EU Trade Actors after Lisbon: Enhanced Negotiations or Business as Usual? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 32, November 2013

As seen by the launching of trade negotiations with Japan and the United States, the European Union has shifted gears in order to achieve amplified benefits in bilateral trade agreements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought the European Parliament and the European External Action Service into the picture as new actors in trade negotiations. The question arises if the new framework of trade negotiations is better off than the pre-Lisbon era. By applying Veto Players theory to the Central American Association Agreement and Principal-Agent theory to the Ukrainian Association Agreement, two results were concluded. First, the participation of the European Parliament as a veto player has decreased the effectiveness of trade negotiation. Second, the participation of the European External Action Service has shown the contrary, namely an increase of effectiveness in trade negotiations.

EU actorness and effectiveness under political pressure at the Copenhagen climate change negotiations

This paper analyses the extent of European Union (EU) actorness and effectiveness at the fifteenth United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. For over a decade the European Union has been characterised as a leader in international climate policy-making and as an important actor in international climate change negotiations. The COP15 meeting in Copenhagen has overall brought about disappointing outcomes, especially from the perspective of the European Union. This casts doubts on EU leadership and begs the question of what has happened to EU actorness and effectiveness in this field. In terms of actorness we take Jupille and Caporaso (1998) as a point of departure and then specify a more parsimonious actorness framework that consists of cohesion and autonomy. Effectiveness (i.e. goal attainment) is seen as conceptually separate from actorness. Effectiveness is conceptualised as the result of actorness conditioned by the ‘opportunity structure’, i.e. the external context (of other actors, events and ideas) that enables or constrains EU actions. We hold that the EU’s actorness has been only moderate, especially given somewhat limited preference cohesion. In terms of the opportunity structure in Copenhagen we argue that the high degree of politicisation constrained the EU’s ability to negotiate and thus to attain its goals. Another external factor that had a substantial adverse impact on the EU’s effectiveness at the Copenhagen negotiations was the strong involvement of other actors with rather different positions, namely the United States (US) and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China).

The TTIP negotiations: a Pirandello play

Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and the European Policy Centre during which experts, including Pascal Lamy, honorary president of Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and former Director of the WTO explored the key issues of the current Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. What are the geoeconomic and geostrategic goals of the negotiations? What are the rules of the negotiations? Who are the main players? What impact might TTIP have on world trade?

Divided but United: European Trade Policy & EC-U.S. Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.3, 1996

How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.

Investor-State Dispute Resolution as an Issue in Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: Lessons from NAFTA. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 3, August 2015

A major issue in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations is investor-state dispute resolution as it relates to foreign investments. The United States would like to have strong investor protections similar to those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) included in the TTIP agreement. Civil society groups on both sides of the Atlantic object to binding arbitration of investment disputes, fearing that arbitration awards could endanger environmental and other types of regulations. This paper examines the experience with investor-state dispute resolution under NAFTA to determine whether judgments rendered in these cases have had adverse effects.