EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations? MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012

The outbreak of the Arab Spring and the unrest, revolution and war that followed during the course of 2011 have forced the EU to acknowledge the need to radically re-think its policy approach towards the Southern Mediterranean, including in the domain of migration. Migration and mobility now feature as key components of High Representative Catherine Ashton’s new framework for cooperation with the region (Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity), while the EU has declared its intention to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up “mutually beneficial” partnerships with third countries – so-called ‘Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security’ – now placed at the centre of the EU’s renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, the success of this approach and its potential to establish genuine cooperative partnerships that will support smooth economic and political transformation in North Africa hinge on the working arrangements and institutional configurations shaping the renewed GAMM at EU level which has long been marked by internal fragmentation, a lack of transparency and a predominance of home affairs and security actors. This paper investigates the development of the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean in a post-Lisbon Treaty institutional setting. It asks to what extent has the application of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of an “EU Foreign Minister” in High Representative Ashton, supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), remedied or re-invigorated the ideological and institutional struggles around the implementation of the Global Approach? Who are the principal agents shaping and driving the Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security? Who goes abroad to speak on the behalf of the EU in these Dialogues and what impact does this have on the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Dialogues under the renewed GAMM as well as the wider prospects for the Southern Mediterranean?

Preventing another Euro Area Crisis: EU Economic Governance ‘Six Pack’ – a case of too little, too late? Paper from the Colloquium: The Politics and Economics of the Euro Crisis, Institute for European Studies, University of Malta, 2 December 2011

Summary: The ‘Six Pack’ forms part of the economic governance reforms which are being implemented in order to prevent a repeat of the current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area. This legislative package involves strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact, with stronger financial sanctions and more focus on debt; a new directive on national budgetary frameworks and a new framework to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, the implementation of the ‘Six Pack’ also involves procedural reforms, in particular reverse majority voting, as well as more oversight by the European Parliament. Inter-institutional negotiations on the ‘Six Pack’ took over a year. In the meantime, the sovereign debt crisis had deepened and broadened, implying that the ‘Six Pack’ may have come ‘too late’. The ‘Six Pack’ has also proved to be ‘too little’ to address the crisis and by the time it entered into force, further measures and proposals to strengthen economic governance had to be made. Nevertheless, the ‘Six Pack’ comprises some positive developments. In particular, recognising that fiscal policy is a matter of national sovereignty, it sets a new approach which relies on institutional reforms at national level. As such, it constitutes a first, small step to improve economic governance in the Euro Area.

Turkey's boycott of the Cyprus EU presidency: context, meaning and its consequences. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 9, September 2012

In 2011 Turkish officials began indicating their intention to suspend all contact with Cyprus’s presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), slated for the second half of 2012, given the issues surrounding the unresolved Cyprus conflict. This came as the latest development in a long and arduous path of Turkey’s application for EU membership that began in 1987. This paper provides the context – the Cyprus conflict, Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and the Cyprus reunification talks – in understanding the reasons and consequences of Ankara’s boycott of the Cyprus presidency. The article also considers the evolving nature and the role of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, especially after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and how this may have played into Turkey’s calculations in calling for the boycott.

Why come here if I can go there? Assessing the ‘Attractiveness’ of the EU’s Blue Card Directive for ‘Highly Qualified’ Immigrants. Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 60, 14 October 2013

This paper analyses the attractiveness of the EU’s Blue Card Directive – the flagship of the EU’s labour immigration policy – for so-called ‘highly qualified’ immigrant workers from outside the EU. For this purpose, the paper deconstructs the understanding of ‘attractiveness’ in the Blue Card Directive as shaped by the various EU decision-making actors during the legislative process. It is argued that the Blue Card Directive sets forth minimum standards providing for a common floor – not a common ceiling: the Directive did not, as originally envisaged by the European Commission, create one European highly skilled admission scheme. This raises questions regarding its concrete use. A critical focus is placed on the personal scope of the Blue Card Directive and the level of rights offered, and a first comparative perspective on the implementation of the Directive in five member states is provided.

Eurasian integration. Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. OSW Study 44/2013

In 2009, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian prime minister, gave impetus to the establishment of closer relations within what was then a still narrow group of three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Russia was determined in embarking on the implementation of the principles of the Customs Union among these three states and, since 2012, within the Common Economic Space as well. This process of integration is intended to bring about the introduction of ‘four freedoms’ in this area: the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. From Moscow’s point of view, building up such integration structures is especially necessary in order to counteract the economic expansion of the European Union and China. It also feels it is important to take measures against the loosening of the bonds between the CIS countries and Russia. At the same time, close co-operation is expected to guarantee for Russia that the strong politico-economic influences in this area will be maintained. Despite the numerous limitations of the integration process, such as the small number of the participating states or limited progress in implementing the CES, this is still the most advanced integration programme in the region seen since the collapse of the USSR. Progress in putting the rules of the Customs Union into practice can be seen as a success for Moscow. In turn, the formation of the CES is still at an early stage, and it is difficult to determine at this point to what extent the three countries will harmonise their markets.

Closing financial institutions on both sides of the Atlantic: Are there differences in approach? CEPS Commentary, 25 February 2015

In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis both the EU and the US have implemented resolution procedures for their largest and most systemic financial institutions. This Commentary examines the main differences between the two frameworks. The EU framework allows, inter alia, action to prevent the failure of a credit institution, while the US regulatory framework requires that all systemic banks subject to resolution must be closed and resolved. The greater flexibility under the EU resolution framework allows action to be taken to preserve a credit institution without putting it through an insolvency process, which makes limiting moral hazard less obvious. Moreover, the scope of the EU framework is still narrow, since it does not allow the recovery of non-bank financial institutions, whereas the US framework does.

The Role of the European Union in the World. European Policy Brief No. 22, March 2014

Despite the hopes raised by the most recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in particular, the European Union has been unable to strengthen, let alone develop its role on the international stage. A couple of weeks away from the European Parliament elections, we need to ask ourselves what can reasonably be done by the upcoming Parliament to ensure that significant progress is made with respect to the EU’s foreign policy. Some of this progress could result from the implementation of the European Security Strategy or originate from the role and initiatives of the High Representative/Vice-president of the Commission. In addition, rethinking specific approaches could allow for significant improvements in key areas such as the EU’s dealings with neighbouring countries, its commercial relationship with the US, its energy security or its common security and defence policy.

The reform of the EU courts (II). Abandoning the management approach by doubling the General Court. Egmont Paper 83, March 2016

The 2011 proposal of the European Court of Justice aiming to increase the number of judges of the General Court has mutated after four years into a complete change of the EU judicial system. This long legislative debate was the first implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the judicial domain. It has revealed different problems – formal and substantial – of the approach of public service reform in the European institutions.