Why the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is bad for you: a letter to the EU. Research Papers in Law, 5/2006

From the Introduction. The aim of the present “letter” is to provoke, rather than to prove. It is intended to further stimulate the – already well engaged – scientific dialogue on the open method of coordination (OMC).1 This explains why some of the arguments put forward are not entirely new, while others are overstretched. This contribution, belated as it is entering into the debate, has the benefit of some hindsight. This hindsight is based on three factors (in chronological order): a) the fact that the author has participated himself as a member of a national delegation in one of the OMC-induced benchmarking exercises (only to see the final evaluation report getting lost in the Labyrinth of the national bureaucracy, despite the fact that it contained an overall favorable assessment), as well as in a OECD led exercise of coordination, concerning regulatory reform; b) the extremely rich and knowledgeable academic input, offering a very promising theoretical background for the OMC; and c) some recent empirical research as to the efficiency of the OMC, the accounts of which are, to say the least, ambiguous. This recent empirical research grounds the basic assumption of the present paper: that the OMC has only restricted, if not negligible, direct effects in the short term, while it may have some indirect effects in the medium-long term (2). On the basis of this assumption a series of arguments against the current “spread” of the OMC will be put forward (3). Some proposals on how to neutralize some of the shortfalls of the OMC will follow (4).

Que reste-t-il de la directive sur les services? = What remains of the Services Directive? Research Papers in Law, 5/2007

No abstract.

Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform? Research Papers in Law, 5/2008

From the Introduction. This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases.