its external dimension. So what lessons can we draw from recent Commission activities on the following issues: – Implementing EU gas market 2nd and 3rd liberalisation packages and their main provisions – EU energy policy and its external dimension – recent developments and the EU’s role – EU-Russia gas relations – where Russian and EU interests diverge.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

Development of Multisector Alliances (MSAs): Organization and Leadership. ACES Working Papers, 2012

The research team reviewed numerous several multi- sectoral entities and identified nine GGNs that became the subject of our case studies. The research team conducted semi-structured interviews with executives and staff from each of these GNNs and prepared a profile, including a description of the unique evolution of the organization, goals and objectives, organizational structure and governance arrangements for each GGN. The following list provides an overview of the nine GGNs profiled: 1. Every Woman Every Child is an unprecedented global effort that mobilizes and amplifies action by governments, multilaterals, the private sector, research centers, academia and civil society to address life-threatening health challenges facing women and children globally. 2. HERproject catalyzes global partnerships and local Networks to improve female workers’ general and reproductive health in eight emerging economies. 3. R4 Rural Resilience Initiative is a cutting-edge, strategic, large-scale partnership between the public and private sectors to innovate and develop better tools to help the world’s most vulnerable people build resilient livelihoods. 4. Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international organizations that aims to improve transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. 5. Global Network for Neglected Tropical Diseases works with international partners at the highest level of government, business and society to break down the logistical and financial barriers to delivering existing treatments for the seven most common neglected tropical diseases. 6. Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition is an alliance that supports public-private partnerships to increase access to the missing nutrients in diets necessary for people, communities and economies to be stronger and healthier. 7. Inter-Agency Network For Education in Emergencies is a global Network of individuals and representatives from NGOs, United Nations and donor agencies, governments, academic institutions, schools and affected populations working to ensure all persons have the right to a quality and safe education in emergencies and post- crisis recovery. 8. mHealth Alliance works with diverse partners to advance mobile-based or mobile-enhanced solutions that deliver health through research, advocacy, support for the development of interoperable solutions and sustainable deployment models. 9. The Rainforest Alliance is a global non-profit that focuses on environmental conservation and sustainable development and works through collaborative partnerships with various stakeholders.

Antitrust on the ‘G string’: What’s behind the Commission’s investigations of Google and Gazprom? CEPS Commentary, 15 June 2015

The past few weeks have marked a shift of gear in EU antitrust enforcement. First, the new European Commissioner for Competition Margarethe Vestager announced on April 15th that the Commission had sent a Statement of Objections to Google, arguing that the giant IT company abused its dominant position in the “general Internet search” market and also in the market for mobile operating systems, apps and services. Exactly one week later, she also sent a Statement of Objections to Gazprom for having created artificial barriers to trade between certain EU countries, preventing gas flows and competition across national borders and charging unfair prices in five Central and Eastern European countries. It is indeed hard to recall any other time in which two investigations of this size – both potentially leading to billions of euros of fines – have been launched almost simultaneously.