Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, 6 November 2013

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: A State-of-the-Art of the Academic Literature and Research. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, October 2013

In the last 30 years, a clear trend has come to define modern immigration law and policy. A set of seemingly disparate developments concerning the constant reinforcement of border controls, tightening of conditions of entry, expanding capacities for detention and deportation and the proliferation of criminal sanctions for migration offences, accompanied by an anxiety on the part of the press, public and political establishment regarding migrant criminality can now be seen to form a definitive shift in the European Union towards the so-called ‘criminalisation of migration’. This paper aims to provide an overview of the ‘state-of-the-art’ in the academic literature and EU research on criminalisation of migration in Europe. It analyses three key manifestations of the so-called ‘crimmigration’ trend: discursive criminalisation; the use of criminal law for migration management; and immigrant detention, focusing both on developments in domestic legislation of EU member states but also the increasing conflation of mobility, crime and security which has accompanied EU integration. By identifying the trends, synergies and gaps in the scholarly approaches dealing with the criminalisation of migration, the paper seeks to provide a framework for on-going research under Work Package 8 of the FIDUCIA project.

Global and regional financial safety nets: lessons from Europe and Asia. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/06 [07?], November 2013

The Asian financial crisis (1997) and the European crisis (2009) have both contributed to the development and deepening of regional safety net arrangements. This paper analyses the relationships between global and regional financial safety nets, and uncovers the potential tensions and operational challenges associated with the involvement of several institutional players with potentially different interests, analytical biases and governance. The G20 has acknowledged the importance of these new players for the international monetary system, but the principles for cooperation between the IMF and regional financing arrangements are far too broad and ad hoc to contribute to a coherent and effective architecture. This paper tries to establish some lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the current European crisis in order to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, equity and governance of these arrangements. In particular, it proposes changes to the IMF articles of agreement to allow for lending or guarantees to regional arrangements directly and it establishes some key desirable features and practices of regional mechanisms that should be adopted everywhere to ensure some global consistency, particularly in the field of macroeconomic surveillance, programme design and conditionality.

Towards a Dynamic Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)? EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 14, May 2013

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) launched in 1996 is into its 17th year, and has expanded from a membership of  26 to 51. ASEM membership is made up of 10 ASEAN countries, the ASEAN Secretariat, China, Japan, South Korea,  Mongolia,  Bangladesh,  India,  Pakistan, Australia, New  Zealand  and  Russia  on the Asian side,  and the  27  EU  member states,  the  European  Commission,  Norway  and  Switzerland  on  the  European side.  Yet,  with such  impressive and diverse membership accounting for around 60% of the world’s population, 50% of global GDP,  and up to 60% of world trade, it remains relatively unknown in the public domain. There is also a palpable sense  that not all is well as interest in ASEM (particularly among the leaders) may wane without adequate follow‐up  actions, concrete deliverables and improved visibility.    The  challenges faced by ASEM were discussed in a recent Symposium in Yangzhou organised by the Chinese  government and co‐sponsored by Laos, India, Poland and the Asia‐Europe Foundation (ASEF).    Into its 17th year, ASEM remains essentially a forum for dialogue. After an initial euphoria following the launch   of the inaugural summit in Bangkok in 1996, symbolising Asia’s and Europe’s commitment to step up engagement  with each other, ASEM has since been plagued by the perennial questions of its lack of effectiveness, efficacy and  visibility, and doubts about sustained interest by its political leaders in light of the lack of concrete deliverables.   This paper drawn in part from an earlier article on The Asia‐Europe Meeting (ASEM) in the Palgrave Handbook on  EU‐Asia Relations (2013), and from the discussions at the above ASEM Symposium, will begin with an examination  of the on‐going debates with regards to the challenges faced by ASEM and the various suggestions to address  some  of these  challenges.  The  paper will  conclude with some  observations  on the real  issues  behind these  debates and a prognosis on the future development of ASEM.   

Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe. Research Paper in Law 07/2013

This article examines why, how, and with what results have judicial councils spread under the influence of European institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the course of the last twenty years. It first traces back how the judicial councils, themselves just one possible form of administration of courts, have emerged as the recommended universal solution Europe-wide and internationally. Second, it discusses how has this model been exported under the patronage of European and international institutions to transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing, thirdly, the reality of the functioning of such new judicial councils in these countries, in particular in Slovakia and Hungary, with the Czech Republic without a judicial council providing a counter-example, it is suggested that their impact on further judicial and legal transition has been either questionable or outright disastrous. This brings, eventually, into question the legitimacy as well as the bare reasonableness of the entire process of European/international standards setting and their later marketing or in reality rather imposition onto the countries in transition.

Developing an Analytical Framework on Social Cohesion in Singapore. Reflections from the framing of social cohesion debates in the OECD and Europe. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 17, November 2013

Official discourse in Singapore on social cohesion is often framed along the broad parameters of achieving racial and religious harmony. Many policies – formal and informal – and several laws evolved to manage these two aspects of society. Yet, as Singapore developed and with a much more complex socioeconomic environment both domestically and externally, there is perhaps a need to re-look the discourse and framework for discussing social cohesion. This paper takes a critical look at how the issue of social cohesion is framed in academic literature and policy discussions in Europe and the OECD, and tries to develop a broader analytical framework that could be useful in the Singapore context as it struggles with the multiple fault lines in society (beyond race and religion) that have emerged in the last decade or so.

Europe's social problem and its implications for economic growth. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/03, 1 April 2014

The European Union faces major social problems. More than six million jobs were lost from 2008-13 and poverty has increased. Fiscal consolidation has generally attempted to spare social protection from spending cuts, but the distribution of adjustment costs between the young and old has been uneven; a growing generational divide is evident, disadvantaging the young. The efficiency of the social security systems of EU countries varies widely. Countries with greater inequality tended to have higher household borrowing prior to the crisis resulting in more subdued consumption growth during the crisis. The resulting high private debt, high unemployment, poverty and more limited access to education undermine long-term growth and social and political stability. Policymakers face three main challenges. First, addressing unemployment and poverty should remain a high priority not only for its own sake, but because these problems undermine public debt sustainability and growth. Second, bold policies in various areas are required. Most labour, social and fiscal policies are the responsibility of member states, requiring national reforms. But better coordination of demand management at European level is also necessary in order to create jobs. Third, tax/benefit systems should be reviewed for improved efficiency, inter- generational equity and fair burden sharing between the wealthy and poor.

How much does EU citizenship cost? The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair: A breakthrough for sincere cooperation in citizenship of the union? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 64, April/2014

How much does European citizenship cost in the EU? This was the question that has raised so much controversy over the Maltese citizenship-for-sale programme. The outright selling of Maltese nationality to rich foreigners led to unprecedented responses by the European Parliament and European Commission. This paper examines the affair and its relevance for current and future configurations of citizenship of the EU. It studies the extent to which member states are still free to lay down the grounds for the acquisition and loss of nationality without any EU supervision and accountability. It provides a comparative overview of member state schemes and the exact price for buying citizenship and a residency permit in the EU. It is argued that the EU’s intervention on the Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair constitutes a legal precedent for assessing the lawfulness of passport-for-sale or golden migration programmes in other EU member states. The affair has also revealed the increasing relevance of a set of European and international legal principles limiting member states’ discretion over citizenship matters and providing a supranational constellation of accountability venues scrutinising the impact of their decisions over citizenship of the Union. The Maltese citizenship-for-sale affair has placed at the forefront the EU general principle of sincere cooperation in nationality matters. Member states’ actions in the citizenship domain cannot negatively affect in substance the concept and freedoms of European citizenship. That notwithstanding, the European institutions’ insistence on the need for Maltese nationality law to require a ‘genuine link’ in the form of an effective residence criteria for any rich applicants to benefit from the fast-track naturalisation poses a fundamental dilemma from the angle of Union citizenship: what is this genuine link really about? And what is precisely ‘habitual’, ‘effective’ or ‘functional’ residence? It is argued that by supporting the ‘real connections’ as the most relevant standard, the European institutions may be paradoxically fuelling nationalistic misuses by member states of the ‘genuine link’ as a way to justify restrictive integration policies on the acquisition of nationality.

Europe is still standing. CEPS Commentary, 6 June 2014

Despite the fact that anti-establishment, mostly euro-sceptic parties won about one-fifth of the vote in the European Parliament elections last month, Daniel Gros insists that it is not quite accurate (or fair) to characterise the result as a rejection of Europe. He argues that the deeper roots of the surge of euro-sceptic and other protest parties originate with the general dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and dysfunctional national political systems. Tinkering with austerity or the fundamental right of free movement within the EU will not make much of a difference and, in his view, only reform at home, in national capitals, will stem the tide of euro-scepticism.

Did the German court do Europe a favor? Bruegel Working Paper 2014/09, July 2014

The European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme was a politically-pragmatic tool to diffuse the euro-area crisis. But it did not deal with the fundamental incompleteness of the European monetary union. As such, it blurred the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy. The fuzziness of this boundary helped in the short-term but pushed political and economic risks to the future. Unless a credible commitment to enforcing losses on private creditors is instituted, these conundrums will persist. The German Federal Constitutional Court has helped by insisting that such a dialogue be conducted in order to achieve a more durable political and economic solution. A study of the European Union Court of Justice’s Pringle decision (Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, Case C-370/12, ECJ, 27 November 2012) suggests that the ECJ will also not rubber-stamp the OMT – and, if it does, the legal victory will not resolve the fundamental dilemmas.

Reflections on quasi-loss of nationality in comparative, international and European perspective. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 66/August 2014

This paper focuses on situations in which a person is said never to have had the nationality of a country, even though (s)he assumed (and in many cases the authorities of the country concerned shared that assumption) that (s)he possessed that nationality. Contrary to situations of loss of nationality, where something is taken away that had existed, quasi-loss involves situations in which nationality was never acquired. This contribution seeks to examine whether a person should under certain circumstances be protected against quasi-loss of nationality. In order to do so, the paper first maps out situations of quasi-loss in EU member states, describing typical cases in which a person never acquired the nationality of the country, although (s)he was at some time considered as a national. Drawing on this taxonomy, the paper attempts to uncover whether national, European and international laws offer some protection, and if yes, to which extent, for situations of quasi-loss. It concludes with outlining best practices which Member States should comply with in handling such situations.

The government Europe deserves? CEPS Commentary, 17 September 2014

Leaders of the EU’s institutions have to be political entrepreneurs if they are to leave a mark on history. Their decision-making power is limited, but they can often frame the choices and broker coalitions to push the existing boundaries of European integration. This Commentary by Daniel Gros finds that none of the EU’s top three new faces – Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk or Federica Mogherini – has a track record in this sense. In his view, the most sobering message from the whole appointment process is that the member states’ leaders will not suffer anyone who might rock the boat and push integration forward. That there will be little movement towards the “ever-closer union” envisioned in the Treaty of Rome might come as a relief for those fearing domination by Brussels (like many in the UK), but it can only dismay those who hope that, despite its sluggish economy and declining population, Europe can become a relevant global actor.

Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU’s new leadership. EPC Challenge Europe Issue 22, September 2014

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE AVAILABLE ON THE ARCHIVE AS SEPARATE ARTICLES. There has been a lot of attention on the current transition of power taking place in Brussels. The new EU leadership will be confronted with a number of internal and external challenges. They will have deal with economic stagnation, the negative effects of fragmentation and the need to increase the Union's legitimacy. There is no better moment to take stock of the ‘state of the Union’ and to look ahead into the next European political cycle (2014-2019), focusing not on personalities but on content: what challenges do we face and what should the EU focus on in the coming years? These new beginnings will encounter new challenges, and who better understands the issues than some of the key players in European politics. Challenge Europe brings these players together and explores what social, political and economic challenges are facing Europe, and its’ citizens.

Social cohesion in Europe after the crisis

In the last few years, Europe has been forced to re-think its socio-economic model. Social indicators speak for themselves. Real household income declined significantly between 2008 and 2012, employment rates are lower and the number of people in poverty saw a steady rise with a growing divergence between EU countries. In the eurozone, cuts in public spending and internal devaluation have been the main tools to aim at a correction of unsustainable fiscal positions and a strengthening of competitiveness. It has carried a heavy social price tag. Outside of the eurozone, austerity has also been the prevailing policy, seen as inevitable to avoid economic instability. The crisis has not hit everyone equally. The general losses have been high, but there have also been some quite important redistributive effects. With all the difficulties of defining and measuring 'fairness', it is clear that the adjustment has not been equitable. Apart from issues of market failure, there have been direct increases of inequality within each of the member states. Higher poverty rates have been observed, rises in inequalities between higher and lower income earners as well as intergenerational inequalities between age groups. Long-term consequences are only beginning to surface in the public debate as the most immediate pressures of the crisis are slowly overcome. In this report, the authors first of all look at the results of the survey we have carried out in seven European countries and review perceptions of the socio-economic model. Subsequently, they assess the importance of the social dimension in the broader context of the European growth model. The authors discuss the impact of the structural challenges of globalisation, demography and technological change. They then review the EU’s performance in the crisis. Finally, the authors make a number of recommendations on how to bridge the gap between Europeans‘ expectations and reality.

Migration and Integration. Common Challenges and Responses from Europe and Asia

With the signing of the ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors (FA) in 2004, migration and integration issues gained significance on the agenda. Primarily concerned with increasing economic growth, this framework excludes the integration of low and unskilled migrant workers; instead, ASEAN efforts to address migration and integration issues have been limited to Mutual Recognition Agreements for skilled labour and professionals. After an analysis of migration policy in the region, we highlight specific barriers to the integration of labour migrants in two priority sectors – nursing, which is highly regulated by the state, and Information, Communications and Technology (ICT), which is typically selfregulated and privately run. Despite a MRA for nursing allowing registered nurses to practice in another ASEAN country under supervision of local nurses without registering with the host country’s nursing regulatory authority, in practice, there are major barriers to the free movement of nurses within ASEAN in terms of skills recognition, licensure requirements and other protectionist measures. Although regulations governing the inflow of ICT professionals are not as stringent as those for healthcare professionals, private costs associated with job search and gaining foreign employment are higher in the ICT sector, largely due to limited information on international mobility within the industry. Three sets of barriers to greater integration are discussed. First, the economic and political diversity within ASEAN makes integration more problematic than in the European Union. Second, the primary concern with value-adding economic growth means that regional agreements are focused on skilled and professional labour migration only. Third, the “ASEAN way” of doing things – via a strong emphasis on consensus and non-interference with domestic policies – often means that the FA provision for the free movement of labour is usually trumped by domestic policies that do not reflect the same desire for labour integration.