Gagauzia: growing separatism in Moldova? OSW Commentary No. 129, 10.03.2014

On 2 February, the regional authorities in Gagauzia - an autonomous region of the Republic of Moldova - carried out two simultaneous referenda. In the first, local residents were asked to declare their support for the country’s integration either with the EU or with the Moscow-led Customs Union (CU); the second referendum sought their opinion on the draft law “On the deferred status of the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia”. Under the proposed legislation, if Moldova were to lose its sovereignty (for example, through the unification of Moldova and Romania, or even as some politicians have argued, through Moldova’s further integration with the EU), the autonomous region would automatically become the independent Republic of Gagauzia. As expected, the outcome of the vote has shown overwhelming support for both the CU and for the draft law. According to the figures released by Gagauzia’s Central Electoral Commission, 98.5% of the voters supported Moldova’s integration with the Customs Union, while 98% voted in favour of the ‘deferred independence’ bill. Support for closer integration with the EU was marginal, reaching just over 2%. Despite the one-sided outcome of the referendum, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the ballot was rigged. It should also be noted that voter turnout was very high, reaching about 70%. Representatives of the Moldovan Central Electoral Commission, however, believe that the figure may have been artificially inflated by excluding many of the voters currently residing abroad from the count.

Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine's internal diversity. OSW Point of View Number 40, March 2014

Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country’s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ‘sub-Ukraines’ has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country’s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine – separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula.

Chechnya: Between a Caucasian Jihad and ‘hidden’ separatism. OSW Point of View, January 2007

1. Even though Chechnya remains the most unstable republic in the Russian North Caucasus, the open armed conflict known as the Second Chechen War, which broke out in the autumn of 1999, is gradually dying down. 2. Several years ago, the conflict in Chechnya could have been characterised as a war between Chechen separatists and the government of the Russian Federation. However, the nature of the conflict has changed significantly over the last four or five years. 3. Even though the intensity of fighting in Chechnya has abated in recent years, the conflict has spilt over to the other Caucasus republics such as Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. As a result, this is presently not so much a Chechen conflict as a regional clash between the authorities and the Caucasian (including Chechen) Islamists. 4. The Chechen militants are weaker now, and the conflict has changed from a struggle for national liberation into a fight for the Islamic cause; but this does not mean that Russia has ultimately solved the problem of Chechen separatism.

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

Separatism, Globalization, and the European Union. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 1, February 2015

Globalization is both an integrative and deconstructive process. Globalization integrates states and non-state actors into transnational and global networks (Keohane & Nye, 2000, p. 105). These networks are based on multiple channels of interdependence that include trade, politics, security, environment, and socio-cultural ties (pp. 106-107). Due to advances in telecommunications technology, the expansion of globalization “shrinks” the distance between peoples (p. 105). On the other hand, globalization can also break up the existing political and social order (Mathews, 1997, p. 50). Globalization disperses power and information flows, thus enabling local and transnational identity movements to challenge states (pp. 51-52). This can be exemplified by separatist movements that seek to break away from central authorities.

Selbstbestimmung und Parteien in Südtirol: Territoriale und europäische Parteistrategien zwischen Autonomie und Sezession = Self-determination and parties in South Tyrol: Territorial and European party strategies between autonomy and secession. EDAP Paper 03/2016 03/2016

Since the final conflict settlement between Italy and Austria in 1992, ethnic politics in South Tyrol experienced insightful transformations. The consociational political system, which was implemented to tame centrifugal tendencies, has been losing its balance over the last decade, with proautonomy stances ceding ground to secessionist pressure in the Germanspeaking intra-ethnic arena. Adopting a contextual and strategic perspective on self-determination, this article traces the evolution of ethno-regionalist party strategies on the territorial and European dimension of party competition through a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of their electoral manifestos in the period between 1993 and 2013. In line with newest research on party strategies, the article empirically shows the strategic capacity of ethnic minority parties to challenge each other not only by shifting their positions on the different issue dimensions but also by the reframing of issues. While the increasing competition on the center-periphery axis leads to a new territorial frame, the rise of secessionism is accompagned by an end to the pro-European elite consensus.