Defining an Institutional Framework for the Labour Market. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 24, February 2012

This paper describes a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of farmers’ labour allocation decisions. The paper presents a brief overview of previous farm household labour allocation studies. Following this, the agricultural household model, developed by Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986), which has been frequently applied to the study of labour allocation, is described in more depth. The agricultural household model, the theoretical model to be used in this analysis, is based on the premise that farmers behave to maximise utility, which is a function of consumption and leisure. It follows that consumption is bound by a budget constraint and leisure by a time constraint. The theoretical model can then be used to explain how farmers decide to allocate their time between leisure, farm work and off-farm work within the constraints of a finite time endowment and a budget constraint. Work, both farm and off-farm, provides a return to labour which in turn relaxes the budget constraint allowing the farm household to consume more. The theoretical model can also be used to explore the impact on government policies on labour allocation. It follows that subsidies that decrease commodity prices, such as reductions in intervention prices, mean that farmers have to work more (either on or off the farm) to maintain income and consumption levels. On the other hand, income support subsidies that are not linked to output or labour, such as decoupled subsidies, are a source of non-labour income and as such allow farmers to work less while maintaining consumption levels, known as the wealth effect.

The Institutional Framework of the Labour Market. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 25, February 2012

Following the identification of relevant labour market characteristics in Deliverable 9.1 (Factor Markets Working Paper No. 25), a survey was designed and implemented across the participant countries in the Factor Markets project. These survey results are detailed in this paper, Deliverable 9.3. The focus is of the survey, which was completed with the assistance of project partner teams, included, employment market, labour legislation, wage-setting mechanisms, unions, taxation and social benefits, education and training, labour mobility and general features of agriculture. Based on the questions posed and the responses received in the survey, in broad terms the agricultural labour market characteristics in the countries under study are not as heterogeneous as one might anticipate. Some of the differences, such as minimum rates of pay, are common to sectors other than agriculture also. There is a notable lack of a regional pattern to the labour market characteristics, i.e. no strong evidence of a north/south or east/west divide. Moreover, the labour market characteristics of one country are not necessarily a good indicator of the labour market characteristics of neighbouring countries.

Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013

This paper describes and compares the institutional framework of the agricultural credit markets in selected European countries. The institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in situations where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in importance. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to agricultural financial experts in selected countries. The case studies show that credit regulations are typically general, with no specific regulations for the agricultural credit market. On the other hand, several countries support agricultural credit in various forms, implying that the governments do not perceive the general credit market to function in the case of agricultural firms. In a risk assessment, the most frequent reasons for rejecting a loan application are all linked to economic performance and the situation of the farmer. Personal characteristics, such as educational level or lack of experience, were generally perceived as less influential. Another interesting point when it comes to risk assessment is that in some countries the importance of asset-based lending compared with cash flow-based lending seems to differ when concerning a first-time applicant and when there is an application to extend a loan. To get an idea of the availability of credit, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was calculated, and it showed remarkably low values for Poland and Slovakia. For all the countries, the calculated value was lower than what the financial experts would have expected. This might imply credit rationing in agriculture in some of the countries studied. The financial experts all judged the possibility of an agricultural firm obtaining a loan as higher than that for other small rural firms, implying that the latter are also credit-rationed.

Performance Indicators in Agricultural Financial Markets. Factor Markets Working Document No. 43, May 2013

This study attempts to develop performance indicators for the financial markets based on the findings in an earlier Factor Markets Working Paper (No. 33, “Agricultural credit market institutions: A comparison of selected European countries”) and on FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) data. Two indicators were developed. One measured the long-term economic sustainability of agricultural firms since the financial characteristics of the firms were perceived as important factors when rejecting a loan applicant. If the indicator works, it should show that a low value in this indicator is related to the performance in the financial markets. The second indicator was the loan-to-value (LTV), or debt-to-asset ratio, the reasoning behind this indicator is that low values can point to credit constraints, and in WP 33 we saw that the interviewed experts expected LTVs to be much higher than what is actually the case. We find that the first indicator can’t be used to measure the performance of the financial institutions, since we can’t show any relationship between the indicator and activities in the financial markets. However, the indicator is valuable for its measurement of the long-term financial sustainability of the agricultural sector, or of the firms. The loan-to-value indicator does imply that most countries would have room to increase the credit.

Agricultural Labour Market Flexibility in the EU and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Document No. 49, June 2013

Factor markets that function well are a crucial condition for the competitiveness and growth of agriculture. Institutions and regulation may give rise to agricultural labour market heterogeneity, which could have important effects on the functioning of the labour market and other agricultural factor markets in EU member states. This paper first defines the institutional framework for the labour market, and then presents a brief literature review of previous studies of labour market institutional frameworks. Based on the literature, a survey to characterise agricultural labour markets was undertaken, which was implemented for a selection of EU27 and EU candidate countries, with responses based on expert opinion. The survey data were then used to construct indices of labour market flexibility/rigidity for the countries examined. These indices were used to make inter-country labour market comparisons and to draw inferences about the institutions and functioning of the agricultural labour market.

Sustainability, Resource Efficiency and Competitiveness. An Assessment of Resource Efficiency Policies in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Research Papers (BEER) 32/2015.

Addressing high and volatile natural resource prices, uncertain supply prospects, reindustrialization attempts and environmental damages related to resource use, resource efficiency has evolved into a highly debated proposal among academia, policy makers, firms and international financial institutions (IFIs). In 2011, the European Union (EU) declared resource efficiency as one of its seven flagship initiatives in its Europe 2020 strategy. This paper contributes to the discussions by assessing its key initiative, the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (EC 2011 571), following two streams of evaluation. In a first step, resource efficiency is linked to two theoretical frameworks regarding sustainability, (i) the sustainability triangle (consisting of economic, social and ecological dimensions) and (ii) balanced sustainability (combining weak and strong sustainability). Subsequently, both sustainability frameworks are used to assess to which degree the Roadmap follows the concept of sustainability. It can be concluded that it partially respects the sustainability triangle as well as balanced sustainability, primarily lacking a social dimension. In a second step, following Steger and Bleischwitz (2009), the impact of resource efficiency on competitiveness as advocated in the Roadmap is empirically evaluated. Using an Arellano–Bond dynamic panel data model reveals no robust impact of resource efficiency on competiveness in the EU between 2004 and 2009 – a puzzling result. Further empirical research and enhanced data availability are needed to better understand the impacts of resource efficiency on competitiveness on the macroeconomic, microeconomic and industry level. In that regard, strengthening the methodologies of resource indicators seem essential. Last but certainly not least, political will is required to achieve the transition of the EU-economy into a resource efficient future.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.