Fundamental rights in the EU: three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg perspective. Research Paper in Law (Cooperative Research Paper) 02/2013

For more than 10 years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the question of the protection of human rights had never been in issue. The emphasis was on the creation and consolidation of the common market establishing the free movement of persons, of services, of goods and of capital. Neither the initial Treaties nor the jurisprudence of the Court made any reference to the protection of human rights in the process of the creation of the common market. It all started in 1969 in the Stauder case with this very short sentence: “Interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”. Forty years later, with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009, fundamental rights are part of primary law. The achievement has been remarkable if we consider the very beginning of the process. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Court with its jurisprudence has been the driving force and the source of inspiration for this achievement.

Déjà-vu (again): The Lisbon Treaty Referendum in Ireland. IHS Political Science Series No. 133, February 2013

There has been an increasing use of direct democracy in the form of referendums on aspects of European integration. Two such referendums have been held in Ireland in 2008 and 2009 with the outcome changing from a No to a Yes vote. This paper addresses the question of what explains the change in outcome in two referendums on essentially the same document. It will do so by looking at the role of the campaign in providing information and hence reducing uncertainty, the importance of issue frames and the impact of domestic considerations on vote choice. It is suggested that there has not been a change in underlying attitudes but a change in how the Irish electorate weighed the same factors differently at both referendums. In addition, a change in economic conditions at the time of the second referendum also had an effect on how voters decided the second time around.

The Lisbon Treaty and Spain: Background, Context and Impact. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue 1, August 2012

The year 2010 will be remembered in the European Union (EU) circles of governmental Spain as a crucial milestone regarding the role of the country in one of the most important alliances of world history. During the first semester, from January to June 2010, Spain had previously been scheduled to hold the rotating presidency as done since the times of the inception of the predecessor of the EU, the European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, on June 12, Spain would be ready to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its adhesion (along with Portugal) to the European integration experiment, by signing the treaty, effectively acceding to the European Community (EC) on January 1, 1986. While all of this was set to occur, the new Reform Treaty (“of Lisbon”) was set to be implemented as a substitute for the failed constitutional text floated during the first years of the new century. Moreover, these spectacular events unraveled in the middle of one of the worst economic crises of the world, with considerable impact on the evolution of the EU and, most especially, Spain. This paper will review the background, context and impact of particular novel aspects of the new treaty governing the EU and several milestones regarding the experience of Spain in the European process.

The Member States’ Initiatives: An Inter-Institutional Turf War after the Treaty of Lisbon

With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon came the possibility for Member States to launch an initiative under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. This came into being as the scope of co-decision was expanded to cover the more sensitive issues of the third pillar (such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation). It was considered necessary that Member States have a shared right of initiative with the European Commission. One case in which the right of initiative was invoked was the Initiative for a European Protection Order (EPO). This dossier is one of the first and few cases in which the Member States’ Initiative after the Treaty of Lisbon was used. It resulted in a turf war between the Presidency and the Commission regarding the scope of the Member States’ Initiatives. This article looks into the Member States’ Initiative as it was introduced after the Treaty of Lisbon and the debate that took place on the EPO.

What Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Regarding Subsidiarity within the EU Institutional Framework?

he principle of subsidiarity refers in general to the choice of the most suitable and efficient level for taking policy action. The European Union associates subsidiarity with the way of taking decisions ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’, as it is referred to in the EU treaties. Thus, ensuring the respect of subsidiarity within the EU legislative framework ensures that any EU action is justified when proposing draft legislative acts. The Lisbon Treaty establishes new mechanisms reinforcing subsidiarity control, both ex ante and ex post the EU legislative process, and by doing so, enhances mainly the role of the national parliaments (and to a lesser extent the regional parliaments) and the Committee of the Regions. But in the end, this is a way of ensuring legitimacy of the EU action as it is quite often questioned, especially in times of crisis. Years of practice will tell whether the words will join reality.

Programming EU External Action Post-Lisbon: New Opportunities or Business as Usual?

Over 90% of the external relations budget of the EU is processed through its external financial instruments. With the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), the institutional architecture of these instruments was significantly reformed. This contribution analyses strategic programming both pre- and post-Lisbon, identifies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and examines the potential of the new provisions to increase the coherence of EU external action. The examination shows that the instruments can be categorised into three groupings: ‘the big three’ comprising the bulk of funding characterised by joint programming and responsibilities; the ‘Commission-only’ instruments where all powers remain with the Commission; and the ‘EEAS-led rest’ in which the High Representative and the EEAS play a strong role but only have limited financial resources available. The new system calls for strong coordination of all involved actors in order to make it work. Findings of a case study on the Instrument for Stability reveal, however, that so far the establishment of the EEAS has not made a substantial impact on strategic programming in its first two years.

Casual but Smart: The Court’s new clothes in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) after the Lisbon Treaty. Research Papers in Law, 2/2008

Introduction. Unintended as it was, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court, the Court of the EU) has played an extremely important role in the construction of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The AFSJ was set up by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and only entered into force in May 1999. The fact that this is a new field of EU competence, poses afresh all the fundamental questions – both political and legal – triggered by European integration, namely in terms of: a) distribution of powers between the Union and its Member States, b) attribution of competences between the various EU Institutions, c) direct effect and supremacy of EU rules, d) scope of competence of the ECJ, and e) extent of the protection given to fundamental rights. The above questions have prompted judicial solutions which take into account both the extremely sensible fields of law upon which the AFSJ is anchored, and the EU’s highly inconvenient three-pillar institutional framework.1 The ECJ is the body whose institutional role is to benefit most from this upcoming ‘depilarisation’, possibly more than that of the European Parliament. This structure is on the verge of being abandoned, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.2 However spectacular this formal boost of the Court’s competence, the changes in real terms are not going to be that dramatic. This apparent contradiction is explained, to a large extent, by the fact that the Court has in many ways ‘provoked’, or even ‘anticipated’, the depilarisation of its own jurisdictional role, already under the existing three-pillar structure. Simply put, under the new – post Treaty of Lisbon – regime, the Court will have full jurisdiction over all AFSJ matters, as those are going to be fully integrated in what is now the first pillar. Some limitations will continue to apply, however, while a special AFSJ procedure will be institutionalised. Indeed, if we look into the new Treaty we may identify general modifications to the Court’s structure and jurisdiction affecting the AFSJ (section 2), modifications in the field of the AFSJ stemming from the abolition of the pillar structure (section 3) and, finally, some rules specifically applicable to the AFSJ (section 4).