Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the Labyrinth. CEPS Working Document No. 370, October 2012

Private governance is currently being evoked as a viable solution to many public policy goals. However, in some circumstances it has shown to produce more harm than good, and even disastrous consequences as in the case of the financial crisis that is raging in most advanced economies. Although the current track record of private regulatory schemes is mixed, policy guidance documents around the world still require that policy-makers give priority to self- and co-regulation, with little or no additional guidance being given to policymakers to devise when, and under what circumstances, these solutions can prove viable from a public policy perspective. With an array of examples from several policy fields, this paper approaches regulation as a public-private collaborative form and attempts to identify possible policy tools to be applied by public policy-makers to efficiently and effectively approach private governance as a solution, rather than a problem. We propose a six-step theoretical framework and argue that IA techniques should: i) define an integrated framework including both the possibility that private regulation can be used as an alternative or as a complement to public legislation; ii) involve private parties in public IAs in order to define the best strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement of the regulatory objectives; and iii) contemplate the deployment of indicators related to governance and activities of the regulators and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes with other regulators.

Shale Gas and the EU Internal Gas Market: Beyond the Hype and Hysteria. CEPS Working Document No. 369, September 2012

This paper analyses the interplay between shale gas and the EU internal gas market. Drawing on data presented in the 2012 International Energy Agency’s report on unconventional gas and additional scenario analyses performed by the Joint Research Centre, the paper is based on the assumption that shale gas will not fundamentally change the EU’s dependence on foreign gas supplies. It argues that attention should be shifted away from hyping shale gas to completing the internal gas market. Two main reasons are given for this. First, the internal gas market is needed to enable shale gas development in countries where there is political support for shale gas extraction. And second, a well-functioning internal gas market would, arguably, contribute much more to Europe’s security of supply than domestic shale gas exploitation. This has important implications for the shale gas industry. As it is hard to see how subsidies or exemptions from environmental legislation could be justified, shale gas development in Europe will only go ahead if it proves to be both economically and environmentally viable. It is thus up to the energy industry to demonstrate that this is the case.