Cross-country insurance mechanisms in currency unions. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/04, 27 March 2014

Countries in a monetary union can adjust to shocks either through internal or external mechanisms. We quantitatively assess for the European Union a number of relevant mechanisms suggested by Mundell’s optimal currency area theory, and compare them to the United States. For this purpose, we update a number of empirical analyses in the economic literature that identify (1) the size of asymmetries across countries and (2) the magnitude of insurance mechanisms relative to similar mechanisms and compare results for the European Monetary Union (EMU) with those obtained for the US. To study the level of synchronization between EMU countries we follow Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007). To measure the effect of an employment shock on employment levels, unemployment rates and participation rates we perform an analysis based on Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995). We measure consumption smoothing through capital markets, fiscal transfers and savings, using the approach by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Afonso and Furceri (2007). To analyze risk sharing through a common safety net for banks we perform a rudimentary simulation analysis. |

The Arms Trade Treaty and the Control of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2013

This paper seeks to delineate some preliminary factors and working methods that could work in favour of establishing a workable international export control regime for dual-use goods and technologies. Drawing on the work initiated by various United Nations initiatives and the Wassenaar Agreement, but specifically looking at the European Union export regime model, this working paper asks if and how a similar model could be adopted at the international level. Far from suggesting that the EU regime should of could be adopted on a global basis or that the regime is full-proof, the authors acknowledge that EU regulations are seen as among the most stringent of frameworks on dual-use goods and technologies available. Accordingly, this paper asks what elements of the EU’s control regime could be of international benefit after the ATT negotiations and how it could be adopted on a more international basis. Indeed, any future ATT control mechanism for dual-use items will have to draw on existing arms transfers and control regimes. It does this through an analysis of the ATT and the current discourse on dual-use goods and technologies in the negotiations, an stocktaking of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s export control regime and by asking what elements of the EU’s regime could be utilised for international control mechanisms after a future ATT is negotiated.