44 resultados para Criminal Sanctions
Resumo:
Over the last two decades, the European Union (EU) has increasingly relied on the use of restrictive measures in its external action. The EU has shown itself to be more open to the possibility of resorting to sanctions outside the United Nations, as well as in cooperation with other international actors, such as the United States. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has blocked and is expected to block any efforts of using this international body to address the crisis in Ukraine so the EU cannot hope for a global sanctions regime and is forced to use a unilateral sanctions regime, in cooperation with some other like-minded players (US, Canada, Australia, Japan).
Resumo:
The increasingly frequent imposition of sanctions by the EU over the past decade has not been accompanied by a thorough pre-assessment and contingency planning stage, which, argue the authors, has led to the formulation of suboptimal sanctions regimes. This paper proposes a practical pre-assessment and contingency planning of sanctions – a checklist, which departs from the ‘ad hoc-ism’ of current decision-making on sanctions. The checklist includes the identification of resources linked to the objectionable policies; the leverage of the EU; the costs to the EU; the legality of the measures; their unintended effects; the expected contribution towards EU goals; their coherence with overall EU external relations; and the communication of these policies.
Resumo:
Russia has been Moldova’s main trade partner and Russian capital has accounted for a large part of its foreign investments, dominating in the energy and the banking sectors. Moreover, Russia has been a key job market for Moldovan expatriate workers. In the economic sphere, this is making Moldova unilaterally dependent on Russia. Moscow has been attempting to exploit this situation to put pressure on the authorities in Chișinău for quite some time. In recent months Russia has increasingly used instruments for exerting economic pressure on Moldova, as a means of responding to the current authorities’ pro-Western policy. A key element of this policy was Moldova’s signing on 27 June 2014 of the Association Agreement with the EU (which came into force on 1 September 2014). Over the last year, Russia has implemented a number of import restrictions on Moldovan goods. The aim of the Russian actions is to fuel social disappointment, and ultimately – to prevent the pro-European coalition currently in power from winning the parliamentary elections scheduled for 30 November 2014. Another aim might be to convince the Moldovan authorities to suspend the implementation of the Association Agreement – a plan openly put forward by Vladimir Putin during the CIS summit in Minsk on 10 October 2014. So far, however, the Russian economic sanctions have failed to produce the expected results. Support for the pro-European parties has been high, and there is little chance that the pro-Russian groups might achieve a parliamentary majority. It is not inconceivable, then, that in the upcoming months Moscow might decide to resort to other, more potent instruments of economic pressure such as speculation on the financial market, carried out as part of its de facto control over the banking sector. Another possibility is further tightening of trade restrictions, issuing expatriate workers from Russia or using Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy.
Resumo:
This study examines the legal and political implications of the forthcoming end of the transitional period for the measures in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, as set out in Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties. This Protocol limits some of the most far-reaching innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon over EU cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs for a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (until 1 December 2014), and provides the UK with special ‘opt out/opt-in’ possibilities. The study focuses on the meaning of the transitional period for the wider European Criminal Justice area. The most far-reaching change emerging from the end of this transition will be the expansion of the European Commission and Luxembourg Court of Justice scrutiny powers over Member States’ implementation of EU criminal justice law. The possibility offered by Protocol 36 for the UK to opt out and opt back in to pre-Lisbon Treaty instruments poses serious challenges to a common EU area of justice by further institutionalising ‘over-flexible’ participation in criminal justice instruments. The study argues that in light of Article 82 TFEU the rights of the defence are now inextricably linked to the coherency and effective operation of the principle of mutual recognition of criminal decisions, and calls the European Parliament to request the UK to opt in EU Directives on suspects procedural rights as condition for the UK to ‘opt back in’ measures like the European Arrest Warrant.
Resumo:
This paper examines an instrument which establishes an explicit link between economic power and foreign policy of the European Union (EU): restrictive measures or sanctions. As the EU is increasingly confronted with situations requiring a firm response, sanctions – arguably the EU’s ‘hardest’ tool – have become somewhat of a standard reaction. To what extent are sanctions a relevant tool for EU external action? By looking at several case studies from a set of 47 autonomous EU sanction cases, this paper acknowledges the many internal and external difficulties the EU faces when using the sanctions tool. However, it also shows that despite those challenges, the ‘hard’ and coercive nature of the sanction instrument nevertheless make it a relevant foreign policy tool which allows the EU to react to external crises.
Resumo:
Summary. The EU’s attempts to adopt an EU-wide instrument on the right to access to legal aid in criminal proceedings have not been successful so far. The important issue was originally part of Measure C of the Roadmap for criminal procedural rights,1 but due to political difficulties legal aid was dropped from the agenda. However, on a different plane agreement was reached on this topic as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted the world’s first international instrument dedicated to access to legal aid in December 2012.2 This policy brief argues that the EU should carry on in the ‘spirit’ of these recent developments and adopt a directive providing suspects and defendants with access to legal aid. 1 Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ C 295/1, 4 December 2009; hereafter will be referred to this Council Resolution as the ‘Roadmap’; for further information see M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The EU Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings’, 4 EUCrim (2009), 157-161. 2 United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, A/Res/67/187, 20 December 2012; from here on will be referred to this as the ‘Resolution’.
Resumo:
Since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the start of the conflict in the Donbass region, the EU has introduced three waves of restrictive measures against Russia, which are regularly updated. Having thus expanded from measures targeting individuals to entire sectors, the current EU sanctions policy impacts Russia’s financial markets, energy sector and defence industry. On top of this, new bans affect EU investments, services and trade in Crimea and Sevastopol. While they hurt the Russian economy, the EU sanctions also have a boomerang effect, especially in conjunction with the countersanctions imposed by the Kremlin on EU food imports. In this lose-lose situation, the usefulness of the EU sanctions has been called into doubt, in particular in those EU member states that are the most economically intertwined with Russia. How successful has the EU been so far in pushing its case with the Kremlin and what moves are left for the two main actors in the sanctioner-sanctionee ‘Game of Thrones’? This Working Document offers a SWOT analysis of the EU sanctions policy towards Russia and identifies the Strengths for the EU to cultivate, Weaknesses to minimise, Opportunities to seize and Threats to counteract.
Resumo:
The decision process leading to the imposition of sanctions against Russia in response to its annexation of Crimea and its subsequent military intervention in Eastern Ukraine has been very difficult for the EU, with some member states claiming that they have been particularly hard hit because exports to Russia are important to their economies. This commentary shows, however, that the economic cost in terms of lost exports, and thus potentially jobs, has in reality been negligible.
E.C. Places Economic Sanctions on South Africa. European Community News No. 27/86, 16 September 1986
Resumo:
Although they are not the deciding factor, the Western financial sanctions are nevertheless an important factor affecting the deteriorating economic situation in Russia. They have significantly undermined the opportunities which Russian companies have to attract foreign capital, thus contributing to the deterioration of their financial condition (which is particularly prominent in the case of energy firms subject to sanctions). Therefore, Russian businesses need more support from the state. However, this support is becoming more difficult due to the dramatic fall in oil prices – revenues from oil exports are the main source of budget revenue.
Resumo:
After Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and then intervened, manu militari, in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the European Union wanted to show its disapproval and put pressure on Russia to change its behaviour. A wide variety of measures were taken, including the imposition of individual restrictions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, but also the suspension of development loans from the EBRD. But the EU (together with the United States) also took, in July and September 2014, a set of broader measures: limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for targeted Russian financial institutions and energy and defence companies; export and import bans on trade in arms; an export ban for dual-use goods and reduction of Russia’s access to sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.