392 resultados para "Marrakesh Treaty"
Resumo:
[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”
Resumo:
[From the Introduction]. The EC Treaty in its present version contains a number of environmental principles. The following contribution will try to retrace the origins of these principles in the EC Treaty and how they were developed by the EC institutions and in particular by the Commission. This discussion concerns the principles of integration[1], prevention[2] and precaution[3], the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source[4] and the polluter-pays principle[ 5].
Resumo:
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty between Germany and France, CEPS Director Daniel Gros acknowledges the fundamental contribution made by the Franco-German motor but also takes the two countries to task for their refusal abandon the pretence that they still perform individually an independent role at the global level. France and Germany should allow European institutions to formulate and implement common external policies.
Resumo:
Despite several daunting obstacles, the low expectations and the high level of apprehension that accompanied the start of the Cyprus Presidency, Thomas Linders and Steven Blockmans find in a new CEPS Commentary that the small, remote and politically divided island nevertheless succeeded in scoring a number of positive results, thanks in part to the country’s pragmatic approach to the job and the perpetual motion of the EU legislature. As a corrective instrument to big state politics in the EU, however, the role of the Presidency remains limited. This underscores the changed nature of the rotating Presidency of the the Council of the EU since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Despite several daunting obstacles, the low expectations and the high level of apprehension that accompanied the start of the Cyprus Presidency, this CEPS Commentary by Thomas Linders and Steven Blockmans expresses surprise that the small, remote and politically divided island succeeded in scoring a number of positive results at all, thanks in part to the country’s pragmatic approach to the job
Resumo:
Finding that the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) currently lacks a strategic vision that would offer states in the southern Mediterranean substantial returns in exchange for making tough reforms, this CEPS Commentary suggests that this weakness can be overcome through a concrete prospect of regional integration pro-actively driven forward by the European Union. Taking inspiration from current projects such as the Energy Community Treaty, the authors urge the EU to explicitly incorporate “legally binding sectoral multilateralism” into the ENP. This would provide the Union’s partners with a tangible prospect of reaping real long-term benefits from EU cooperation and reinvigorate the ENP for the next decade.
Resumo:
The European Council has outlined the creation of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complementing the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The thinking on the SRM’s legal basis, design and mission is still preliminary and depends on other major initiatives, including the European Stability Mechanism’s involvement in bank recapitalisations and the Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) Directive. The SRM should also not be seen as the final step creating Europe’s future banking union. Both the BRR Directive and the SRM should be designed to enable the substantial financial participation of existing creditors in future bank restructurings. To be effective, the SRM should empower a central body. However, in the absence of Treaty change and of further fiscal integration, SRM decisions will need to be implemented through national resolution regimes. The central body of the SRM should be either the European Commission, or a new authority. This legislative effort should not be taken as an excuse to delay decisive action on the management and resolution of the current European banking fragility, which imposes a major drag on Europe’s growth and employment.
Resumo:
Despite apparent consensus that the creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress is painfully slow. The Single Supervisory Mechanism may not be ready before the middle of next year, the Single Resolution Mechanism may require a laborious change of the EU Treaty and common deposit insurance has been postponed into the indefinite future. Any real progress has been prevented by the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of past bad loans. In this Policy Brief, Thomas Mayer suggests that a radically new approach is needed if there is any prospect of moving beyond this impasse to reach full Banking Union. Instead of trying to move from common bank supervision over to resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he argues that policy-makers should go backwards and start with deposit insurance, move from there to resolution, and end with supervision.
Resumo:
This Policy Brief urges the European Union to consider reinforcing the Energy Community by further Europeanising the Energy Community Treaty. It argues that the level of dysfunctionality with respect to the rule of law and corruption will make it very hard to establish a pathway for accession for most Balkan states. However, the demand across the region for a sustainable, competitive and stable energy sector creates an ‘energy incentive’ that the Union can leverage to improve the rule of law and adherence to European rules. Furthermore, a juridical strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty will also strengthen the hand of those parties supporting energy liberalisation rules across the region, such as independent businesses, consumers and NGOs. In addition, there is likely to be significant spill-over effects from decisions of a European Energy Community Court operating in the region on the rule of law in general and the accession process in particular.
Resumo:
The Dutch government set out the results of its review of EU competences on June 21st, under the slogan “European where necessary, national where possible”, claiming that the EU does not adequately respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. It published a list of 54 points for corrective action, which Michael Emerson assesses in this new CEPS Commentary. The political significance of this initiative is heightened because it comes alongside the UK's ongoing review of EU competences, although unlike the British, the Dutch make no mention of secession, treaty changes or repatriation of competences.
Resumo:
The article describes and assesses the role of national parliaments in EU legislation considering the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This is closely connected with the understanding and (political) application of the principle of subsidiarity. After an analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the relevant legal regulations in the post-Lisbon age, alternative ways for participation of national legislators on the European level are being scrutinized and proposed. The issue of democratic legitimization is also interconnected with the current political reforms being discussed in order to overcome the Euro Crisis. Finally, the authors argue that it does not make sense to include national parliaments in the existing legislative triangle of the EU, but instead to promote the creation of a new kind of supervisory body.
Resumo:
The EU has tried to bridge decision making by qualified majority and unanimity over the years by expanding qualified majorities (consensus) or by making unanimities easier to achieve. I call this decision-making procedure q-“unanimity” and trace its history from the Luxembourg compromise to the Lisbon Treaty, and to more recent agreements. I analyze the most recent and explicit mechanism of this bridging (article 31 (2) of the Lisbon Treaty) and identify one specific means by which the transformation of qualified majorities to unanimities is achieved: the reduction of precision or scope of the decision, so that different behaviors can be covered by it. I provide empirical evidence of such a mechanism by analyzing legislative decisions. Finally, I argue that this bridging is a ubiquitous feature of EU institutions, used in Treaties as well as in legislative decision-making.
Resumo:
This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. One innovative element of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). At the time, this was sometimes hailed as a fundamental change in the European institutional system. A few years after the entry into force of the Treaty, however, much less is heard about this “first truly transnational instrument of modern direct democracy”, this “revolution in disguise”, this “very innovative and symbolic” provision. This could seem surprising at first sight. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the implementation of this provision has been remarkably rapid. Meanwhile, new arguments have risen concerning the lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and the lack of connection between the European institutions and the citizens.
Resumo:
For more than 10 years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the question of the protection of human rights had never been in issue. The emphasis was on the creation and consolidation of the common market establishing the free movement of persons, of services, of goods and of capital. Neither the initial Treaties nor the jurisprudence of the Court made any reference to the protection of human rights in the process of the creation of the common market. It all started in 1969 in the Stauder case with this very short sentence: “Interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”. Forty years later, with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009, fundamental rights are part of primary law. The achievement has been remarkable if we consider the very beginning of the process. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Court with its jurisprudence has been the driving force and the source of inspiration for this achievement.
Resumo:
In order to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the establishment of European Union citizenship under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the year 2013 has been designated by the European Commission as the ‘European Year of Citizens’. The European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI) – labelled by the Commission as a ‘direct gateway through which citizens can make their voices heard in Brussels’ - may emerge in the European awareness as a new appealing platform for policy-shaping and communication. The ECI, through its transnational vox civilis character, figures among the most important novelties in the Lisbon Treaty and in the long run may facilitate and accelerate the bottom-up building of a European demos. The question is, however, whether the mechanism of pan-European signature collection is strong enough to face the democratic challenges present in the EU, especially during the ongoing financial crisis.