22 resultados para financial instruments
Resumo:
Since the Arab uprisings of 2011, European Union (EU) assistance has nominally targeted more resources to supporting democracy movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The EU has better equipped itself institutionally, financially and conceptually, by strengthening its bottom up grassroots approach to democracy support; resources earmarked for supporting civil society have been increased, the budget for the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has been beefed up, and the strengthened EU Delegations have be come more empowered to reach out to groups at the local grass roots level behind democracy activities; The European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was created with the mandate to support individuals and organizations in neighbouring countries that work for democracy. Whether this translates into a more effective strategy for democracy support, however, remains to be seen. In this report, Rosa Balfour, Francesca Fabbri and Richard Youngs present a detailed overview of the support given to civil society in the MENA region by the EU, with a special focus on the various financial instruments used.
Resumo:
The euro crisis has forced member states and the EU institutions to create a series of new instruments to safeguard macro-financial stability of the Union. This study describes the status of existing instruments, the role of the European Parliament and how the use of the instruments impinges on the EU budget also through their effects on national budgets. In addition, it presents a survey of other possible instruments that have been proposed in recent years (e.g. E-bonds and eurobonds), in order to provide an assessment of how EU macro-financial stability assistance could evolve in the future and what could be its impact on EU public finances.
Resumo:
Over the past five years, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets have received heightened regulatory attention, due to their opaqueness, size and interconnectedness, with a view to improving the robustness, safety and resilience of this market segment. There has been continued progress in the follow-up to the G-20 commitments, with the EU (EMIR, MIFID II, CRD/CRR IV, MAD) and the US (Swap Execution Facility or SEF, Title VII of Dodd-Frank Act, Basel III) leading in the implementation timelines and capturing approximately 80-90% of the overall market. Based on the data compiled for the yearly ECMI Statistical Package, this commentary provides a snapshot of the current status of the global OTC derivatives markets by: i) identifying general trends over the past decade, ii) looking at the changes in the market structure (instruments and participants), iii) estimating the uncollateralised derivatives exposure and iv) examining the relationship between OTC derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives (ETD).
Resumo:
The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.
Resumo:
From the start of 2016, new rules for bank resolution are in place – as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) – across the EU, and a new authority (the Single Resolution Board, or SRB) is fully operational for resolving all banks in the eurozone. The implementation issues of the new regime are enormous. Banks need to develop recovery plans, and authorities need to create resolution plans as well as set the minimum required amount of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for each bank. But given the diversity in bank structures and instruments at EU and global level, this will be a formidable challenge, above all with respect to internationally active banks. In order to explore ways in which the authorities and banks can meet this challenge, CEPS formed a Task Force composed of senior experts on banking sector reform and chaired by Thomas Huertas, Partner and Chair, EY Global Regulatory Network. This report contains its policy recommendations.
Resumo:
This paper discusses the application of the new European rules for burden-sharing and bail-in in the banking sector, in view of their ability to accommodate broader policy goals of aggregate financial stability. It finds that the Treaty principles and the new discipline of state aid and the restructuring of banks provide a solid framework for combating moral hazard and removing incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking by bankers. However, the application of the new rules may have become excessively attentive to the case-by-case evaluation of individual institutions, while perhaps losing sight of the aggregate policy needs of the banking system. Indeed, in this first phase of the banking union, while large segments of the EU banking sector still require a substantial restructuring and recapitalisation, the market may not be able to provide all the needed resources in the current environment of depressed profitability and low growth. Thus, a systemic market failure may be making the problem impossible to fix without resorting to temporary public support. But the risk of large write-offs of capital instruments due to burden-sharing and bail-in may represent an insurmountable obstacle to such public support as it may set in motion an investors’ flight. The paper concludes by showing that existing rules do contain the flexibility required to accommodate aggregate policy requirements in the general interest, and outlines a public support scheme for the precautionary recapitalisation of solvent banks that would be compliant with EU law.