The relief of Vienna in vain. Assessing the Implications of Turkish EU-membership for Council of Ministers’ Decision-making. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2011

This research forecasts the implications of Turkish membership for decision-making effectiveness and dynamics within the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU). Effectiveness is determined in this research by 'passage probability': the chance that a random proposal as put forth by the European Commission (EC) is accepted by the Council of Ministers. Dynamics are determined by means of the Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI), which plots power values of individual member states by forecasting a number of possible EU enlargement scenarios. This study falsifies earlier research by Baldwin and Widgrén.1 It finds that the implications of Turkish EU-membership for EU decision-making efficiency are ambiguous and depend on the number of other candidate states entering the EU alongside Turkey, as well as the timeslot - 2014 or 2020 - at which the accession would take place. Moreover, this study asserts that Turkish EU-accession would result in unequal- but generally negative - power changes among other EU member states, although member states with similar demographic weight will experience comparable changes. Finally, it appears that the larger a EU member state is, the more power it loses if Turkey would join the EU.

The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.

The Greek debt trap: an escape plan. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/19, 7 November 2012

Without corrective measures, Greek public debt will exceed 190 percent of GDP, instead of peaking at the anyway too-high target ratio of 167 percent of GDP of the March 2012 financial assistance programme. The rise is largely due to a negative feedback loop between high public debt and the collapse in GDP, and endangers Greek membership of the euro area. But a Greek exit would have devastating impacts both inside and outside Greece. A small reduction in the interest rate on bilateral loans, the exchange of European Central Bank holdings, buy-back of privately-held debt, and frontloading of some privatisation receipts are unlikely to be sufficient. A credible resolution should involve the reduction of the official lending rate to zero until 2020, an extension of the maturity of all official lending, and indexing the notional amount of all official loans to Greek GDP. Thereby, the debt ratio would fall below 100 percent of GDP by 2020, and if the economy deteriorates further, there will not be a need for new arrangements. But if growth is better than expected, official creditors will also benefit. In exchange for such help, the fiscal sovereignty of Greece should be curtailed further. An extended privatisation plan and future budget surpluses may be used to pay back the debt relief. The Greek fiscal tragedy highlights the need for a formal debt restructuring mechanism