The Impact of Spain’s Economic and Political Crisis on the European Elections. EPIN Commentaries No. 17, 2 April 2014

Despite the emergence of a critical debate against the EU-imposed austerity measures both at the level of the political elites and on the street, this EPIN Commentary by two Spanish political scientists based in Barcelona finds no sign that the upcoming European elections will have a more European focus than any of the previous ones. While there is no anti-European discourse among the Spanish mainstream political parties, they report that public trust in the European institutions is plummeting and Spanish turnout in European elections has been dropping in the last few years. In the authors’ view, the main reason for this is the low level of awareness of the functioning of the European Parliament but some responsibility also lies with the Spanish political parties and the way they deal with the electoral campaign to mobilise the discontented voters, who consider unemployment and the economic situation as the two most important issues that the country is facing at the moment.

EU integration and party politics in the Balkans. EPC Issue Paper No.77, September 2014

Throughout the Balkan region, popularly elected leaders consistently fail to meet the democratic standards set by the EU and, more importantly, they fall short of their voters’ expectations. Distrust in representative institutions and disengagement from political life runs dramatically high among the people of the Balkan countries, and this generalised sense of dissatisfaction is starting to breed cynicism also towards the idea of a better future inside the Union. This study highlights the interplay between EU integration and national politics in the region, and that both are consequential for the quality of Balkan democracies, as well as reminiscent of the Western and Central and Eastern European experience.

Migration and War Memory in a European Perspective A Case-Study on Displaced Persons in Belgium. Natolin Research Paper 05/2011

In the aftermath of World War II, about 20,000 people who had experienced displacement entered Belgium.1 Among those there were about 350 soldiers serving in the Polish armed forces in the West, and about 4,000 ostarbeiterinnen - young female Soviet citizens who were deported to Nazi Germany to do forced labour. All the soldiers and Soviet women married Belgian citizens, and most settled in the home town or city of their spouses. This paper focuses on the war memories of these migrants in post-war life, memories that were arguably shaped not only by the characteristics of their war experiences themselves, but also by the changing positions which they held within their home and host societies. Following the migrants from their moment of settlement until today, the article highlights the changing dynamics of their war memories over time, starting during the Cold War era and ending up in present day Europe. As such, the study finds itself on the crossroads of memory and migration studies, two academic disciplines that only recently started to dialogue with each other.2 Before analysing the arrival, settlement and war memories of the Displaced Persons at study, I give an interpretation of academic literature on memory of World War II from the perspective of migration studies.

The resource wealth burden - oil and gas sectors in the former USSR. OSW Study 12/2003

The former USSR area plays a great role in the international oil and gas market. Russia is a real gas giant, with the richest deposits of this material in the world. Russia is also the main exporter of natural gas to many European countries. Keeping a strong position in this market remains a priority for the Russian Federation's economic policy. Europe is a very attractive region because its demand for gas is expected to grow steadily, while its own gas production keeps decreasing. In the long term, the Far East will be an important market for Russian exports, too. According to estimates, demand there will grow even faster than in Europe. Caspian gas producers, for the time being, can not really compete with Russia in this field, and this status quo will most probably be preserved in the nearest future.

Is Independence Possible in an Interdependent World? Scotland vs. the UK's Participation in the European Economy. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 30/2013

Many commentators have criticised the strategy used to finance regional governments such as the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system and the limited amount of fiscal autonomy devised in the Scotland Act of 2012. This lecture sets out to identify what level of autonomy or independence would best suit a regional economy in a currency union, and also the institutional changes needed to sustain those arrangements. Our argument is developed along three lines. First, we set out the advantages of a fiscal federalism framework and the institutions needed to support it, but which the Euro-zone currently lacks. The second is to elaborate a model of fiscal federalism where comprehensive powers of taxation and spending are devolved (an independent Scotland and the UK remain constituent members of the EU and European economy). Third, we evaluate the main arguments for the breakup of nations or economic unions with Scotland and the UK as leading examples. We note that greater autonomy may not result in increases in long run economic growth rate, but it does imply that enhancing the fiscal competence and responsibility of regional governments would result in productivity gains and hence higher levels of GDP per head. That means the population is permanently richer than before, even if ultimately their incomes continue to grow at the same rate. It turns out that these improvements can be achieved through devolved tax powers, but not through devolved spending powers or shared taxes.

Efficient taxation of multi-national enterprises in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 5/2003

Current arrangements for multi-national company taxation in EU are plagued by severe conceptual and administrative problems, leading to high compliance costs, considerable uncertainty and ample room for abuse. Integration is amplifying these difficulties. There are two possible approaches in designing an efficient trans-border corporate tax system for the European Union. The first is to consolidate the EU-wide operations of MNEs, using an agreed common base as the reference variable, and then to apportion this total tax base using some presumptive indicators of activity in each tax jurisdiction – hence, implicitly, of the likely benefits stemming from each location. The apportionment formula should respect requisites of neutrality between productive factors and forms of corporate financing. A radically different approach is also available that offers considerable advantages in terms of efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation, including full administrative autonomy of national tax authorities. It entails abandoning corporate income as the relevant tax base and taxing at a moderate rate some agreed measure of business activity such as company value added, sales or employment. These are the variables usually considered in formula apportionment, but they would apply directly without having first to go through the complications of EU-wide consolidation based on a common-base definition. Reference to a broad base, with no exemptions or deductions, would allow to set low statutory rates.

Necessary desirability: The inherent contradiction in the European system. EuropEos Commentary No. 11, 9 June 2011

In all political systems there is a gap between the rhetoric of electoral programmes and the practical work of institutions, argues author Riccardo Perissich, but the ‘vision thing’ is often a necessary prerequisite to reaching difficult decisions. When it comes to European institutions, which include the member states acting collectively, the desirable vision – the goal of European unity – has always been there and is still very much alive. Also, the existence of a broadly defined political goal has often facilitated agreements that were in fact purely necessary. However, because we lack a pan-European constituency to debate it, the narrative about this goal has been translated into different languages and is all but common. In fact, we have never seriously tried to unify it. Indeed, Europeans stopped debating what is desirable a long time ago: they simply react to events.