ECB Banking Supervision and beyond. CEPS Task Force Report, December 2014

With publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank has set the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The centralisation of the supervision in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming months and years ahead. This report analyses these challenges in detail, drawing on the discussions and presentations in the CEPS Task Force on ECB Banking Supervision, and reinforced by extensive research undertaken by the rapporteur. José María Roldán, Presidente, Asociación Española de Banca, served as Chairman of the Task Force.

Dispute Settlement Alternatives in Future EU BITS. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2012

Following the inclusion of the Common Commercial Policy in the exclusive competences of the European Union, a handful of policy adjustments have occurred. Among these adjustments, investment protection has been a remarkable one - given its new, exclusive framework and an already established, state-level practice. As the new policy stands, Bilateral Investment Treaties, which had been negotiated and executed by the EU Member States in the pre-Lisbon period, can now only be negotiated and executed by the EU. These prospective ‘EU BITs’, inter alia, aim for an even stronger mechanism for the protection of investors both in the EU and in third states. A strong protection mechanism inevitably calls for a strong Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the establishment of a DSM may prove to be challenging. The EU currently faces several questions on its path to a tangible and reliable ‘EU BIT’, and arguably the most outstanding one is the question of the DSMs to be incorporated in these new agreements. What are the alternatives of a DSM for these new BITs? Which alternatives are currently utilizable and which ones are not? What are the current problems that the EU face, and how can those problems be tackled? Is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes an alternative, and if not, why? Following a thorough overview, this paper aims to analyse the DSM alternatives for the EU to be used in the new EU BITs and ultimately provide a solid DSM proposal.

What drives the European Parliament? The Case of the General Data Protection Regulation. Bruges Political Research Papers 47/2015.

This paper evaluates which factors influence the European Parliament’s decision-making, based on a case study: the 2012 proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation. Following a ‘competitive testing’ approach, six different hypotheses are successively challenged in order to explain why the EP adopted a fundamental rights- oriented position. The first three factors relate to the internal organization of the EP’s work, i.e. the role played by the lead committee, by the rapporteur and by secretariat officials. The last three factors are external-related, i.e. lobbying activities, outside events and institutional considerations. Based on the empirical findings, it is argued that even though the EP’s position is due to a range of various factors, some of them prove to be more relevant than others, in particular the rapporteur and lead committee’s roles. New institutionalism theories also provide a comprehensive explanation for the EP’s willingness to achieve a fundamental rights oriented outcome.