The electoral success of the Svoboda Party - the consequences for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 97, 2012-11-26

The All-Ukrainian Association ‘Svoboda’ scored an unexpected success in the parliamentary elections, winning support from over 10% of the voters and entering the select group of Ukrainian parliamentary parties which operate at a national level. Svoboda’s manifesto is nationalist and anti-liberal, in both economic and political aspects. It is in fact the anti-liberal component of this party’s manifesto which it can thank for achieving such a big electoral success. The faction formed by Svoboda’s 37 representatives in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) will have a small impact on legislative work, but their activity may add further to the brutalisation of parliamentary life. Furthermore, Svoboda will attempt to make other opposition groupings adopt a more radical approach, which may trigger the disintegration of the United Opposition Baktivshchyna. A new wave of public protests is likely to emerge in Ukraine in the coming months. Therefore, it can be expected that Svoboda will make efforts to join in or even incite them, in order to promote its social and nationalist messages. This may contribute to increasing the popularity of nationalist ideas and to a further radicalisation of sentiments in Ukraine.

The Economics of Subsidies for R&D: The Intrinsic Difficulty of Determining Optimum Subsidies and Implications for Reform of EU State Aid Rules on R&D. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 26/February 2013

The European Commission is reforming state aid rules. An important element of the reform is to prevent the granting of excessive subsidies. This paper shows that the determination of the optimum subsidy for research is difficult. What appears to be the socially optimum level of research effort depends on the benchmark of comparison and whether this benchmark is the situation before subsidies or the situation after subsidies. In the presence of asymmetric information, policy makers should induce firms to reveal their true costs and should grant subsidies to the relatively more efficient firms by allocating subsidies not on a first-come-first- serve basis but through a competitive process. However, competitive selection of subsidy recipients is not a panacea as it may not be possible to be effectively used in all cases and for all research programmes. This is because in principle public subsidies should support those programmes with the largest value for society, rather than with the lowest costs. Although this paper focuses on R&D, its findings are relevant to any subsidy whose aim is to remedy market failure caused by positive externalities.